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Reflexive Statement 1. 
 
My involvement with problematic drinkers began while working as a volunteer for a 
charity dealing with the homeless.   What became quickly apparent was the not 
inconsiderable number of ‘street homeless’ individuals addicted to alcohol who were 
the most challenging of all clients.   In the majority of cases, these individuals’ 
alcohol and housing problems were compounded by a variety of psychiatric problems, 
learning difficulties and poor physical health.   Initially, my response to this client 
group was one of confusion and mixed feelings.   On the one hand, I would feel 
frustrated by the impression many of these clients gave of not willing to help 
themselves, while at the same time I was angered by the hostile reaction of services 
meant to help.   In particular, my experience was that mental health services had 
washed their hands of this group.   The comment of one community psychiatric nurse 
to me summed up the attitude I generally encounter when attempting to secure some 
form of treatment “Too difficult, too smelly”.     At this point I resolved to ‘treat’ 
them myself.   That decision has culminated in the position I find myself today, a 
trainee counselling psychologist working, in the main, with drug and alcohol 
dependent people. 
 
These early experiences have shaped my views about alcohol use.   For example, I 
was struck by the overwhelming number of men who were alcohol dependent 
compared with women.   This observation led me to believe that there are obvious 
differences in male and female drinking behaviour.   Consequently, I came to this 
research with an awareness of my own confirmation bias.   There is a vast literature 
on alcohol use so the ease with which subtle confirmatory selections can be made is a 
trap I am keen to avoid.   However, it is still true to say that my presuppositions in this 
regard have influenced the hypotheses generated for this research.   Those hypotheses 
are openly couched in terms of potential sex differences so the line between my 
examination of the field and my own beliefs is, arguably, blurred.    Managing the 
conflict between presupposition and exploration will, to a large extent, be met through 
the use of a quantitative design.   Hypotheses will be accepted or rejected based on 
standard statistical techniques.   However, the pressure to find and report evidence 
that might contradict my personal assumptions might lead to less relevant material 
just to satisfy my sense of fairness.  
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Allied to the point about assumptions, is the observation about the degree to which I 
feel comfortable with abductive logic.   I am cognisant of my own preference for the 
‘Eysenckian’ confirmatory rather than explanatory approaches to enquiry and which 
has had an influence on the design chosen for this study.   That position, however, 
will be fully exposed in the methodology section. 
 
I am also aware of my own, perhaps, crusading approach might lead me to be 
selective about the participants for this study.   My intention, therefore, is to allow the 
participating branches of Crime Reduction Initiative (the organisation cooperating 
with the research) to select the participants and eliminate any conscious or non-
conscious selection on my part.   Of course, that approach might involve someone 
else’s biases but they won’t be mine.    
 
Finally, I expect to feel some frustration if the general path of results appears to going 
away from the position I expect.   I need to monitor my feelings as I progress and 
make an honest judgement about their impact on both myself and the research. 
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Abstract. 
 
Background – The Marlatt model of alcohol treatment (Marlatt & Gordon, 1986) is 
widespread.  A key component of that model is alcohol expectancies.  Alcohol 
expectancies refer to the effects of alcohol use anticipated by individuals.   
Metacognitive beliefs about alcohol are considered to be a specific form of alcohol 
expectancy (Spada, Moneta, & Wells).   The present study argues that development of 
a triphasic metacognitive formulation for problematic drinking (Spada, Caselli, & 
Wells, 2012) represents the single most important advance in alcohol treatment since 
the advent of the Marlatt model.  The formulation postulates that a reduction in 
positive and negative alcohol metacognitive beliefs leads to a reduction in alcohol 
use.   A crucial element of the metacognitive formulation is attention allocation 
(Steele & Josephs, 1990).   Internally generated conflict, such as gender role conflict 
(O’Neil, 1981), it is hypothesised, can disrupt attention allocation thereby reducing 
efficacy of metacognitive treatment.  Method – a clinical sample of 102 (male, 74; 
female, 28) completed the Positive Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (PAM), Negative 
Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (NAM), Gender Role Conflict Scale (GRCS) and the 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT). Results – regression analysis 
indicated that gender role conflict moderated the relationship between positive 
alcohol metacognitions and alcohol use in men but not in women.  Similar results 
were obtained for the GRCS subscale ‘Restricted Emotionality’.   Conclusions – 
Findings have implications for gender sensitive interventions in both the Marlatt 
model generally and metacognitive therapy specifically. 
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Gender Role Conflict and Alcohol Metacognitions: Implications for the Marlatt 
Model of Relapse Prevention. 
 
1.   Introduction. 
It is pertinent in beginning this review to ask why alcohol relapse is important.   
Perhaps the most common answer is that relapse is such a frequent event that 
alcoholism has been described as a chronic relapsing disease (Becker, 2008).   
Indeed, if relapse is defined as a return to pre abstinence levels of alcohol 
consumption then there is considerable evidence to support this view.   Within one 
year of treatment for alcohol abuse or dependence between 50 and 80 per cent of 
individuals will resume drinking at hazardous levels (Armour, Polich & Stambul, 
1978; Monahan & Finney, 1996; Miller & Tonigan, 2001); while non hazardous 
levels of drinking can be as high as 90 per cent (Orford & Edwards, 1977).   More 
importantly, multiple alcohol withdrawals and relapse have been associated with 
significant increases in craving (Malcolm, Roberts, Wang, Myrick & Anton, 2000).   
This implies that failing to prevent alcohol relapse might exacerbate the very problem 
for which individuals initially sought help. 
The poor prognosis for those seeking treatment might contribute to the reason why 
only 63,000 individuals entered specialist alcohol misuse programmes in 2004-04 out 
of the estimated 1.6m in England alone thought to be alcohol dependent (Drummond, 
Oyefeso,  & Phillips, 2005; McManus, Meltzer, Brugha, Bebbington & Jenkins, 
2009).    Also contributing to the problem of alcohol dependence and relapse is its 
complex aetiology.   Factors such as family history, psychological phenomena, 
personality, psychiatric co morbidity, stress and life events and cultural concerns are 
thought to be involved in dependence and relapse (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, 2010).   However, it can be argued that this very complexity is why 
alcohol relapse is relevant to Counselling Psychology practice.   This is because if 
Counselling Psychology is to emphasise an approach where “The individual can be 
seen as existing at the centre of a personal matrix in which biology, social structure, 
and life events combine with developmental processes to present each individual, at 
any one time, with a unique set of challenges” (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2003), then 
the complex nature of alcohol relapse surely falls within this ambit.       
Research into relapse, Allsop & Saunders (1989) argue, did not gain much 
momentum until the late 1970s, because until then alcohol dependence had been 
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conceptualised as cravings of such power that they were irresistible.   So relapse was 
considered to be beyond the control of both drinker and therapist.   Only when studies 
demonstrated that an individual’s experience of craving could be influenced by their 
expectations (Maisto, Laverman & Adesso, 1977) and that environmental conditions 
could be manipulated to influence the quantity and frequency of alcohol consumption 
(Biglow & Liebson, 1972) did a rejection of the then established notion of relapse 
begin to change. 
At the forefront of this change of view were Gloria Litman (Litman, Eiser, Rawson & 
Oppenheim,1979; Litman, Stapleton, Oppenheim, Peleg & Jackson, 1983) and Alan 
Marlatt (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985).   Marlatt and colleagues brought together research 
published during the previous 15 years to produce a single comprehensive model of 
relapse.  Central to Marlatt’s cognitive behavioural model is the notion of relapse as a 
process that in turn leads to strategies for intervention (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985).   
Marlatt’s model has probably been the most influential development in relapse 
prevention and alcohol treatment since its original publication and remains 
substantially unchanged in its application (Raistrick, Heather, & Godfrey, 2006).     
 
This present study, however, argues that recent research in alcohol metacognition 
(Spada, Caselli, & Wells, 2012), a specific sub-type of alcohol outcome expectancy 
integral to the Marlatt model, can be regarded as a significant extension to that model.   
It is that extension (alcohol metacognition) to the Marlatt model that forms one area 
of focus for investigation in this present study.   
 
No matter which recovery process is chosen, however, overlaying alcohol treatment 
in almost all countries are notable differences in patterns of alcohol consumption 
resulting from gender role differences.   Researchers and theorists from a number of 
disciplines have argued that alcohol consumption is part of the male gender role, but 
is discouraged as part of the female gender role (Chassin, Tetzloff, & Hershey, 1985; 
Landrine, Bardwell, & Dean, 1988; White & Huselid, 1997).    Studies have found 
that individuals who endorse traditionally feminine traits, such as nurturance or 
emotional expressivity, report lower consumption and reduced frequency of alcohol 
use (e.g., Chomak & Collins, 1987; Horwitz & White, 1987; Huselid & Cooper, 1992; 
Ricciardelli, Connor, Williams, & Young, 2001; Wilsnack & Wilsnack, 1978).    
Indeed, young women who hold more traditional gender role attitudes are less likely 
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to drink at all (Parker & Harford, 1992; Zucker, Battistich, & Langer, 1981).   In 
contrast, men who endorse traditionally gendered beliefs toward male and female 
roles are more likely to consume alcohol, drink more heavily and display more 
alcohol related problems (Huselid & Cooper, 1992; Mosher & Sirkin, 1984; Pleck, 
Sonenstein, & Ku, 1994).    
 
Despite these well-documented differences, however, alcohol treatment models do not 
expressly adapt their approach to take account of such findings leading one well 
known organization to comment,  “Although the research evidence into substance 
misuse demonstrates that gender is not necessarily a significant predictor of retention, 
completion or outcome once an individual begins treatment, there may be a number of 
other factors that might influence treatment outcomes and these may vary according 
to the gender of the service user” (Alcohol Concern, 2008).    Gender role and, 
specifically, gender role conflict, form the second area of focus for this present study. 
 
Definitions. 
Considering the impact that relapse prevention as an intervention has had globally, the 
lack of an agreed definition of relapse is surprising.   As a result, some authors have 
criticised the use of the term.   Miller (1996), for example, in a paper entitled What is 
Relapse? 50 Ways to Leave the Wagon argues that the term relapse has little utility 
and should not be used.   Consequently, in this present study the term alcohol 
treatment has been adopted to encompass the recovery process.   
 
When referring to sex and gender this present study has adopted the definitions 
outlined in the World Health Organization’s Statement on Gender Policy.   “Gender is 
used to describe those characteristics of women and men, which are socially 
constructed, while sex refers to those which are biologically determined. People are 
born female or male but learn to be girls and boys who grow into women and men. 
This learned behaviour makes up gender identity and determines gender roles” 
(WHO, 2002, Annex 1). 
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2. Models of Alcohol Treatment. 
Three, overlapping, models of treatment can be said to characterise alcohol recovery 
programmes in the United Kingdom.    They are: the self-help, biomedical and 
psychosocial models.   By far the largest and well organised of the self-help groups is 
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) (Babor et al., 2010).   Underpinning the AA model is 
the theory that alcohol dependence is a disease and dependent individuals are, 
whether abstinent or not, powerless over the drug’s effect.   Combating the effects of 
alcohol dependence requires participants to develop a strong spiritual belief system 
(Gowing, Proudfoot, Henry-Edwards & Teeson, 2001, Alcoholics Anonymous World 
Services, 1976).  This theory implies that individuals have the power to make the 
decision to stop drinking even if the ability to do so lies with a spiritual entity.   The 
AA treatment approach is referred to as the 12 Step Programme.  This is a stage by 
stage process where members are inducted by a sponsor into admitting powerlessness 
over the drug, admitting failings and making amends.   Regular participation in group 
sessions is considered essential for success (Emrick & Tonigan, 2004). 
 
Underpinning the biomedical model of treatment is evidence that certain genetic 
markers increase the likelihood of alcoholism and that changes in brain chemistry 
lead to a greater likelihood of relapse for those previously dependent.   Neuroadaptive 
changes frequently occur in brain transmission processes that are sensitive to alcohol 
effects (Gilpin & Koob, 2008).  Problematic alcohol use, it is posited, leads to 
adaption in these systems and has been associated with both negative and positive 
reinforcement of alcohol use, enhanced anxiety and increased sensitivity to stress.  As 
a result, it is argued, adaptive changes contribute to a vulnerability to relapse in post 
treatment individuals Clapp, Bhave, & Hoffman, 2008).   Based on this model of 
alcoholism pharmacological treatments have been developed.   It is thought that only 
nine per cent of individuals in the UK receive medication for relapse prevention 
(NICE, 2010).   Three drugs dominate relapse prevention treatment: disulfiram and 
two others that operate specifically on the brain’s neurotransmission processes, 
acamprosate and naltrexone.  
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2.1  Psychosocial Treatment and The Marlatt Model. 
At the core of the psychosocial model of alcohol abuse treatment in the UK lies Alan 
Marlatt’s cognitive behavioural approach which attempts to integrate both theoretical 
perspectives and diverse treatment approaches (Marlatt & Gordon,1980; Marlatt, 
1982; Marlatt & George, 1984; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; NICE, 2010).   It is by far 
the most comprehensive and holistic model available.   Conceptually it has integrated 
classical and operant conditioning and, especially, social learning theory as espoused 
by Bandura (1977).   A conceptual shift that the Marlatt model introduced to the field 
is that relapse is a process and that it could take place over a long period of time and 
is not a reflex-like phenomenon. 
 
Marlatt argues that once an individual has resolved to change an addictive behaviour, 
or has changed behaviour, this state of affairs holds until they encounter a high risk 
situation.  The most common high risk situations are negative mood states, social 
pressure, interpersonal conflicts, negative physical states and some positive emotional 
states (Cummings, Gordon, & Marlatt, 1980).    An Individual’s failure to cope with a 
high risk situation leads to a series of cognitive processes such as dissonance conflict 
and alcohol outcome expectancies of the addictive behaviour and reduced self 
efficacy.   Together these factors contribute to relapse. 
 
The Marlatt model can be criticised for a number of reasons.   Much of the research 
that led to the identification of high risk situations as fundamental to the model is 
based on retrospective accounts of relapse.   This implies that individuals’ accounts of 
events could be open to reinterpretation and bias.   For example, a general cognitive 
model suggests mood state might affect the memories to which individuals attend, and 
that cognitive priming could determine memories and emotions elicited (Clarke, Beck 
& Alford, 1999; Riskind, 1989).   Hence the accounts given by participants in the 
Marlatt research might not reflect accurately cognitions and emotions experienced at 
the time of the situation recalled.    Indeed, Hall, Havassy and Wasserman (1990) 
reported that subjects only associated relapse with elevated stress levels after the 
event (that is retrospectively) not when stress levels were assessed prior 
(prospectively).   This observation suggests, therefore, that high risk situations leading 
to anxiety might not necessarily result in relapse.   It is possible the relapse itself 
might have contributed to an increase in anxiety which participants then attribute as 
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the cause of their relapse.   Such an observation lends weight to claims that cognitive 
processes such as positive outcome expectancies of alcohol in reducing anxiety are 
not sufficient to account for the power with which individuals experience craving 
(Heather & Stallard, 1989).   
 
On the other hand, a prospective study by Kushner et al., (2005) showed that 
individuals with an active anxiety disorder when entering treatment for alcohol 
dependence displayed a significantly greater risk of relapse than those with no anxiety 
disorder.   This result was stable across a variety of relapse definitions (for example, 
any alcohol use, absolute amounts used and time to first drink).     Such conflicting 
results indicate, perhaps, that situational factors alone might not fully explain the 
reasons for relapse.  
 
The validity of the notion of high risk situations has been called into question (Sutton, 
1993).   Sutton notes that post treatment individuals are presumably encountering 
many and varied high risk situations but that only some of these situations lead to 
relapse and not at all in certain individuals.  So, when and how does a situation 
become high risk?              
 
Sutton, it seems, fails to make the obvious point that it is not the variety of situations 
that is important but the variety of individuals.   In an outline of personal construct 
theory, Bannister and Fransella (1971) suggest that no two situations are the same 
because no two individuals are the same.   They argue, individuals differ from others 
in how they perceive and interpret a situation, what is considered important and what 
is considered to be its implications.   Especially they differ in the degree to which a 
situation is clear, obscure, threatening or promising.    
 
In treatment settings the Marlatt model of tratment emphasises training people to 
“identify situations or states where they are most vulnerable to alcohol use, to avoid 
high risk situations and to use a range of cognitive and behavioural strategies to cope 
effectively with these situations” (NICE, 2010, p264).   Treatment, therefore, instils in 
the individual a sense of preparedness that has been described as being akin to fire 
drill training (Wanigaratne & Keaney, 1990).    A significant limitation of this 
approach, however, even where individuals have identified high risk situations they 
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personally have encountered and have developed appropriate coping skills, is that 
such situation dependent preparedness might not be sufficient to deal with future 
novel situations.     
It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that individuals in treatment following this 
model have little opportunity to explore the subjective world of the self that gives rise 
to meanings about why for them one situation differs from another.    Indeed, cultural 
variables and intrapersonal factors are given relatively little attention in this model 
(Maisto, Carey & Bradizza, 1999).        
 
On this view, Marlatt’s alcohol treatment model lays insufficient emphasis on the 
subjective experience of the individual that, it is argued, is a primary consideration in 
Counselling Psychology (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2003).  What this criticism suggests, 
therefore, is that significant areas of experience, such as gender roles, can go 
unexplored thus leaving individuals less prepared than originally believed. 
 
A key concept of the Marlatt model is the notion of alcohol outcome expectancies 
(Wanigaratne, 2003).   These expectancies are considered to be an important 
component among the immediate determinates of relapse and problematic drinking.   
Such expectancies are thought to become salient in high-risk situations when 
individuals expect alcohol to help them cope with negative emotions or conflict, that 
is “when drinking serves as self-medication” (Larimer, Palmer, & Marlatt, 1999, p. 
153).   Alcohol expectancies are discussed next. 
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3. Alcohol Expectancy. 
 
Until the 1960s alcohol’s effect on human behaviour was considered to be entirely 
pharmacological (George et al., 2012).   However, once this notion was challenged 
from an anthropological perspective, by claiming that the effect of alcohol on 
individuals within and between societies were too varied to be explained by 
pharmacological processes alone, then links with general expectancy theory were 
made (MacAndrew & Edgerton, 1969).    General expectancy theory suggested that 
individuals anticipate a particular outcome before participating in an activity and that 
those expected outcomes result from prior learning.   Such expectancies, it is argued, 
are acquired from cultural norms, personal experience as well as through vicarious 
learning (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999).   At that point Marlatt and colleagues 
articulated a comprehensive synthesis of expectancy theory an alcohol experience to 
argue for the construction of an ‘alcohol expectancy set’ (Marlatt, Demming, & Reid, 
1973). 
 
The impact of that article is not to be underestimated.   A search of the PsychINFO 
database for the terms ‘alcohol’ and ‘expectancies’ contained in journal abstracts 
revealed just three articles in the three years preceding publication compared with an 
average of 28 per year during the 40 years subsequently.   Today, almost all attempts 
to explain alcohol’s causal role in social, sexual, emotional and behavioural outcomes 
rely on alcohol expectancy theory in some form other (George et al., 2012). 
 
Alcohol expectancy is frequently defined as: beliefs about the cognitive, affective and 
behavioural effects of alcohol (e.g. Nicolai, Moshagen, & Demmel, 2012; Madison et 
al. 2013).   However, Goldman et al. (1999) argue that the expectancy construct has 
been so widely used that it has accumulated a variety of meanings as well as 
subsuming different assumptions.   At the very least alcohol expectancy can be 
considered to be a multidimensional construct and three key dimensions: Implicit-
Explicit; Positive-Negative and Cognitive-Metacognitive are discussed next. 
 
3.1.Implicit and Explicit Alcohol Expectancy. 
Certain psychological traditions, it is suggested, emphasise the idea that expectancy 
templates require activation at the highest cognitive levels, implying that such 
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expectancies are conscious events that must use attentional resources.   On the other 
hand, different models suggest that expectancies can take place outside of conscious 
awareness.  For example, the well-known model of relapse outlined by Beck, Liese, 
and Najavits (2005) implies that individuals are only partly aware of the chain of 
cognitions leading to alcohol use.   Implicit (non-conscious) cognitions, it is 
suggested, underlie mental processes that are automatic in nature and rely on a 
network of associative memories.   Explicit (conscious) cognitions, on the other hand, 
require an awareness of motives and expected outcomes hence are deliberate in nature 
(George et al., 2012).   Recently, research has attempted to unpick the knot of 
evidence surrounding explicit and implicit alcohol cognitions in subsequent 
behaviour.    
 
In a meta-analytical review Reich, Below, and Goldman (2010) addressed the 
uncertainties concerning the independence of implicit and explicit alcohol expectancy 
constructs.   Put simply, the authors were concerned to answer the questions ‘do 
measures of implicit and explicit alcohol expectancies measure the same alcohol 
related construct’ and, if they appear to be distinct, ‘what improvement in prediction 
of alcohol use do implicit measures contribute’?   Analysis revealed that in 11 of the 
16 studies reviewed implicit and explicit measures were correlated significantly with 
one another.   More importantly, in 13 of the 16 studies, explicit measures accounted 
for more of the variance than implicit measures.   However, despite the relatively 
large amount of variance in alcohol consumption explained by explicit measures, 
implicit measures did account for significant additional variance.   Perhaps the most 
pertinent conclusion from this study is that the preponderance of evidence points 
away from a binary either-or approach to implicit and explicit alcohol cognitions.   
What this conclusion implies is that measures of explicit alcohol cognitions might 
vary with regard to the influence of other implicit cognitions, and vice versa.   Indeed, 
Roediger (2003) contends that explicit measures of expectancy are invariably subject 
to priming effects outside of participants’ conscious awareness.     
 
3.2. Positive and Negative Alcohol Expectancy. 
Positive alcohol expectancies are those that reflect more emotionally arousing 
properties of alcohol consumption, such as feeling happy.   Alternatively, negative 
alcohol expectancies typically include more adverse and sedating effects of alcohol, 
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such as feeling sick or sad.  Generally, those who consume higher levels of alcohol 
have been shown to endorse more positive expectancies, while lighter consumers tend 
to endorse more negative expectancies (Goldman et al., 1999). 
 
Positive alcohol related outcome expectancies have, most notably, been associated 
with alcohol consumption, for example in Norwegian and Italian students (Anderson, 
Grunwald, Bekman, Brown, & Grant, 2011; D’Alessio, Baicco, & Laghi, 2006).   
Furthermore, increased alcohol consumption by adolescents over time has also been 
demonstrated to operate as a function of such expectancies (Aas, Leigh, Anderson, & 
Jakobson, 1998).   Unsurprisingly, therefore, positive expectancies have been shown 
to be associated with an increased likelihood of problematic drinking in students 
(Labbe & Maisto, 2011) as well as it’s maintenance (Leeman, Toll, Taylor, & 
Volpicelli, 2009).   Additionally, positive expectancies are also associated with 
greater endorsement of ‘pre-gaming’ behaviours; that is, consuming alcohol prior to 
attending social events (Zamboanga, Schwartz, Ham, Borsari, & Van Tyne, 2010), as 
well as greater consumption once in attendance (Bot, Engels, & Knibbe, 2005; 
Larsen, Engels, Weirs, Granic, & Spijkerman, 2012).    
 
Perhaps, however, the most widely quoted positive expectancy associated with 
alcohol’s effect is the notion of anxiety reduction.   Indeed, the view that alcohol 
reduced tension was widely accepted among researchers as far back as the 1940s 
(Greeley & Oei, 1999).   This general view later crystallised into Conger’s (1956) 
‘tension reduction theory’ and eventually ‘stress-response dampening ideas’ (Sher & 
Levison, 1982).   When reviewing the literature between 1987 and 1997, Greely and 
Oei (1999) concluded that views on alcohol’s stress reducing properties had changed 
little during that period.   Some individuals, they summarised, might have a greater 
genetic predisposition, mood enhancing beliefs and or situational stressors that lead 
them to consume alcohol for its stress reducing effect.   Other researchers, however, 
regarded such a conclusion as little more than “efforts at organising much the same 
literature” (Kushner, Abrams, & Borchardt, 2000, p. 149).   These authors were 
inclined to the view that previous reviews merely maintained the status quo and did 
little to add to the understanding of this primary expectancy construct.   As a result, 
they sought to address the subject by reviewing the comorbidity of alcohol and 
anxiety using a far wider range of literature than previously.   The “tentative 
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conclusion” (Kushner et al. 2000, p. 343) reached was that either an anxiety disorder 
or alcohol dependence can contribute to the persistence of pathological alcohol use in 
a ‘feed-forward vicious cycle’.   In simple terms, they contended that anxiety can lead 
to alcohol use and that alcohol use can lead to anxiety.   What this conclusion implies, 
however, is that individuals who consume alcohol, for whatever reason, are likely to 
adopt a positive expectancy that alcohol will reduce tension.   This means that alcohol 
use and tension reduction are virtually axiomatic and that the greater exposure to 
alcohol the greater the association.    Consequently, it might be expected that 
individuals with greater experience of alcohol use will demonstrate a greater 
endorsement of alcohol’s tension reducing properties.     However, Nicolai et al. 
(2012), examining more than 6000 respondents of mean age 36 years, contend that 
such a view is overly simplistic.   Their results indicated that expectancies about 
tension reduction did not significantly predict alcohol use among younger subjects but 
were a strong predictor in older age groups.   They suggest that such age-related shifts 
in alcohol expectancies might be explained, a least partially, by the different 
consumption patterns exhibited by each group.   Older participants reported drinking 
more frequently but consuming less alcohol per occasion and tended to less strongly 
endorse social assertiveness expectancies than younger subjects.   The implication 
being that younger participants’ drinking motives centre on social rather than 
anxiolytic factors; an observation consistent with Lundahl, Davis, Adesso and Lukas’ 
(1997) conclusions concerning the age related preferred settings for alcohol 
consumption. 
 
At this point it is worth exploring, if only briefly, the model of positive expectancy 
that has wide currency among both problematic drinkers and the varied professionals 
working with them, namely the self-medication hypothesis (SMH).   Put simply, SMH 
posits that individuals believe alcohol consumption will alleviate symptoms of 
distress.   Originating with the work of Edward Khantzian, SMH focused initially on 
heroin use (Khantzian, Mack, & Schatzberg, 1974) then later incorporated alcohol 
consumption (Khantzian, Halliday, & McAuliffe, 1990).   Khantzian takes a 
psychodynamic approach to SMH, whereby alcohol consumption compensates for 
parts of the self that are cut off from consciousness by defense mechanisms.  
According to Khantzian, the development of alcohol dependence involves the gradual 
incorporation of alcohol’s effects, and the need to sustain these effects, into the 
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defensive structure of the ego.  Alcohol's effects substitute for defective or non-
existent ego defence mechanisms. 
Latterly, however, SMH has also been viewed from a cognitive-behavioural 
perspective.   This view suggests that the negative reinforcement of drinking, 
stemming from alcohol induced anxiety reduction, results in an escalation of alcohol 
consumption among anxiety-disordered individuals (Kushner, Sher, & Beitman, 
1990).   Recently Menary, Kushner, Maurer, & Thuras (2011), investigating a 
nationally representative sample of US citizens – mean age 46 years, tested the 
proposition that a self-medicating style of drinking among anxiety disordered 
individuals would lead to increased alcohol consumption and, ultimately, alcohol 
dependence.   
 
A striking result of this study is that despite the SMH core tenet, that alcohol is 
consumed to cope with symptoms of distress, only 20 per cent of drinkers with an 
anxiety disorder reported using alcohol to cope with anxiety symptoms.   This finding, 
however, must be weighed against the observation that the measure of self-medication 
used in the study was a single-item self-report question in the American National 
Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC).   Nor had 
the survey item been validated as an accurate reflection of the conceptual intention of 
the question; the inference being that the extent of self-medicating behaviour might 
have been underestimated.  
 
If, however, self-medicating behaviour had been underestimated to a significant 
degree, then it might be expected that differences between self-medicating and non 
self-medicating groups would be small.   In fact, results indicated that anxiety 
disordered individuals who report self-medication consumed alcohol at more than 
twice the daily rate of anxiety disordered individuals not reporting self-medication.   
Furthermore, rates of alcohol dependence were significantly greater among anxiety 
disordered individuals reporting self medication (35 per cent of the group) compared 
with anxiety disordered individuals not reporting self medication (9 per cent of the 
group).    The significant differences between these groups suggest that the survey did 
not underestimate the proportion of self-medication among anxiety disordered 
drinkers, and supports the hypothesis that self-medicating expectations are associated 
with increased rates of alcohol consumption and dependence. 
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However, what this study fails to examine is the possibility that the 80 per cent of 
anxiety disordered individuals who reported they did not consume alcohol to self-
medicate their distress would not also endorse the notion that alcohol does have a 
tension reducing effect.   It is possible, therefore, that the motive for drinking is more 
salient to the individual than a simple set of alcohol expectancies.    For example, one 
individual might endorse the view that alcohol helps them relax but their primary 
motive for drinking is to maintain their sociability, whereas another might drink 
solely to relax.   So an individual’s set of alcohol expectations might be called on 
differentially as and when needs arise.   In other words, the study might merely have 
demonstrated that at any one time approximately 20 per cent of individuals feel the 
need to call on their expectation that alcohol will help alleviate their symptoms of 
distress rather than only 20 per cent of anxiety disordered drinkers believe that 
consuming alcohol will reduce anxiety.   What remains unanswered is the proportion 
of individuals who endorse the idea that consuming alcohol reduces anxiety, the 
strength with which such a belief is held and the factors that might catalyse its 
activation.      
 
3.3. Metacognitive and Cognitive Alcohol Expectancy. 
Before beginning this section proper it is worth outlining the case to view alcohol 
metacognitive therapy as an extension or development of the Marlatt model rather 
than a stand alone and independent form of intervention.    
 
Firstly, “Positive metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use can be conceptualised as a 
specific form of expectancy” (Spada et al, 2007, p. 568).   This statement implies that 
positive alcohol metacognitions, as a subset of alcohol expectancies, are as likely to 
feature in individuals’ psychological processes resulting from a failure to cope with 
high-risk situations.  This connection from high-risk situation failure to positive 
outcome expectancies is a central component in the Marlatt model.   Indeed, the 
authors note that the modification of metacognitions “may supplant interventions 
aimed at restructuring alcohol expectancies” (p. 573).   In other words they envisage 
the possibility that addressing metacognitive beliefs might replace attending to 
alcohol expectancies within models such as Marlatt but not replacing the model itself. 
 
 21 
Secondly, challenging positive and negative metacognitive beliefs is an integral part 
of the suggested treatment approach to metacognitive therapy (Spada, Caselli, & 
Wells, 2012).   However, challenging beliefs such as “Drinking reduces my anxious 
feelings” or “Drinking helps me fit in socially” that appear in the Positive Alcohol 
Metacognitions Scale overlaps completely with the efforts to counteract drinker’s 
misperceptions about the effects of alcohol in the Marlatt model (see Larimer, Palmer 
& Marlatt, 1999).    
 
Finally, the holistic nature of the Marlatt model also addresses a number of other 
immediate determinates of drinking and relapse such as ‘high-risk situations’ and 
‘coping strategies’.   It seems unlikely that such factors would be omitted from any 
alcohol treatment programme including one featuring metacognitive interventions.  
 
Metacognitive beliefs concern the information an individual holds about their 
thoughts and emotions as well as the strategies employed to regulate theses factors 
(Spada, Moneta, & Wells, 2007).   For example, the information an individual holds 
about their cognitions could centre on the significance they attach to a particular 
thought.   For a problematic drinker such a belief might be ‘I need to control my 
thoughts about opening a can of beer’.   Beliefs about strategies they employ to 
regulate thoughts and emotions might include ‘Worrying about how much I drink will 
help to keep me safe’ or ‘Drinking will calm me down and help me think straight’.     
 
Metacognitive cognitions, it is argued, can be regarded as a specific subset of alcohol 
expectancies, where the primary difference between positive alcohol expectancies and 
positive metacognitive cognitions concerning alcohol use is that the former do not 
explicitly distinguish between cognitive and metacognitive belief domains (Spada, 
Moneta, & Wells, 2007).   For example, the Balanced Alcohol Expectancy 
Questionnaire (BAEQ) (Jones & McMahon, 1999) comprises 37 items across four 
factors that appear to monitor social-cognitive domains when measuring positive 
alcohol expectancies rather than a metacognitive one: Factor 1 (n=l4): SOCIABILITY 
e.g. ‘I would expect to be more adventurous’; Factor 2 (n=l0): LONG TERM SELF-
FULFILMENT e.g. ‘I would expect to make more friends’; Factor 3 (n=8): 
MENTAL/PHYSICAL ACTIVITY e.g. ‘I would expect to have more energy’; Factor 
4 (n=5) DESRABILITY e.g. ‘I would expect to think I was more interesting’.   
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Crucially, as these examples indicate, the survey items fail to identify beliefs 
concerning the utility of alcohol as a means of cognitive control and self-regulation.   
Similarly, negative alcohol expectancies in the BAEQ largely measure more general 
negative predictions about outcomes (e.g. ‘I would expect to get the DTs’) rather than 
beliefs about lack of executive control (e.g. ‘Drinking will damage my mind’). 
 
Why, however, is the distinction between metacognitive (i.e. process orientated) 
compared with cognitive (i.e. content orientated) beliefs important?    There are two 
strands of reasoning.    Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, the metacognitive 
model of psychological disturbance, referred to as the self-regulatory executive 
function model (S-REF), is considered to offer an explanatory account of the 
aetiology and maintenance of disordered behaviours such as alcohol dependence 
(Wells, 2009).   Central to this model is a combination of metacognitive beliefs that 
are considered to be the basis for predisposing individuals to engage in a set of 
processes about thoughts and emotions that constitute a cognitive attentional 
syndrome (CAS).   These beliefs are characterised by increased self-focused attention, 
rumination, threat monitoring, thought suppression and maladaptive behaviours 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells, 2000).    Activation of an individual’s CAS during 
problematic situations, it is argued, drives particular coping strategies such as alcohol 
consumption (Spada & Wells, 2009).  The implication of this theory is that clinical 
assessment and treatment might be better facilitated by concentrating on the 
metacognitive components of an individual’s belief system, rather than general 
alcohol expectancies as is currently the case in a number of recovery models such as 
the Marlatt model of relapse prevention. 
 
 
Secondly, from an empirical perspective, evidence suggests that measures of positive 
and negative alcohol metacognitions have greater predictive power than measures of 
general alcohol expectancy (Spada, Moneta, & Wells, 2007).    Furthermore, alcohol 
metacognitions have been demonstrated to predict alcohol use following a course of 
cognitive behavioural therapy in problematic drinkers (Spada, Caselli, & Wells, 2009) 
and alcohol dependent individuals (Spada & Wells, 2010).   What this means is that 
clinical instruments, such as positive and negative alcohol metacognition scales could, 
potentially, identify those most vulnerable to relapse, monitor treatment progress and 
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target resources.    
 
Underpinning the use of metacognitive instruments and therapy is the notion that they 
are superior to existing alcohol expectancy tools and treatment approaches.   A key 
study in this regard, Spada, Moneta and Wells (2007), lies at the basis of this claim.   
A community sample of 355 individuals completed measures of alcohol expectancies 
(The Alcohol Outcome Expectancies Scale, AOES), positive alcohol metacognitions 
(PAM), negative alcohol metacognitions (NAM) and drinking behaviour.   Drinking 
behaviour was measured using the Alcohol Use Disorders Test (AUDIT) and the 
Quantity Frequency Scale (QFS).   Structural regression modelling, with drinking 
behaviour as the dependent variable, was adopted. 
 
Results demonstrated that when drinking behaviour was regressed onto the eight 
alcohol expectancy sub scales the model fit was satisfactory and accounted for 40 per 
cent of the variance in drinking behaviour.   However, only one (negative social 
performance) of the eight sub scales was a significant predictor of drinking behaviour.   
In contrast, as well as demonstrating similar levels of model fit and variance, all four 
sub scales of the positive and negative alcohol metacognitions scales were significant 
predictors of drinking behaviour.   Furthermore, when drinking behaviour was 
regressed on to both alcohol expectancies and alcohol metacognitions three of the 
four metacognition sub scales remained significant predictors of alcohol use while 
only one of the eight expectancy sub scales did so.   This combined model accounted 
for 54 per cent of the variance in drinking behaviour; a modest increase. 
 
From a technical perspective the study noted and compensated for positively skewed 
measures common in alcohol studies.   Equally, an examination of the correlation 
matrix of independent variables showed that significant intercorrelations ranged from 
0.15 to 0.64, indicating that multicollinearity was unlikely to be a problem in the 
regression analysis, even though the results of any procedural checks were not given. 
 
Despite, however, the robustness of the design and methods of this study its results 
are in stark contrast to previous alcohol expectancy research, indeed “A number of 
reviews show expectancies to be among the strongest predictors of drinking, even 
after other variables are controlled” (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999).    How 
 24 
then might such a divergence be accounted for between these sets of results?  
In a meta-analysis, McCarthy and Smith (1996) reported that the length of an alcohol 
expectancy measure accounted for 18 per cent of the variance in effect sizes, 
independent of reliability.   What this means is that short measures correlate with 
dependent variables at substantially lower rates, even though they are equally reliable. 
This finding can occur when the shorter measure does not sample the full content 
domain of the target construct.    As the AOES, a 37 item, questionnaire is designed to 
measure the broad spectrum of alcohol expectancies and the PAM (12 items) and 
NAM (6 items) are designed to measure the narrower metacognitive domain of 
beliefs, then it is possible that the statistical association between these latter set of 
measures is an artefact that reflects question design and scope.    In other words, the 
predictive power of the alcohol metacognitive measures compared with general 
alcohol expectancies might be accounted for, if only partially, by differences in 
questionnaire length and domain specificity.    In this regard it is interesting to note 
the results of an initial investigation of general metacognitions using the 30 item 
Meta-Cognition Questionnaire (MCQ 30) to predict drinking behaviour (AUDIT and 
QFS).   This study showed that of the five metacognitive dimensions of the MCQ-30 
that were entered into the regression equation only one, beliefs about the need to 
control thoughts, was found to account for a significant amount of variance in alcohol 
use after controlling for anxiety and depression measured by the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Survey (HADS) (Spada & Wells, 2005).    
 
In a follow up study, Moneta (2011) attempted to address some of the limitations of 
sample size and power noted by Spada and Wells (2005), as well as investigate 
moderation effects between metacognition, emotion and alcohol use.    A similar 
cross-sectional design, involving 300 British college students (60 per cent male, 40 
per cent female) was employed.   Again similarly, the MCQ, AUDIT and HADS 
instruments used in the Spada and Wells (2005) study were employed; the QFS, 
however, was not included. 
 
Results were mixed.   In contrast to results noted by Spada and Wells (2005), and 
Hypothesis 1 put forward in Moneta (2011) metacoginiton was not found to be 
positively associated with alcohol use.   Equally surprising was the rejection of 
Hypothesis 2a (Moneta, 2011), namely that emotion (measured as anxiety and 
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depression) would be positively associated with alcohol use.   This particular result 
not only contradicts the results of Spada and Wells (2005) but also runs contrary to 
the extensive literature on the subject (e.g. see Kushner, Abrams, & Borchardt, 2000 
for a review).   One possible reason for these contradictory results, and observed by 
Spada and Wells (2005), is the inappropriateness of using AUDIT as a measure of 
drinking problems in non-clinical populations thus leading to unstable results.   
Furthermore, it is also noted that AUDIT scores reported in Moneta (2005) are 
referred to as measures of “alcohol dependence”; which they are not even for high 
scores. 
 
Results did, however, support the hypothesis that metacognition would moderate the 
association between emotion and alcohol use.   In particular, participants with high 
MCQ scores tended to drink more alcohol as negative emotion scores rose, compared 
with the reverse for participants with low MCQ scores.   What’s more, the rate of 
increased problematic drinking for the former group far exceeded the rate of decrease 
for the latter group.   Moneta (2011) suggests this dichotomy can be explained if those 
with high MCQ scores view the emotion as the problem and seek anxiolytic relief 
from alcohol. Whereas, those with low MCQ scores recognize environmental factors 
as the problem and seek to rectify the situation.   However, this explanation merely 
recycles the theoretical proposition put forward in the paper’s rationale for its 
hypothesis, that high maladaptive metacognition is associated with poor coping 
strategies, while low rates of maladaptive metacognition are associated with more 
adaptive coping strategies.   A convincing theoretical account as to why these two 
dichotomous groups exist seems to be lacking in this study’s analysis.    Furthermore, 
while sex differences were reported, in that females had lower alcohol use scores than 
males, no information was provided as to what these scores were related – emotion, 
metacognition or their interaction?   Nor was an account offered as to why such sex 
differences might occur.    
 
What these results, taken together, indicate are that on the one hand alcohol 
metacognition measures might only provide greater predictive power over general 
alcohol expectancies because they tap a narrower domain with fewer items.   On the 
other hand, what these results also suggest is that greater focus could provide better 
utility, assuming alcohol metacognitions cover sufficiently the expectancy dimensions 
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of interests to the researcher.   Put simply, researchers or clinicians primarily 
interested in predicting alcohol use might be better able to do so using measures of a 
subset of alcohol expectancies such as alcohol metacognitions. 
 
However, is such potential utility sufficient to pursue alcohol metacognition as a 
research or clinical tool?    One further reason to utilise alcohol metacognitions, 
especially in clinical settings, is the claim that they can provide a model that accounts 
for problematic drinking (Spada & Wells, 2009).  
 
A key assertion in this model is that the effective monitoring of internal states by 
attentional processes is disrupted both in the initiation and maintenance of a drinking 
episode.   Problematic drinkers, they suggest, have attentional biases towards alcohol 
related stimuli that can lead to a reduction in the resources available to monitor 
internal states thereby more readily triggering alcohol consumption.   The chemical 
effects of alcohol consumption then leads to further disruption of the monitoring 
process where information about emotional change (e.g. feeling less anxious) and 
drinking goals (achieving low levels of anxiety) are poorly attended.  As a result, the 
drinking episode persists because the individual fails to access information about the 
extent to which their affect laden goals have been met.   This initial metacognitive 
model of problematic drinking has subsequently been further refined such that the 
processes involved are divided into three periods which constitute a triphasic 
formulation of problem drinking (Spada, Caselli, & Wells, 2012).  
 
In the first phase (pre-alcohol use phase) alcohol related stimuli such as cravings, 
images or memories trigger positive alcohol metacognitions thereby activating the 
cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS) characterised by rumination, worry and desire 
thinking.   For example,  ‘If I study drinking memories it will help me understand 
why I drink’ (rumination),  ‘If I imagine walking into a pub then I will know how to 
avoid it’ (desire thinking) and ‘Thinking about the times I’ve been drunk will keep me 
safe’ (worry).    Once activated, the CAS increases negative affect and craving thus 
strengthening negative alcohol metacognitions about the need to control thoughts 
thereby increasing the chance of alcohol consumption.     The concluding element of 
this phase, that strengthening of alcohol metacognitions increases the likelihood of 
alcohol use, is supported by correlational data from earlier studies of both community 
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and clinical samples (Spada, Moneta, & Wells, 2007; Spada & Wells, 2009).   In each 
of these studies negative alcohol metacognitions were positively and significantly 
correlated with alcohol consumption. This conclusion, however, might not be 
universally accepted.   For example, Ciesla, Dickson, Anderson, and Neal (2011) 
report an inverse relationship between worry and alcohol use among students.   
Similarly, negative general alcohol expectancies are associated with reduced alcohol 
consumption among adolescents (e.g. Fromme & D’Amico, 2000).    One possible 
way of accounting for this discrepancy is that the expectancy-alcohol experience 
continuum is bidirectional (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999).   It is postulated 
that not only do expectancies influence alcohol use but that experience of alcohol use 
influences expectancies.   It appears feasible, therefore, that those with greater 
experience of alcohol use might be more likely to endorse negative expectancies and, 
as a result, reduce their alcohol consumption.   For example, Jones and McMahon 
(1994) report that individuals (mean age 44.2 years) leaving treatment with the 
highest negative alcohol expectancy scores were the most successful in reducing their 
drinking.   As 78 per cent of participants for the studies demonstrating positive 
correlations between negative alcohol metacognitions and alcohol use were 
undergraduates, their experience of alcohol could be considered to be in its early 
stages so less likely to moderate their consumption as a function of negative 
expectancies or negative alcohol metacognitions.      
 
The second phase (alcohol use) involves an increase in both positive and negative 
alcohol metacognitions, which serve to reinforce alcohol consumption.   At the same 
time, disruption of the metacognitive monitoring of internal states contributes to 
dysregulation of alcohol use.   The reduction in the metacognitive monitoring 
component of this formulation owes much to the attention allocation model of 
drinking put forward by Steele and Josephs (1990), (Spada, & Wells, 2009; Spada, 
Caselli, & Wells, 2012).   This model of drinking behaviour suggests “ a state of short 
sightedness in which superficially understood, immediate aspects of experience have 
a disproportionate influence on behavior and emotion, a state in which we can see the 
tree, albeit more dimly, but miss the forest altogether” Steele & Josephs, 1990, p. 
923).   Alcohol, they posit, narrows perception of immediate cues, both internal and 
external, restricting cognitive abstracting capacity to the most salient aspects of 
experience.   An important implication of attention allocation theory is that certain in 
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circumstances, such as intoxication, individuals’ responses to salient cues can be 
extreme because response conflict is disinhibited (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 
1999).    Indeed, studies examining the effect of alcohol use on social behaviour have 
reported that individuals’ behaviour when intoxicated differs markedly compared with 
sober behaviour when response conflict is high (Steele & Josephs, 1990; Steele & 
Southwick, 1985).  
 
The effects of response conflict in relation to metacognitive monitoring and alcohol 
metacognition, however, have not been studied.   This appears to be an important gap 
in the triphasic formulation proposed, as a number of inter and intrapersonal 
experiences could impact on the behaviour of individuals and the observed outcomes.    
In particular, evidence suggests that response conflict linked to self-evaluation could 
merit closer examination.      
 
Self-evaluation conflict can arise when the wish to view oneself in a positive light is 
contradicted by an awareness of negative characteristics.  For example, it might be an 
individual’s to wish to see themselves as physically fit, and at the same time they 
could also know that they have not undertaken any training for many years.   As a 
result of this oppositional knowledge internal psychological conflict is generated.   In 
this circumstance, it is argued, positive characteristics are more salient than negative 
ones, but both are accessible to the individual when sober (Bannaji &Steele, 1989).    
However, an alcohol-induced reduction in attention allocation can ameliorate the 
conflict experienced by individuals, because positive self-information is more readily 
accessible.   For example, in a study of discrepancies between the actual self and ideal 
self, alcohol consumption improved participants’ self-ratings for high conflict traits 
but not low ones (Bannaji & Steel, 1989).  
 
One important aspect of self-evaluation concerns gender roles and the degree to 
which individuals believe they meet expectations of gender stereotypes.  Indeed, 
given the large number of variations in alcohol expectancies between men and women 
(Monk & Heim, 2013), then an investigation of how conflict associated with gender 
roles might impact metacognitive beliefs and alcohol consumption seems merited.  
 
During the third phase (post alcohol use) the affective, cognitive and physiological 
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effects of uncontrolled drinking become the subject of rumination (Spada, Caselli, & 
Wells, 2012).   As a consequence, both negative effect and alcohol-related thoughts 
increase.    At the same time negative alcohol metacognitive beliefs about such 
thoughts (e.g. ‘I can’t control my thinking about alcohol’) are strengthened.   The 
upshot of this process is that the likelihood of alcohol consumption becomes more 
likely as the chosen method of emotion regulation. 
 
 
3.4. Gender Roles and Alcohol Consumption. 
 
Studies have consistently shown significant differences in drinking patterns between 
men and women (Babor et al., 2010).   This difference is reflected in the proportion of 
men compared with women classified as alcohol dependent; in England, three times 
as many men than women are alcohol dependent (Drummond et al., 2005; Singleton, 
Bumpstead & O’Brien, 2001).    These differences have implications beyond simple 
dependence.   For example, in England, men have more than twice the number of 
alcohol attributable deaths than women; 10, 000 compared with 5000 annually (Jones, 
Bellis, Dedman, Sumnall, & Tocque, 2008).   Nor are these gender differences 
localised to the UK; in most cultures men drink more than women (Heath, 2000).    
However, such patterns are not immutable.   Although men still generally drink more 
than women in how much and how often they drink, the gap is closing as women’s 
alcohol consumption increases. 
In an examination of data from yearly national surveys conducted in the United States 
between 2002 and 2012 differences between men and women’s alcohol consumption 
and alcohol-related incidents had narrowed along several different measures.  Among 
other things, the study evaluated the number of days an individual drinks each month, 
incidents of driving while under the influence of alcohol, and the incidence of 
symptoms of alcohol use disorder, (White et al. 2015).   Results indicated that the 
percentage of those who drank alcohol in the previous month increased for women to 
48.3 from 44.9 per cent, but decreased for men to 56.1 from 57.4 per cent between 
2002 and 2012.   The mean number of days women drank within the previous 30 days 
also increased, to 7.3 days from 6.8 days, while for men, the number of days 
decreased to 9.5 days from 9.9.   Interestingly, reasons for the emerging patterns 
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between 2002 and 2012 remained unclear and could not be explained by recent trends 
in employment, pregnancy or marital status (White et al. 2015).   A recent OECD 
report across all 34 OECD countries also confirmed the changing patterns of alcohol 
use.   It reports that the proportion of children aged under 15 who have not yet drunk 
alcohol shrank from 44 to 30 of boys and from 50 to 31 per cent of girls during the 
2000s.   However, over the same period the proportion of children who had 
experienced drunkenness increased from 30 to 40 per cent for boys and from 26 to 41 
per cent for girls.  In particular for adults, the report noted that for men those in less 
educated lower socioeconomic groups were more likely to engage in risky drinking.    
Whereas, women who engage in risky drinking tend to be more educated and from 
higher socioeconomic groups (Sassi, 2015).   The report confirmed that for the UK in 
2012 that a greater proportion of men engaged in hazardous drinking than women.   
However, from 2000 to 2012 the proportion of men engaging in hazardous drinking 
increased marginally from 24 to 26 per cent, whereas over the same period the 
proportion of women engaging in hazardous drinking increased from 15 to 21 per 
cent. 
The antecedents of male drinking patterns are, from an anthropological perspective, 
rooted in cultural practice (Hunt, MacKenzie, & Joe-Laidler, 2005).   For example, 
the initiation of boys into drinking is often viewed as a rite of passage.   “Along with 
his first sexual experience, [drinking] is one of the fundamental activities by which a 
boy is initiated as a man” (Lemle & Mishkind, 1989, p.214).   Furthermore, it has 
been argued that not only is drinking alcohol seen as a male activity but drinking 
heavily is regarded as even more masculine and that such behaviour occurs in men 
“who are obsessed with manly virtues” (McClelland, 1972, p.248.  
 
The critical observation made by this present study is that alcohol treatment models 
such as Marlatt including advances such as metacognitive approaches, take little or no 
account of the cultural antecedents that lead to gender differences in alcohol 
dependence.   These models say nothing about the nature of alcohol outcome 
expectancies or the subtype of metacognitive beliefs in relation to gender, which in 
turn, is reflected in the lack of acknowledgement given to it in treatment guidelines.  
   
Gender stereotypes not only create expectancies about how men and women are likely 
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to behave, argue Rudman and Glick (2008), they also set up social rules that prescribe 
how they ought to behave.   Among the traits for which men are most highly rewarded 
are competence and strength.   In contrast, people least tolerate traits such as 
emotionality in men.  In particular, “Men can expect social disapproval for any 
display of weakness e.g., big boys don’t cry” (Rudman & Glick, 2008, p.123). 
 
At birth, sex is embedded in the biological characteristics based on genitalia, the 
infant displays, however, the biological distinctions tend to be quickly overlaid with 
attitudes and behaviours that are stereotypical representations of particular genders.   
These gender stereotypes have their roots in cultural beliefs about the spectrum on 
which masculinity and femininity lie.   In turn, these cultural beliefs impact on a raft 
of behaviours, jobs and societal roles with which the emerging individual has to 
contend.  
 
An Essentialist Approach. 
The distinction applied to the terms sex and gender often represents an attempt by 
those working in the field as a means of avoiding the trap of ‘essentialising’ culture 
bound conceptions of masculinity and femininity (Rudman & Glick, 2008).   The 
tendency to view members of particular categories, such as all men or all women, is 
referred to as ‘psychological essentialism’.   Category members, it is argued, share 
absolute properties that determine conceptions of self and others; in simple words 
‘who they are’ (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997).   From an essentialist 
perspective, therefore, biological sex differences underpin a number of psychological 
sex differences.   As a result, ‘essentialists’ view the differences in emotion, cognition 
and behaviour between men and women as biological in basis and immutable.   What 
this means is that changes to the cultural context of human lives, for example equal 
numbers of males and females in the work place receiving equal pay, would not lead 
to men and women being more alike.    
 
The extent to which an enduring essentialist attitude has prevailed in the UK so far as 
alcohol consumption is concerned can be gleaned from two newspaper reports 
spanning more than 80 years of social change. 
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“Girls not long from school were to be seen drinking cocktails, champagne and 
liqueurs, while in time whiskies and sodas were added to the list of stimulants 
required to keep them going.   Scarcely had the age of twenty been reached before the 
lines that rightly belong to the women of middle age had become evident in such girls.   
Was it to be supposed that when girls of this kind reached womanhood and became 
mothers they could produce men and women with anything but the most miserable 
physique and of the neurotic type?”     
Manchester Guardian, 18 February, 1926. 
 
Then, 82 years on: 
“ The ladette culture epitomises everything that is wrong with young British women.   
Why do women feel it necessary to act like ‘one of the boys’, are they not proud of 
their own gender?   Generally these girls might be good for a ‘bit of fun’ but they are 
certainly not relationship material.” 
Sun, 11 December, 2008. 
 
Little appears to have changed with regard to attitudes towards gender and alcohol 
consumption during this extensive period of social change.   Indeed, it has been noted 
that laypeople (those not working professionally sex/gender issues) display an 
exaggerated tendency to essentialise gender compared with even the most vociferous 
biologically orientated psychologist (Rudman & Glick, 2008).    These authors 
suggest two reasons why such essentialist views persist.   First, they argue, gender is 
based on what is usually a clear-cut dichotomous grouping, representing males and 
females, than is evidenced in other social categorisations.   For example, individuals 
might convert from one religion to another thus adopting new beliefs and practices, or 
acquire new national identities from that they received at birth so imbuing them with 
a different world view.   By contrast men and women retain more permanent 
biological distinctions.   Second, obvious differences in physical characteristics, such 
height, weight, strength and reproductive organs, only serve to emphasise gender as 
different social categories.   By dividing men and women into irreducible categories, 
therefore, essentialism tends to engender the attitude that different sexes are complete 
biological opposites.    The implication of this biological ring fencing is that nature 
trumps nurture (Gelman & Taylor, 2000). 
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A Cultural Approach. 
Gender socialisation, the process by which male and female children learn masculine 
and feminine identities is perhaps the foremost culturally based psychological theory 
of gender (Martin & Ruble, 2004).   From this essentially social constructionist 
perspective cultural beliefs underpin observed sex differences in behaviour as 
individual follow traditional scripts assigned to their gender roles.    
 
Social learning theory (Mischell, 1966) is frequently invoked to explain gendered 
differences in behaviour that are observed between men and women.   A focal point 
of social learning theory is the modelling of behaviour resulting from observation of 
same sex others.   For example, children are more likely to imitate the behaviour of an 
individual of the same sex compared with an individual of the opposite sex (Bussey & 
Bandura, 1999).   Other cultural theories emphasise the role of society in 
communicating shared beliefs about how each gender ought to behave.   These 
gendered cultural norms coalesce into knowledge structures known as gender 
schemata that influence individuals’ perception of self and others.   Consequently, the 
individuals’ social world is viewed through a matrix of gendered schemata that 
constitute a set of expectations around behaviour and preferences for each sex (Bem, 
1981).   Gendered schemata, it is argued, develop in childhood and persist through 
adulthood and, given the length of time between the newspaper extracts above, appear 
also to persist over time through generations.     
 
As the views expressed in those extracts appear in well known newspapers, it is fair to 
assume that they reflect the values, or gendered schemata, of a significant proportion 
of the society they serve.   What these extracts seem to express, is that excessive 
drinking might not always be applauded in young men but is by no means seen as 
unusual.   In contrast, the same behaviour in young women is viewed as deplorable 
and, to some extent, a symptom of societal failure.   In many cultures, “alcohol is one 
of the most powerful symbols of gender roles and identities (Holmila & Raitasolo, 
2005).   Evidence points to women believing that female intoxication is perceived in a 
more negative light than intoxication in men.   More than 50 per cent of female 
respondents in one study of adult respondents to a survey across 29 countries held the 
view that an intoxicated woman would receive strong disapproval from others, while 
only 30 per cent believed an intoxicated man would receive such disapproval (Rahav, 
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2006).     Indeed, a qualitative study by Lillie (2000) revealed that one of the five 
categories of self-evaluation identified among women recovering from alcohol 
dependence was ‘In society’s spotlight’, that comprised a further six sub categories: 
‘Being blamed/judged’, ‘Being different/abnormal’, ‘Desire to achieve/contribute’, 
‘Having a label’ and ‘Being a 
woman/making comparisons with men’.    What these categories and subcategories 
reflect is the social stigma experienced by women who drink excessively and the 
internal distress that results.   One participant summed up her experience: 
“I mean and now of course, I look - I consider myself as being insane because that’s 
what - that’s what the stigma came from outside, you know, my family and society at 
large were, you know, were really blaming me, you know, they were saying, you’re 
probably mad...and so I really started to see myself as an insane person.” (Lillie, 
2002, p. 104). 
 
3.5. Gender Role Conflict. 
 
As alluded to above one important aspect of self-evaluation concerns gender roles and 
the degree to which individual believe they meet expectations of gendered 
stereotypes.   A common conceptualisation of adherence to gender roles lies in the 
construct of gender role conflict.   Gender role conflict is considered to be a 
psychological state that results from the negative consequences of sex role 
socialisation (O’Neil, 1981).   In its original conceptualisation, and majority 
application, gender role conflict applied particularly to men, however, it has been 
successfully extended to women (O’Neil, 2008).   Gender role conflict can be 
understood as a measure of individual differences in stereotypical sex role compliance 
that result from processes concerning the socially constructed expectations applied to 
each sex.  For example, men who subscribe to more stereotypical gender roles might 
view their problems as a sign of weakness and unusual among other men.   Equally, 
men who place elevated value on adhering to gender roles might believe that certain 
behaviours, such as drinking, ought to be privileged above others.   However, when 
the reality of an individual’s experience fails to match gender role expectations 
psychological conflict arises.   Similar mechanism may apply equally to women 
(O’Neil, 2008).   The Gender Role Conflict Scale (GRCS) was developed to measure 
gender role conflict (O’Neil, 1986). 
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An important consideration, however, is the suitability of the GRCS for measuring 
gender role conflict in women.   While the four sub-scales (Restrictive Emotionality; 
Successes, Power and Competition; Restrictive Affectionate Behaviour Between the 
Same Sex* and Conflict Between Work and Family) could be conceived as applying 
equally to women the original conceptualisation of this construct was confined to the 
experience of men (O’Neil, 2008).  What’s more, O’Neil’s early theorising resulted in    
“conceptual models of men’s GRC that depicted gender role socialization as an 
interaction of environmental and biological factors that promote certain masculine 
values (the masculine mystique) and the fear of femininity” (O’Neil, 2008, p. 361).   
The notion of ‘fear of femininity’ still forms a core premise in theoretical structure of 
GRC for O’Neil (see O’Neil, 2008, p. 368).    So, on the one hand there is concern 
whether it is legitimate to apply a construct with a core premise concerning men’s 
experience or ‘fear of femininity’ to women generally.    While, on the other hand, 
there seems to be evidence that such legitimacy has been achieved. 
 
For example, the subscales reported by O’Neil (1986) were also identified in a factor 
analysis of women’s GRCS responses (Borthick, 1997).   In a later study comprising 
61 men and 144 women it was reported that “Factor analyses have yielded four 
factors: (a) Success, Power, Competition; (b) Restrictive Emotionality; (c) Restricted 
Affection Between Men; and (d) Conflict Between Work and Family; confirmatory 
factor analyses have verified the veridicality of these factors.  Adequate internal 
consistency indexes for the subscales that correspond to the four factors have been 
found. Moreover, validity has been established by demonstrating convergence with 
related constructs, expected correlation with mental health variables, and lack of 
correlation with social desirability”.   The researchers then successfully used the 
GRCS to determine whether the relationship between male gender role conflict 
variables and mental health generalises to women (Zamarripa, Wampold,  & Gregory, 
2003).   Similarly, Magovcevic & Addis (2005) successfully applied the GRCS to a 
sample of 60 US men and women undergraduates.   In both these latter studies items 
on the GRCS were made sex appropriate by substituting ‘women’ for ‘men’ in certain 
items and using appropriate personal pronouns.    
 
The theoretical premise linking excessive alcohol use and masculinity is that alcohol 
is considered to temper gender role expectations and help manage conflict from 
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restricted gender roles (Capraro, 2000; Isenhart, 2001; Lemle & Mishkind, 1989).  In 
a review of gender role conflict O’Neil (2008) reports that seven studies have found 
significant relationships between GRCS scores and alcohol use were found.   Recent 
studies have reported similar findings among a clinical sample of adults (e.g. Uy, 
Massoth, & Gottdiener, 2014).
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3.6. Hypotheses. 
 
Previous studies of positive and negative alcohol metacognitions have not reported 
sex differences in scores of those measures (e.g. Spada &Wells, 2005; Spada & 
Wells, 2009; Spada, Caselli & Wells, 2012).   Such an omission might well be 
because no such difference was observed, alternatively sex differences might not have 
been investigated.   Given that researchers and theorists from a number of disciplines 
have argued that alcohol consumption forms a central component of the male gender 
role but discouraged as part of the female gender role (Chassin, Tetzloff, & 
Hershey,1985; Landrine, Bardwell, & Dean, 1988; White & Huselid, 1997) it seem 
reasonable to theorise that men are likely to endorse positive, and possibly negative, 
alcohol metacognitions than women.   Consequently, the first hypothesis of this study 
is:   
Hypothesis 1: scores of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs predicting 
alcohol use will differ by sex. 
 
 
Williams and Ricciardelli (1999) have used the phrase confirmatory and 
compensatory drinking to account for the relationship between culturally bound 
gender roles and alcohol consumption in men.   Confirmatory drinking they argue 
refers to alcohol consumption that reinforces a perceived view of masculine gender 
role drinking behaviour.   Such a view of masculine gendered behaviour is summed 
up by McCelland (1972, p. 248) who describes drinking alcohol not only as a male 
activity but that drinking heavily is regarded as even more masculine, and that such 
behaviour occurs in men “who are obsessed with manly virtues”.   Compensatory 
drinking, on the other hand, represents an attempt to surmount the internal conflict 
experienced through a perceived failure to meet notions of the masculine ideal.   
Indeed, O’Neil (2008) argues that the theoretical premise problematic drinking to 
masculinity is that alcohol tempers gender role expectations and helps manage 
internal conflict generated by restricted gender roles.   Hence the second hypothesis of 
this study is: 
Hypothesis 2: GRC scores will predict alcohol use in men. 
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Spada & Wells (2009) argue that positive metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use are 
associated with a reduction in metacognitive monitoring that, in turn, contributes to 
alcohol use.   Once drinking begins, they contend, a disruption in metacognitive 
monitoring leading to a continuation in drinking is likely to occur.   In particular, it is 
argued, impairment of attentional functioning appears to play a fundamental role in 
disrupting metacognitive monitoring.   Drawing on Steele and Josephs’ (1990) 
attention allocation theory, they argue that alcohol’s pharmacological properties 
disrupt attentional processes by narrowing perception to immediate cues and reducing 
cognitive abstracting capacity, so disrupting metacognitive monitoring.   However, an 
important implication of attention allocation theory is that in certain circumstances, 
such as alcohol consumption, response conflict is disinhibited (Goldman, Del Boca, & 
Darkes, 1999).   An alcohol induced reduction in attention allocation can ameliorate 
the response conflict (e.g. gender role conflict) experienced by individuals because 
positive self-information is more readily accessible (Bannaji & Steele, 1989).   For 
example, in a study of discrepancies between the actual self and ideal self, alcohol 
consumption improved participants’ self-ratings for high conflict traits but not low 
ones (Bannaji & Steele, 1989).   Consequently, it can be theorised that the greater the 
degree to which an individual experiences response conflict (such as gender role 
conflict) the greater will be the influence on the relationship between alcohol 
metacognitions and alcohol use.   Hence, the third hypothesis of this study is: 
Hypothesis 3: positive and negative metacognitive belief scores will not predict 
alcohol use independently of GRC. 
 
Behavioural factors central to the male gender role model, such as drinking alcohol, 
have been highlighted above.   However, attitudinal factors within both sexes can also 
frame conceptions of the male gender role.   Gender stereotypes not only create 
expectancies about how men and women are likely to behave, argue Rudman and 
Glick (2008), they also set up rule that prescribe how they ought to behave.   Among 
the traits for which men are most highly rewarded is strength, both physical and 
mental.   As a result people least tolerate traits such as emotionality in men.   In 
particular, “Men can expect social disapproval for any display of weakness e.g. big 
boys don’t cry” (Rudman & Glick, 2008, p. 123).   Consequently, if positive alcohol 
metacognition is positively associated with a central component of the male gender 
role (alcohol use) (Spada & Wells, 2009), then positive alcohol metacognition ought 
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to be associated with other important components of the male gender role (e.g. 
restricted emotionality).  Hence, the fourth, hypothesis of this study is: 
Hypothesis 4: scores on the GRC subscale ‘Restricted Emotionality’ will predict 
scores of positive metacognitive beliefs. 
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4. Methodology. 
 
4.1. Epistemological Position. 
Psychological research, both mainstream and clinical, have been “largely wedded to 
quantitative methods within a naively realist epistemological framework”, argues 
Harper (2008, p 431).    This research aims to challenge any naivety by adopting a 
critical realist position.    
 
In simple terms, critical realism contends there is a reality that exists independently 
from its human conception and, by extension, that there are unobservable events 
which cause observable ones (Collier, 1994).   This implies that “the world is 
composed not only of events and our experience or impression of them, but also of 
(irreducible) structures, mechanisms, powers and tendencies, etc. that although not 
directly observable, nevertheless underlie actual events that we experience and govern 
or produce them” (Lawson, 1997, p.8).   In a research setting this notion suggests that 
the researcher might be able to create the conditions necessary (observable events) but 
that the results are caused by the underlying mechanisms (unobservable events). 
 
It is argued, however, that the application of this view in the social sciences (open 
systems) is different from the natural sciences (closed systems) (Bashkar, 1979).   
Society and culture are generated through human endeavours and change dynamically 
with human activity.   So, unlike natural laws, the rules of society and culture are not 
universal but dependent on situation and open to modification through mutual 
agreement.   This contention chimes with the view, posited by Strawbridge and 
Woolfe (2003), that counselling psychology consists of bodies of knowledge 
constructed in cultures and tested pragmatically by its usefulness rather than existing 
as a single large integrated system.   
 
Bashkar (1979) argues that fundamental difficulties exist with the way notions of 
prediction and falsification have been applied in open systems that characterise the 
social world.   Investigation of that social world, he argues, is unable to replicate the 
closed system typical of experiment in the natural sciences.   Bashkar contends that 
this inability means that a critical realist position ought to assert the ascendancy of 
explanation above prediction.   “…given the impossibility of artificially creating 
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closed systems, the human sciences must confront the problem of the direct scientific 
study of phenomena that only manifest themselves in open systems – for which 
orthodox philosophy of science , with its tacit presupposition of closure, is literally 
useless” (Bashkar, 1979, p. 27).     
 
This analysis, some suggest, leads to important ramifications for the methods used in 
this research - notably the use of statistical techniques in the prediction of outcomes 
(e.g. Mingers, 2002).   If the goodness of a theory, it is argued, is measured by its 
explanatory power then the predictive use of theories is not possible in open systems, 
so prediction fails as a measure of goodness.   On the other hand, Scott (2007) 
contends that this dilemma can be resolved.  
 
Scott (2007) argues that a complete explanation of social events and processes cannot 
be reduced to the intentions of agents without reference to structural properties nor 
structural forms be envisaged without reference to the intentions and beliefs of agents.    
Resolution is achieved through compensation, which allocates different purposes to 
different sorts of data (e.g. quantitative and qualitative data).   This is because reality 
is multi-layered and the various layers require different types of symbolic systems to 
describe them.   Such symbolic systems are manifest through extensionality and 
intentionality.  Extensionality in this sense is defined as ‘any two expressions true of 
the same objects, i.e. having the same extension,’ being ‘substituted freely for one 
another without changing the truth of the larger context’ (Wilson, 1990, p. 387).   
Extensionality, the argument continues, refers to the substitution of an expression and 
not the meaning.   By contrast, intentional expressions such as ‘she believes that…’ 
and ‘she wishes that….’ reflect the meaning of a proposition, so are inappropriate to 
standard mathematical or statistical modelling.   Hence, a mathematical or statistical 
explanation may be appropriate if the property of the object can be expressed 
extensionally; and likewise a qualitative approach is appropriate if the property can be 
expressed intentionally.   The products of this research, it is argued, meet the criteria 
for extensionality.  For example, alcohol consumption can be measured by a number 
of different, but substitutable, scales without changing the truth of an individual’s 
pattern of drinking.    
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4.2. Background. 
Previous research methods and approaches to the subject. 
 
This research is multifaceted, however, two main fields of enquiry can be delineated: 
the relationship between alcohol and gender and the relationship between alcohol and 
metacognition.   These fields of enquiry are discussed prior to outlining a rationale for 
the chosen research method.  
 
A. The relationship between alcohol and gender. 
Broadly, five subtypes of investigation of the relationship between alcohol and gender 
can be discerned. 
 
Subtype 1. Epidemiological Studies. 
These studies tend to be large scale national and international surveys of drinking 
behaviour that compare a number of parameters such as alcohol consumption, health 
indicators and economic costs between sexes.   The methods employed focus on 
producing comparative statistics (e.g. World Health Organisation, 2010) and rely on 
large scale sample data from numerous sources. 
 
Subtype 2.  Situating sex differences in cultural norms of alcohol use. 
These studies tend to blend data from epidemiological research with original material 
investigating attitudes towards alcohol, gender and notions of femininity and 
masculinity.   Research methods in this area generally comprise cross-sectional self-
report Likert scales (e.g. Wilsnack et. al., 2000). 
 
Subtype 3. Situating sex differences within existing psychological theories of alcohol 
use. 
From a cognitive behavioural perspective these include reviews of: tension reduction 
theory (Greely & Oei, 1999), personality theory (Sher, Trull, Bartholow, & Vieth, 
1999), developmental theory (Windle & Davies, 1999), alcohol expectancy theory 
(Goldman, Del Boca & Darkes, 1999) and behavioural genetic models (McGue, 
1999).   The methods chosen by researchers in this area centre on the 
operationalization of cognitive constructs and their measurement in relation to various 
behavioural outcomes particularly the volume of alcohol consumed. Research designs 
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on the whole have encompassed both cross-sectional and prospective approaches.   
Cross-sectional designs are the most frequently employed approach because of their 
ease of implementation and low cost, however, they have been criticised as they fail 
to resolve temporal relations between variables.   For example, correlations between 
alcoholic status and personality can reflect causal, consequential or spurious 
associations (Sher et al., 1999).   Prospective designs on the other hand, although 
useful in resolving temporal patterns, still do not establish causal relations and it is 
necessary to consider the effect of possible third variables in such studies. 
From a psychodynamic perspective, methods generally amount to the theoretical 
explanation of clinical observations.  For example, Khantzian’s (1985) self 
medication theory which posits addiction is a form of self soothing that is driven by 
deficits in the function of an individual’s ego.   Less common is O’Neill’s (1981) 
operationalization of the psychodynamic notions of men’s fear of femininity in the 
GRCS and which has been used in a number of cross sectional studies.      
 
Subtype 4.  Situating sex differences in a biomedical model. 
In this arena physiological and neurological sex differences as well as genetic markers 
are considered to be the antecedents of observed behavioural differences (e.g. Acker, 
1986; Hommer et al., 2001; Mann et al., 2005; Pfefferbaum et al., 2001).   
Experimental as well as prospective and cross sectional studies are the prevalent 
methods in this area.  
 
Subtype 5. Exploring the subjective experience of alcohol addiction from the 
perspective of a single sex. 
This area of research has employed qualitative methods (generally grounded theory) 
to provide insights into the male and female experience of alcohol dependency.   In 
doing so, these studies attempt to identify sex specific as well as overlapping themes 
in individuals’ journeys from addiction to recovery (e.g. Owen-Pugh & Allen, 2012; 
Lillie, 2002).    
 
B. The relationship between alcohol and metacognition. 
This area is dominated by cross sectional research designs that aim to demonstrate the 
relationship between alcohol consumption and metacognitive beliefs about the effects 
of alcohol use.   Methods centre on statistical techniques that and on correlational 
 45 
methods together with structural equation modelling which has been employed to 
create causal relationships. 
 
Rationale for the research method chosen. 
This research concerns specifically the contention that a causal relationship exists 
between alcohol metacognitions and alcohol consumption and can be represented by 
correlational data between these variables (e.g. Spada, Caselli & Wells, 2012; Spada, 
Moneta & Wells, 2007).   If that relationship is to be challenged with regards to a 
third variable (gender role conflict) then the method of investigation ought to be 
consistent with previous methods so that results are in an appropriate form for 
comparison.  In that way new information can be added more appropriately to the 
existing body of knowledge.   
 
Following the typology outlined by Barker, Pistrang and Elliott (2002), qualitative 
methods are more suited to descriptions of phenomena but are less appropriate for 
questions relating to correlation, causality and measurement, which are quantitative 
constructs.   Equally, Harper, (2008) argues that qualitative methods cannot address 
questions based on factors and outcome logic such as what is the influence of X on 
Y?    Some form of quantitative method, therefore, seems the most appropriate way of 
producing results from which valid comparisons with previous data can be drawn and 
is most capable of meeting the aims of this study. 
 
While acknowledging that the above argument follows the notion that the choice of 
method often relies on practical considerations (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992), it is also 
recognised that choosing the most appropriate method means ensuring the underlying 
epistemology is consistent with the research aims (Harper, 2008).    When the 
researcher adopts a realist epistemological framework, Harper (2008) concedes, a 
hypothetico-deductive approach to method is more appropriate.    
 
 
4.3.   Design 
The design is a cross sectional study of a purposive sample of 102 participants using 
previously published and validated survey scales, and analysed via correlational 
methods. 
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4.4.   Participants. 
Purposive sampling was used for selecting participants, consisting of attendees at 
alcohol recovery groups run by a national third sector organisation providing 
community based drug and alcohol services.   For purposes of inclusion in this study, 
participants were required to speak English, to have used alcohol regularly (at least 
within the last year) and be more than 18 years of age.   102 individuals participated 
in the study between January and May 2013.   Participants were included in the study 
if they scored more than 5 on (AUDIT; Babor, de la Fuente, Saunders, & Grant, 
1992).   A score of less then 5 on AUDIT is considered an acceptable cutoff for non-
problematic drinking (Gual, Segura, Contel, Heather, & Colom, 2002; Piccinelli et al., 
1997).   All participants completed the Gender Role Conflict Scale (GRCS) (O’Neil, 
Helms, Gable, David, & Wrightsman, 1986), the Positive Alcohol Metacognitions 
Scale (PAMS) (Spada & Wells, 2008), the Negative Alcohol Metacognitions Scale 
(NAMS) (Spada & Wells, 2008), and the AUDIT (Babor, T.F., Higgins-Biddle, J.C., 
Saunders, J.B., & Monteiro, M.G. 2001).   The mean age for the study sample was: 
male 41 years (standard deviation [SD] = 10.66 years) and female 39 years (SD 10.85.   
There were 74 males and 28 females.  
 
4.5.   Measures. 
Gender Role Conflict Scale (GRCS).    
Participants’ experience of GRC was assessed using the GRCS (O’Neil, et.al., 1986).   
This self-report instrument was developed to measure men’s reactions to the gender 
role expectations they face in current society.   The GRCS consists of 37 items that 
are grouped into four subscales: Success, Power, and Competition (SPC; 13 items); 
Restrictive Emotionality (RE; 10 items); Restrictive Affectionate Behavior Between 
Men (RABBM; 8 items); and Conflict Between Work and Family Relations 
(CBWFR; 6 items).   Sample items include “I like to feel superior to other people” 
(SPC), “I have difficulty telling others I care about them” (RE), “Affection with other 
men makes me tense” (RABBM), and “My work or school often disrupts other parts 
of my life (home, health, leisure)” (CBWFR).   Participants rate their agreement with 
each item on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 
agree), with higher scores indicating greater degrees of conflict associated with the 
male gender role.   Factor analysis of the original sample using Cronbach’s alpha 
indicated internal consistencies of .85, .82, .83, and .75, and four-week test– retest 
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reliabilities of .84, .76, .86, and .72 for SPC, RE, RABBM, and CBWFR, respectively 
(O’Neil et al., 1995).   Schaub and Williams (2007) recently reported similar test–
retest reliabilities; ranging from .82 to .89.   Construct validity is provided by 
correlations between the GRCS scores and endorsement of traditional male gender 
role norms.   For example, the RE and RABBM subscales were found to correlate 
with a fear of intimacy measure (Good & Mintz, 1990; Good et al., 1995).  
Concurrent validity of the GRCS has been found with differentiating the three 
subscales of the Personality Attributes Questionnaire (O’Neil et al., 1986), correlating 
the factors with attitudes of masculinity, social desirability, and fear of intimacy 
(Good et al.,1995).   Female versions of the GRCS were constructed by reversing 
relevant words (e.g. him, her; man, women) (O’Neil, 2008).  
 
Positive Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (PAMS). 
Participants’ positive alcohol metacognitions were measured using she PAMS (Spada 
& Wells, 2008).  PAMS is a 12-item measure developed to assess positive 
metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use.   It consists of two factors: (1) positive 
metacognitive beliefs about emotional self-regulation; and (2) positive metacognitive 
beliefs about cognitive self-regulation.   Examples of items relating to emotional self-
regulation include: ‘drinking reduces my self-consciousness’.  Examples of items 
relating to cognitive self-regulation include: ‘drinking helps me to control my 
thoughts’.   Participants rate their agreement on a four-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 (do not agree) to 4 (agree very much).   Higher scores represent higher levels 
of positive metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use.   PAMS was constructed and 
factor analysed initially using a community sample (n = 261), and its factor structure 
replicated in a clinical sample (n = 80) (Spada & Wells, 2006b).   Results from these 
studies suggest that PAMS is dimensional and possesses good internal and external 
reliability in both community (α = 0.88 for PAMS total, α = 0.81 for factor 1, and α = 
0.87 for factor 2) and clinical populations (α = 0.84 for PAMS total, α = 0.77 for 
factor 1, and α = 0.81 for factor 2)  (Spada & Wells, 2006b).   Mean PAMS scores at 
testing and retesting over an eight-week period in a community sample (N = 50) 
indicate acceptable test-retest reliability for both factors (factor 1: rho = 0.75,P 
<0.0005; factor 2: rho = 0.65, P <0.0005), suggesting that they possess relatively 
stable characteristics (Spada &Wells, 2006b).   PAMS factors 1 and 2 have been 
found to predict problem drinking independently of trait anxiety in a community 
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population (n = 138) (Spada & Wells, 2008).   PAMS factor 1 has been found to 
predict problem drinking independently of anxiety and depression in a clinical 
population (n = 80) (Spada & Wells, 2008).   PAMS factor 2 has been found to 
predict classification as a problem drinker independently of emotion in a mixed 
community and clinical population (n = 163) (Spada & Wells, 2008). 
 
Negative Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (NAMS). 
Participants’ negative alcohol metacognitions were measured using the NAMS (Spada 
& Wells, 2008).   NAMS is a six-item measure developed to assess negative 
metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use.  It consists of two factors: (1) negative 
metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability; and (2) negative metacognitive beliefs 
about cognitive harm.   Items relating to uncontrollability include: ‘my drinking 
persists no matter how I try to control it’. Items relating to cognitive harm include: 
‘drinking will damage my mind’. Participants rate their agreement on a four-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 4 (agree very much)..   Higher scores 
represent higher levels of negative metacognitive beliefs about alcohol use. NAMS 
was initially constructed and factor analysed in a community sample (n = 261), and its 
factor structure was replicated in a clinical sample (n = 80) (Spada & Wells, 2008).    
Results from these studies suggest that NAMS is dimensional and possesses good 
internal and external reliability in 
both community (α = 0.74 for NAMS total, α = 0.68 for factor 1, and α = 0.72 for 
factor 2) and clinical (α = 0.87 for PAMS total, α = 0.87 for factor 1, and α = 0.83 for 
factor 2) populations (Spada & Wells, 2006b).   Mean NAMS scores at testing and 
retesting over an eight-week period in a community sample (N = 50) indicate 
acceptable test-retest reliability for factor 2, but poor test-retest reliability for factor 1 
(factor 1:rho = 0.42, P = 0.001; factor 2: rho = 0.68, P <0.0005) (Spada & Wells, 
2006b).   NAMS factor 1 has been found to predict problem drinking independently 
of trait anxiety in a community population (n = 138) (Spada & Wells, 2008). NAMS 
factor 1 has been found to predict problem drinking independently of anxiety and 
depression in a clinical population (n = 80) (Spada & Wells, 2008). NAMS factor 1 
has been found to predict classification as a problem drinker independently of 
emotion in a mixed community and clinical population (n = 163) (Spada & Wells, 
2008). 
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The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT). 
AUDIT (Babor et.al., 2001) was developed as a screening tool by the World Health 
Organization for early identification of problem drinkers.   AUDIT consists of ten 
questions regarding recent alcohol consumption, alcohol dependence symptoms and 
alcohol-related problems.   Respondents are asked to choose one of between three and 
five statements (per question) that most applies to their use of alcoholic drinks during 
the past year.   Responses are scored from 0 to 4 in the direction of problem drinking.   
The summary score for the total AUDIT ranges from 0, indicating no presence of 
problem drinking behaviour, to 40, indicating marked levels of problem drinking 
behaviour and alcohol dependence.   A score of 5 on AUDIT is considered the lowest 
acceptable cutoff for problem drinking.   A score of 20 or above is considered a cutoff 
point for severe alcohol dependence (Babor et al., 2001).   This instrument has been 
extensively used and possesses good validity and reliability (Babor et al., 2001). 
 
 
4.6.   Statistical Analyses. 
Gender role conflict, metacognition and alcohol consumption characteristics of male 
and female participants were compared using chi-square and t test analyses.    
Multiple regression analyses were performed to examine the main and interactive 
effects of sex and alcohol metacognition with alcohol use as the dependent variable.  
Tests for mediation were carried out following the method outlined by Barron and 
Kenny (1986) and a Sobel test for significance applied.   Tests for moderation 
outlined in Howell (2002) were also conducted. 
 
 
4.7. Ethics. 
Approval for this study was sought and given by London Metropolitan University and 
Crime Reduction Initiative (CRI).    CRI centres in Slough, Reading, Watford, 
Hatfield and Stevenage agreed to facilitate this study.    CRI employees are trained to 
deal with client distress, confidentiality, power relationships and informed consent 
that facilitated an ethical approach to recruitment and survey completion. Employees 
received a presentation on the background to the study and a procedural briefing 
during their regular monthly meetings in advance of the study.    An important 
consideration of employees and the researcher’s personal experience is gaining and 
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maintaining client trust.   In the experience of the researcher it is not unusual for 
clients to be suspicious of questions asked of them.   Equally, given the nature of this 
clinical population and the often difficult personal circumstances they have 
experienced, questions – oral or written – can appear intrusive and or insensitive.   
Consequently, the survey battery proposed for this study contained only the minimum 
amount of personal data (age, sex) required for the analysis. 
 
Employees agreed to ask clients if they would be willing to participate in the study.   
Clients of CRI agreeing were handed an information sheet (Appendix 2) and 
reminded of the voluntary nature of the study.  Those clients participating were 
handed the questionnaires (Appendix 1) to complete anonymously in private; 
subsequently placing them in a sealable envelope; only the researcher saw completed 
questionnaires.  Where requested a debrief session was conducted for both individuals 
and groups. 
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5. Results. 
 
1. Statistical Analysis. 
Measures of drinking behaviour are often skewed positively therefore questioning the 
use of analyses that assume an underlying normal distribution.   Positively skewed 
data are routinely transformed using square roots to ameliorate this problem.   
Variables in this study that were skewed excessively were reflected and then square 
root transformed (i.e., the raw value x was transformed as √K- x, where K = largest 
value + 1).   The AUDIT and PAM variables exhibited excessive skewness and were 
transformed using reflected square roots, whereas the NAM and GRC measures were 
relatively symmetric and not transformed.   The effect of these transformations in the 
correlation matrices is to reverse the sign when the product of a transformed variable 
against an untransformed variable is reported.   However, for ease of interpretation the 
axes of graphs have been transformed back to the original scales. 
 
2. Means and Standard Deviations. 
Means and standard deviations of age and scales are reported.   Reliability was 
assessed using Chronbach’s Alpha.    Results, split by sex, are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations 
 Scale Mean SD N 𝛼 
Male Age 41.03 10.66 74  
 GRC 127.78 23.17 74 .85 
 PAM 17.43 1.17 74 .84 
 NAM 16.38 5.80 74 .89 
 AUDIT 23.60 1.39 74 .91 
Female Age  38.74 10.85 27  
 GRC 124.82 34.95 28 .94 
 PAM 18.24 1.24 28 .84 
 NAM 15.93 5.31 28 .91 
 AUDIT 23.84 1.33 28 .88 
Paired samples t-test indicated there were no significant differences in mean ages and 
test scores between males and females.   Reliability scores measured by Chronbach’s 
Alpha are in line with previous estimates outlined in the Methodology chapter. 
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3. Correlations. 
The Pearson product moment correlations were calculated so that overall patterns of 
relationships between variables could be examined and scores, split by sex, are 
reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Correlations between GRC, PAM NAM and AUDIT. 
  GRC PAM NAM AUDIT 
Male GRC 1 -.20  .36** -.30** 
 PAM  1 -.52**  .44** 
 NAM   1 -.66** 
 AUDIT    1 
      
Female GRC 1 -.33  .23 -.16 
 PAM  1 -.61*  .45* 
 NAM   1 -.76** 
 AUDIT    1 
      
** p < 0.01 level (2-tailed), * p < 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Pearson product moment correlations between GRC sub-scale scores and main scale 
scores are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3.Correlations between GRCS Subscales, PAM, NAM, and AUDIT. 
  SPC RE RAB CWLF GRC PAM NAM AUDIT 
Male SPC 1 .14 -.05 .28* .57** -.08 -.03 -.00 
 RE  1 .56** .04 .75** -.23  .45** -.44** 
 RAB   1 .05 .68** -.08  .36** -.28** 
 CWLF    1 .42**  .14 .14 -.17 
          
Female SPC 1 .39* .18 .38* .69** -.19 -.11  .09 
 RE  1 .81** .42* .88** -.38*  .43* -.34 
 RAB   1 .46* .79** -.31  .33 -.27 
 CWLF    1 .66** -.04  .06  .02 
** p < 0.01 level (2-tailed),  * p < 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Gender role conflict (GRC) was positively correlated with alcohol use (AUDIT) 
(reversed sign), however, this relationship was significant only for males.   There was 
a positive correlation between positive alcohol metacognitions (PAM) and alcohol use 
(AUDIT) for both males and females; the Pearson product moment correlation was 
similar to that previously reported (Spada & Wells, 2009).    
 
4. Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Scores of positive and negative alcohol metacognitions will differ by 
sex.   
Linear regressions were used to assess whether significant differences occurred 
between males and females predicting scores on PAM and NAM scales.   Sex was 
included in the model as a dummy variable.    Results of the regressions are given in  
Table 4. Regression coefficients of PAM and NAM on Sex. 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 16.38  .60  
Sex   -.45 1.14 -.04b 
 Dependent variable: NAM.   
 b. p > .05 
 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 4.07 .14  
Sex -.10 .23 -.04b 
Dependent variable: PAM.   
b. p > .05 
 
Results indicate there is no significant difference in in PAM and NAM scores 
between males and females. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: GRC scores will predict alcohol use in men but not in women. 
Linear regressions were conducted to assess whether scores of gender role conflict 
predict alcohol use in males but not females.   Effect size for the models was 
calculated using Cohen’s f 2.   Power was assessed following the procedure 
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recommended in Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang (2009) using G* Power program 
‘Linear bivariate regression: One group, size of slope’.    Results of regressions are 
given in Table 5. 
Table 5.Regession coefficients of GRC on AUDIT. 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 6.39 .88  
GRC Male -.02 .01 -.30a 
Dependent variable: AUDIT.    a.  p < .05 
Effect size: f 2 = .10 
Power (alpha .05) = .77 
 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 4.79 .96  
GRC Female -.01 .01 -.16b 
Dependent variable: AUDIT.    b.  p > .05 
Effect size: f 2 = .03 
Power (alpha .05) = .13 
 
Results indicate that GRC scores in males predict alcohol use (AUDIT), whereas the 
relationship between female GRC scores and alcohol use (AUDIT) was non 
significant.   However, the low power reported for the female regression model 
reduces confidence that a type II error has not resulted, suggesting that non-
significance could be due to insufficient power.  Stevens (1996) suggests that when 
small sample sizes are involved it might be necessary to adjust the probability level 
(alpha).  Adjusting the probability (alpha = .10) resulted in revised power of .22.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Scores on the GRC subscale ‘Restricted Emotionality’ will predict 
scores of positive alcohol metacognitions.  
 
Two series of regression were conducted to examine the predictive power of the GRC 
subscale ‘Restricted Emotionality’ (RE) against positive alcohol metacognitions 
PAM.   The first series of regressions examined the relationship using the full PAM 
scale.   The second series examined the relationship in terms of the two PAM 
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subscales ‘Emotional Self Control’ (ESR) and ‘Cognitive Self Control’ (CSR).   
Effect size for the models was calculated using Cohen’s f 2.   Power was assessed as in 
Hypothesis 2.   Results of regressions are given in the tables below. 
  
Series 1: Restricted Emotionality (RE) – Positive Alcohol Metacognition (PAM). 
Table 6. Regression coefficients of RE on PAM. 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 5.12 .39  
RE Total Sample -.03 .01 -.28a 
Effect size: f 2 = .08 
Power (alpha .05) = .83 
 
Constant 5.03 .50  
RE Male -.03 .02 -.23a 
Effect size: f 2 = .06 
Power (alpha .05) = .51 
 
Constant 5.24 .64  
RE Female -.04 .02 -.38a 
Effect size: f 2 = .1                                 Dependent variable: PAM.         a.  p < .05. 
Power (alpha .05) = .56 
 
 
 
 
 
Series 2a: Restrictive Emotionality (RE) – Emotional Self Regulation (ESR). 
Table 7. Regression coefficients of RE on ESR.  
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 4.00 .32  
RE Total Sample -.03 .01 -.28a 
Effect size: f 2 = .09 
Power (alpha .05) = .83 
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Constant 4.00 .43  
RE Male -.03 .01 -.25a 
Effect size: f 2 = .07 
Power (alpha .05) = .58 
Constant 4.00 .50  
RE Female -.03 .02 -.37b 
Effect size: f 2 = .16                  Dependent variable: ESR.   a.  p < .05,  b.  p > .05 
Power (alpha .05) = .52 
 
 
Series 2b: Restrictive Emotionality (RE) – Cognitive Self Regulation (CSR). 
Table 8. Regression coefficients of RE on CSR. 
 B SE B 𝛽 
Constant 3.35 .26  
RE Total Sample -.02 .01 -.23a 
Effect size: f 2 = .06 
Power (alpha .05) = .66 
Constant 3.22 3.3  
RE Male -.01 .01 -.16b 
Effect size: f 2 = .03 
Power (alpha .05) = .29 
Constant 3.55 .45  
RE Female -.03 .01 -.36b 
 Effect size: f 2 = .14             Dependent variable: CSR.      a.  p < .05,  b.  p > .05 
Power (alpha .05) = .49 
                                
Results indicate that PAM scores are predicted by RE for both the total sample as well 
as males and females separately.   Furthermore, RE scores for the total sample predict 
scores on both PAM subscales (ESR and CSR).  However, when split by sex neither 
male nor female RE scores predicted CSR.  While male RE scores predicted ESR 
female scores did not reach significance (p = .055).    
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Hypothesis 4: Positive and negative metacognitive belief scores will not predict 
alcohol use independently of gender role conflict.  
The independence of metacognitive beliefs’ prediction of alcohol use relies on the 
fact that a third variable, such as GRC, does not play a role in governing that 
relationship.   Both mediating and moderating relationships can indicate the effect of 
a third variable on the relationship between two variables.   A series of studies 
investigated the presence, or absence, of mediating and moderating relationships. 
 
Mediating Relationships. 
 
Mediation would exist if GRC ‘sat between’ the relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs (positive and negative) and alcohol use.    The requirements set out by Baron 
and Kenny (1986) were followed to establish whether GRC mediated the relationship 
between metacognitive beliefs and alcohol use.  In particular, if when the mediator 
(GRC) and the independent variable (PAM or NAM) are used simultaneously to 
predict the dependent variable (AUDIT), the previously significant path between the 
independent and dependent variables is reduced or non significant then a mediating 
relationship is indicated. 
Mediation of PAM-AUDIT by GRC. 
                                                 GRC 
 
 
                            PAM                                 AUDIT 
 
A series of correlations were conducted to establish whether or not further 
investigation was merited.   Results indicated that GRC did not mediate the 
relationship between positive metacognitive beliefs and alcohol use nor negative 
metacognitive beliefs and alcohol use. 
 
Moderating Relationships. 
 
While a mediating relationship identifies a variable through which the independent 
variable (PAM or NAM) influences the dependent variable (AUDIT), a moderating 
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relationship describes a state where the independent and dependent variables change 
as a function of a third variable (GRC).   
 
Moderation of PAM-AUDIT by GRC. 
                                                                 
                                                                 GRC 
 
 
 
 
                                      PAM                                           AUDIT 
 
 The procedure outlined by Howell (2002) was followed to investigate the moderating 
effect of GRC on the relationship between metacognitive beliefs (PAM and NAM) 
and alcohol use.   A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to test the 
above hypothesis. 
 
Series 1: Does GRC moderate PAM – AUDIT? 
A series of regression analyses was performed to assess whether gender role conflict 
(GRC) moderates the relationship between positive alcohol metacognition and alcohol 
use.  Prior to creating a product term to represent an interaction between GRC and 
PAM, scores of both variables were centred by subtracting the relevant sample means.   
The regression included GRC, PAM and GRC x PAM interaction term as predictors 
of alcohol use (AUDIT). 
The table below summarises the results of GRC moderation regressions for positive 
alcohol metacognitions.   Power is assessed using G*Power ‘Several Predictors 
(Multiple Linear Regression)’.  The ‘random model’ was chosen over the ‘fixed 
model’ because predictors are assumed to be random variables with values sampled 
from an underlying multivariate normal distribution.   The fixed-predictors model is 
more appropriate for experimental research where known predictor values are 
typically assigned to participants.  In contrast, the random predictors model resembles 
more closely the design of observational studies, such as this instance, where 
participants together with associated predictor values are sampled from an underlying 
population (Faul et al., 2009). 
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Table 9. Regression of GRC and PAM on AUDIT. 
Total Sample B SE  𝛽 
Constant 3.955 .118  
GRC -.007 .004 -.133b 
PAM -.064 .013 -.434a 
Interaction  .002 .000  .278a 
Effect size: f 2 = .44 
Power (alpha .05) = .99 
Male B SE  𝛽 
Constant 3.972 .138  
GRC -.012 .006 -.193b 
PAM  .478 .119  .400a 
Interaction -.015 .005 -.302a 
Effect size: f 2 = .50 
Power (alpha .05) = .99 
Female    
Constant 3.920 .246  
GRC -.001 .007 -.014b 
PAM  .512 .205  .477b 
Interaction -.007 .006 -.216b 
Effect size: f 2 = .32                 Dependent variable: AUDIT.  a.  p < .05;   b.  p > .05 
Power (alpha .05) = .47 
 
While results for the total sample indicated that gender role conflict moderated the 
relationship between positive alcohol cognitions and alcohol use, further examination 
suggested that the total sample was not homogeneous.   The male subsample 
interaction term reached statistical significance, however, the female subsample did 
not.   As a result only the male subsample was investigated further.   The overall 
regression for the Male subsample (N=74) was statistically significant,  
R = .576, F(3, 70) = 11.574, p < .001.   Unstandardised regression coefficients are 
reported, unless otherwise stated.   There was a significant GRC x PAM interaction,  
b = -.015, t(70) = -3.075, p < .01, sr2 = .0906. There was also a significant effect for 
PAM, b = .478, t(70) = 4.013, p < .001, sr2 = .154.  GRC failed to reach significance,  
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b = -.012, t(70) = -1.930, p > .05, sr2 = .036.  As the interaction term was statistically 
significant it was retained in the model; although GRC was non-significant by 
convention it was also retained as it is involved the interaction (Howell, 2002).  To 
visualise the GRC x PAM interaction examine the graph (Figure 1) of the regression 
prediction lines for High, Medium and Low GRC scores. 
 
Relationship between Alcohol Use and Positive Alcohol Metacognitions split by 
Gender Role Conflict category. 
 
 
Figure 1. Males:  Plot of alcohol use (AUDIT) as a function of positive alcohol 
metacognitions (PAM) for different levels of gender role conflict (GRC). 
Three values of GRC (30, 0 and -30) were selected as representative of high, medium 
and low groups in this subsample.   Scores of 1.7 and -1.7 were chosen as 
representative values for PAM.  The graph in Figure 1 was constructed by substituting 
these values into the regression equation: 
 
Y = 3.972 - .012 GRC + .478 PAM - .015 Interaction  
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To assess whether the regression slopes for each of the individual GRC group are 
statistically significant further analyses were conducted.  Regressions were run to 
predict alcohol use from positive alcohol metacognitions separately within each GRC 
group.  Based on an examination of the frequency distribution, GRC scores were 
divided into three groups.   The lowest 33% of the subsample had GRC scores lower 
than -9, the middle 33% had GRC scores between -8 and 10, and the highest 33% had 
GRC scores above 11.   The mid points of these groups corresponded to the values of 
GRC for which the line graph above was calculated.  This distribution split gave the 
largest number of participants in each group.       Within the Low GRC group the 
PAM variable was statistically significant as a predictor of alcohol use, t(22) = 3.521, 
p < .01.   Within the Medium GRC group the PAM variable was statistically 
significant as a predictor of alcohol use, t(22) = 4.206, p < .001.  Within the High 
GRC group the PAM variable did not reach statistical significance, t(22) = -.445,       
p = .661.    
 
A causal inference cannot be made from non-experimental data that is correlational in 
basis, however, results appear to indicate that the higher an individual’s gender role 
conflict, the less likely a reduction in alcohol use if treatment were to focus on 
reducing positive alcohol metacognitions or alcohol expectancies generally. 
 
Series 2: Does GRC moderate NAM – AUDIT? 
 
Results from a series of multiple regression analyses indicate that GRC does not 
moderate negative alcohol metacognitions (NAM) in the sample as a whole or 
subsamples of males and females. 
 
 
Series 3: Does the GRC subscale Restricted Emotionality (RE) moderate PAM – 
AUDIT. 
Results from the correlation matrix indicate that of the four GRC subscales 
‘Restricted Emotionality’ (RE) has the strongest association with alcohol use.    
The idea that masculine gender roles are problematic for men has led to various 
attempts to measure individual differences in men’s adherence to these gender roles 
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(Smiler, 2004).   Applied to the context of men’s emotional behavior and problematic 
outcomes by far the most widely used measure has been the RE subscale of the GRC 
scale (Wong, Rochlen & Pituch, 2006).   To investigate how ‘restricted emotionality’ 
might be associated with problematic alcohol use in men compared with women, a 
series of regression analyses was conducted.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Regression coefficients of RE and PAM on AUDIT. 
Male B SE  𝛽 
Constant 3.94 .13  
RE -.02 .02 -.15b 
PAM -.57 .12  .48a 
Interaction -.05 .01  .39a 
Dependent variable: AUDIT 
Effect size: f 2 = .63   
Power (alpha .05) = .99 
a.  p < .05,   b.  p > .05 
 
Female B SE  𝛽 
Constant 3.81 .24  
RE -.01 .02 -.13b 
PAM  .50 .20  .46a 
Interaction -.04 .02 -.35bc 
Dependent variable: AUDIT.   
Effect size: f 2 = .52                    
Power (alpha .05) = .61 
Power (alpha .10) = .83 
a.  p < .05,   b.  p > .05, c. p =.055 
The male subsample interaction term reached statistical significance, however, the 
female subsample did not.   As a result only the male subsample was investigated 
further.   The overall regression for the Male subsample (N=74) was statistically 
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significant, R = .622, F(3, 70) = 14.724, p < .001.   Unstandardised regression 
coefficients are reported.   There was a significant RE x PAM interaction, b = -.050, 
t(70) = -3.919, p < .001, sr2 = .180.       There was also a significant effect for PAM, b 
= .570, t(70) = 4.801, p < .001, sr2 = .248.  RE failed to reach significance, b = -.023, 
t(70) = -1.491, p > .05, sr2 = .031.  The interaction term was statistically significant 
and retained in the model; RE was non-significant but retained as it is involved the 
interaction (Howell, 2002).  The GRC x PAM interaction is represented the graph 
(Figure 2) of the regression prediction lines for High, Medium and Low RE scores. 
 
Relationship Between Alcohol Use and Positive Alcohol Metacognitions, Split by 
Restricted Emotionality category. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Males:  Plot of alcohol use (AUDIT) as a function of positive alcohol 
metacognitions (PAM) for different levels of restricted emotionality (RE).  
Untransformed data are used for ease of interpretation. 
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To assess whether the slopes for each of the individual RE group are statistically 
significant further analyses were conducted.  Regressions were run to predict alcohol 
use from positive alcohol metacognitions separately within each RE group.  
 
Three values of RE (12, 0 and -12) were selected as representative of high, medium 
and low groups in this subsample.   Scores of 1.7 and -1.7 were chosen as 
representative values for PAM.   Based on an examination of the frequency 
distribution, RE scores were divided into three groups.   The lowest 33% of the 
subsample had RE scores lower than – 4.39, the middle 33% had RE scores between -
4.38 and 3.61, and the highest 33% had GRC scores above 3.62.   The mid points of 
these groups corresponded to the values of RE for which the line graph above was 
calculated.  This distribution split gave the largest number of participants in each 
group.       Within the Low RE group the PAM variable was statistically significant as 
a predictor of alcohol use, t(22) = 4.319, p < .001.   Within the Medium RE group the 
PAM variable was statistically significant as a predictor of alcohol use, t(24) = 3.876, 
p < .001.  Within the High RE group the PAM variable did not reach statistical 
significance, t(19) = -1.078,  p = .295.    
 
Again caution is required for data that is correlational in basis when inferring 
causality, however, results appear to indicate that the higher an individual’s restricted 
emotionality, the less likely a reduction in alcohol use if treatment were to focus on 
reducing positive alcohol metacognitions. 
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6. Analysis. 
 
1. Correlations. 
 
Chronbach Alpha is high for both male (.84) and female (.94) GRC implying the scale 
has good internal consistency.   However, visual inspection of the pattern of 
intercorrelation for GRC subscales differs between males and females: five out of six 
intercorrelatons display significant Pearson product moment correlation for the female 
subsample whereas, for males there are only two.     Furthermore, the strength of 
correlation is different between male and female coefficients.    The implication is that 
the GRC scale might display internal consistency but not uni-dimensionality.  This 
possibility would mean different patterns of shared variance between subscales, hence 
different factors constituting the main GRC scale for male and female subsamples. 
 
Differences in correlation coefficients, however, do not meet statistical significance. 
For example, the intercorrelations for SPC – RE  (r = .14 male, p > .05 and r = .39, p 
< .05 female) on first inspection appear reasonably different.   However, significance 
testing by converting the Pearson product moment correlations (r) into standard 
scores (z scores), then using these values to calculate the test statistic zobs , reveals a 
clearer picture.   The above intercorrelations, for example: 
 
Zobs = 
!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!    = -1.16                  (Z1, N1 = male, Z2, N2 = female) 
 
As Zobs lies between -1.96 and 1.96 differences between male and female correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant.   This example result, plus others not 
reported here, indicates that despite visual differences in the pattern of correlation 
coefficients, such differences are not significant so the GRC scale displays both 
internal consistency and uni-dimensionality.   Furthermore, results also indicate that 
the same set of factors underpins both the male and female subsample. 
 
Of greater concern is the high intercorrelation between the restricted emotionality 
(RE) and Restricted Affectionate Behaviour (RAB) subscales for both males (.56, p = 
< .001) and females (.81, p = < .001).   Such a correlation suggests a high degree of 
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overlap between subscales thus calling into doubt whether they really sample discreet 
areas of the GRC domain.   Inflated correlations can also ensue because of problems 
caused by content overlap, which in turn, has implications for reliability and validity. 
Inspecting items in the RE subscale reveals such a possible overlap.    For example, 
three of the ten items included in this subscale (“Talking (about my feelings) during 
sexual relations is difficult for me” [item 13], “Telling others of my strong feelings is 
not part of my sexual behaviour” [item 22], and “Telling my partner my feelings 
about him/her during sex is difficult for me” [item 30]) appear to measure similar 
components of restricted emotionality in relation to sexual behaviour.    Similarly, two 
other items (“I have difficulty expressing my tender feelings” [item 19], and “I often 
have trouble finding words that describe how I am feeling” [item 25]) both appear to 
describe overlapping notions about an inability to express emotion. 
 
The strength of correlation between negative alcohol metacognitions (NAM) and 
AUDIT was stronger than previously reported (Spada & Wells, 2009).   This latter 
difference could have resulted from different sampling frames.  The previous study 
used a community sample (mean AUDIT = 11.2) whereas this study sampled a 
clinical population (mean AUDIT = 24.6, untransformed).  Scores above 20 indicate 
alcohol dependence. 
 
 
 
2. Hypothesis 1: Scores of positive and negative alcohol metacognitions will differ by 
sex.  
Neither means nor regression analysis revealed any significant difference between 
males and female scores of either positive or negative alcohol metacognitions.    
Previous studies have presented contradictory evidence with regards to alcohol 
metacognition and sex differences.   For example, on the one hand, Clarke et al. 
(2012, p. 573) report “… that being male, low on conscientiousness and high on 
positive alcohol metacognitions about cognitive self-regulation raises the risk for 
increased weekly levels of alcohol use in binge drinking university students”.    In 
contrast, other studies (e.g. Spada et al., 2013) have not reported any significant 
significant differences between male and female scores on tests of positive and 
 67 
negative metacognition.   Such lack of difference, however, remains perplexing 
because alcohol metacognitions, can be regarded as a subset of alcohol expectancies 
generally, for which a number of studies have reported sex differences in both 
younger and older adults (e.g. Satre & Knight, 2001; Madson et al. 2013). 
 
One factor that might explain these results is the commonly reported finding that sex 
differences in alcohol expectancies are confounded by the level of alcohol use 
(Wilson, 1988).    High alcohol use tends to endorse positive (e.g., Brown et al., 1980; 
Mooney et al., 1987) and negative (Hittner, 1995; Rohsenow, 1983) alcohol 
expectancies more than low use across a broad age range of adults.   Similar positive 
and negative metacognition scores in this study for males and females, therefore, 
might simply reflect similar levels of alcohol use; AUDIT scores showed no 
significant different between male and females.   Further research is required to 
disentangle this possible confound. 
 
Another factor that might contribute towards an explanation about why results did not 
support the hypothesis is the difference in mean age between this study and previous 
ones.   Many previous studies have relied on undergraduates as convenience samples 
or have deliberately targeted young adults.  Hence, previously reported mean ages are 
considerably younger than participants in this research.   For example, Clarke et al. 
(2012) report a mean age of 21.2 years and Madson et al. (2013) 20.2 years, compared 
with 41.03 years for males and 38.74 years for females in this study.   It is possible 
therefore, that attitudes towards alcohol metacognitions and alcohol expectancies 
show greater differences between sexes at younger ages, then converge as age and 
alcohol experience increases.    Evidence for age differentials has been demonstrated 
by Pabst et al. (2014) who report, that for age groups 18-24, 25-44 and 45-64 years, a 
range of alcohol expectancies have significantly different mean scores.   Furthermore, 
an investigation conducted among a community sample Leigh and Stacy (2004) 
reported that positive expectancy predicted drinking better than negative expectancy 
only among respondents under 35, while negative expectancy was a better predictor 
of drinking status in most respondents over 35 years.   These age related differences 
might result from past experiences with alcohol which, it is hypothesised, influence 
individuals’ implicit alcohol-related expectancies (i.e., expectancies that are outside 
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conscious awareness and influence behaviours automatically) (Cox, Fadardi, & 
Klinger, 2006).    It is possible that the shared experiences of heavy alcohol users over 
considerable periods of time might result in a convergence of attitudes towards 
alcohol expectancies generally and alcohol metacognitions particularly.   Further 
research, of a prospective nature, is required to indicate if such a convergence occurs 
over time for alcohol dependent individuals. 
 
3. Hypothesis 2: GRC scores will predict alcohol use in men but not in women. 
 
Results of the regression analyses supported the hypothesis that gender role conflict 
predicts alcohol use in men but not women.  This simple statement, however, belies a 
more complex picture.   On the one hand, previous studies suggest that gender role 
conflict predicts both alcohol consumption and drinking problems in students as well 
as clinical populations (Blazina & Watkins, 1996; Isenhart, 1993; Korcuska & 
Thombs, 2003), and that for similar age cohorts GRC is significantly higher in men 
than women (O’Neil, 2014) thus supporting the hypothesis.    On the other hand, 
mean GRC and AUDIT scores in this study show little difference between men and 
women, suggesting that support for the hypothesis is surprising.   One possible reason 
why results in this study, of mean scores compared with correlation and regression 
investigations, appear to oppose one another is that GRC might be related to other 
behaviours in men and women, and it is those consequent behaviours that create a 
differential in the propensity for alcohol use.    
 
A number of alcohol related behaviours are associated with sex differences, e.g. 
impulsivity, normative amount and coping strategies.   However, only the relationship 
between coping strategies, gender role conflict and alcohol consumption has been 
investigated.    Uy, Massouth and Gottdiener  (2014) report that, in an investigation of 
a clinical sample of men, coping strategies mediated the relationship between gender 
role conflict and alcohol consumption as well as drinking-related problems.  Coping 
strategies were the only predictor of increased alcohol use as well as the most robust 
predictor of drinking-related problems.    They note that alcohol might be used as a 
coping mechanism to deal with negative states (Khantzian, 1999), suggesting that 
men who restrict their emotions more frequently than others could experience a 
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greater desire to drink to cope with their emotions.   Thus leading to greater alcohol 
consumption.   This suggestion is consistent with results of this study that indicate the 
GRC subscale ‘restricted emotionality’ (RE) is significantly associated with alcohol 
use in men but not women.   They hypothesize, that men with lower levels of gender 
role conflict, recognize and use more adaptive coping strategies such as obtaining 
support from others.     
 
Furthermore, a prospective eight year study of alcohol coping strategy sex differences 
among untreated problem drinkers found that from baseline to year eight, both women 
and men increased their reliance on approach (adaptive) coping and decreased 
reliance on avoidance (maladaptive) coping and drinking to cope.  Importantly, 
however, these improvements in coping over time were significantly more apparent 
for women than for men (Timko et al., 2005). 
 
It is also possible, however, that the sex difference reported could have arisen if males 
and females were to hold differing conceptions of gender role conflict which, in turn, 
would be reflected in the GRC scale’s lack of dimensionality generally and across 
males and females particularly.   A recent confirmatory factor analysis of the GRC 
scale, with two independent male samples consisting of European and African 
American men, revealed that factorial invariance across both models was the same 
(Nowalk et al., 2011).  Thus, suggesting that the GRC scale’s dimensionality was the 
same across both samples.    Further, analysis of this study’s correlation matrix did 
not produce evidence of a lack of dimensionality across the male – female samples.   
While internal consistency is a form of reliability, dimensionality is associated with 
construct validity, hence it can be argued that the GRC scale represents conceptually 
identical domains for both men and women.  
 
 
4. Hypothesis 3: Scores on the GRC subscale ‘Restricted Emotionality’ will predict 
scores of positive alcohol metacognitions.  
 
Restricted emotionality (RE) predicted positive alcohol metacognition (PAM) in the 
total sample as well as the male and female subsamples despite a reduction in power 
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for the latter two.   However, when RE was regressed on the emotional component of 
the PAM scale, ‘emotional self regulation’ (ESR), only male RE scores predicted 
ESR.   These findings are consistent with a gendered social learning model (Addis et 
al., 2010; Smiler, 2004), which offers a theoretical framework for explaining 
relationships among masculine norms, alcohol expectancies and alcohol-related 
problems.    This model hypothesizes that traditional masculine norms influence an 
individual’s (male or female) perception of their environment so influencing the 
development of learning across a variety of social processes such as the development 
of positive alcohol expectancies (Addis & Cohane, 2005; Courtenay, 2000; Levant, 
1996; Mahalik et al., 2003).    Men, it is claimed, receive positive reinforcement 
within social contexts when they endorse masculine norms but are also penalised if 
they display characteristics perceived as a feminine, for example by expressing their 
emotions (Addis & Mahalik, 2003).    Support for this contention is suggested by the 
observation that men, predominantly white American students, appear to restrict their 
emotionality more than women by having significantly higher RE scores (Zamarripa 
et al., 2003).   As a result, men who adhere to such masculine norms might be more 
likely to learn and develop positive alcohol expectancies centred on emotional self 
regulation. 
 
The cognitive component of the PAM scale ‘cognitive self regulation’ (CSR) is not 
predicted by male or female RE scores, however, as a combined sample (male + 
female) CSR is predicted by RE.    The low power observed in the two subsamples 
indicates that, given the low to medium effect sizes for these regression results, the 
sample size was too small to accept the reliability of these results.    Even so, other 
concerns about repetition in three of the four items of the CSR subscale might also 
affect the result.   For example, item 3 ‘Drinking makes me think more clearly’, item 5 
‘Drinking helps me control my thoughts’ and item 11 ‘Drinking helps me focus my 
mind’ appear undifferentiated in terms cognitive processes.  This lack of 
differentiation suggests that the relationship between RE and CSR in the total (male + 
female) sample might be inflated, thus weakening the case for accepting the positive 
prediction observed.    
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5. Hypothesis 4: Positive and negative metacognitive belief scores will not predict 
alcohol use independently of gender role conflict.  
 
Results from this study indicated that gender role conflict did not mediate the 
relationship between positive alcohol metacognitions and alcohol use, so mediation 
appears not to be a process that supports this hypothesis.   In broad terms, results from 
a recent investigation among US students using similar variables supports the 
observed result  (Iwamoto, Corbin, Lejuez & MacPherson, 2014).   These researchers 
argue that a structural model showing that ‘alcohol expectancies’ mediate the 
relationship between ‘conformity to masculine norms’ and ‘alcohol use’ provides the 
best fit of their data.  Hence, the hypothesis that gender role conflict (i.e. conformity 
to masculine norms) mediates the relationship between positive alcohol metacognition 
(i.e. alcohol expectancies) and alcohol use is unlikely to succeed.   However, despite 
the general indication supporting the results of this study some significant differences 
of detail emerge between the two studies.    
 
In the study by Iwamoto et al. (2014) the correlation between the independent 
variable (conformity to masculine norms) total score and the mediator variable 
(alcohol expectancy) total score is not reported.   However, only 12 of the 36 subscale 
intercorrelations met statistical significance and none achieved a correlation above r = 
.19.    Mediation, however, was rejected in this study by the author because it failed to 
meet one the first set of criteria set by Barron and Kenny (1986), namely, the 
independent variable (PAM) and the mediator variable (GRC) should demonstrate a 
statistically significant relationship.   The implication is that statistical analysis based 
on Barron and Kenny’s (1986) procedures (correlation and regression) rather that 
structural equation modelling employed by Iwamoto et al. (2014) would not have 
yielded support for the alternative mediation route proposed by them.    What this 
means is that evidence for a competing model of mediation has yet to be confirmed 
and that the lack of support from this study for the existence of mediation might be 
better explained by other factors such as low power. 
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A further difference of note relates to Iwamoto et al.’s conformity to masculine 
norms’ subscale ‘emotional control’ and its relationship to the variables ‘alcohol 
expectancy’ and ‘alcohol use’.   In the development of the ‘conformity to masculine 
norms’ scale Mahalik et al. (2003) report a strong and significant positive correlation 
between the ‘emotion control’ subscale and the GRC subscale ‘restricted 
emotionality’ of r = .66, p < .001 among Caucasian US students.   It is surprising, 
therefore, to note the disparity between Iwamoto et al.’s results and those of this study 
with regards to these subscales.   For example, Iwamoto et al. report a weak but 
significant negative correlation between ‘emotion control’ and ‘alcohol use’.   Such a 
claim lies in contrast to the results of this study and results reported elsewhere among 
predominately US students (e.g. Levant et al., 2009; Groeschel et al., 2010).    
 
It is difficult to explain this divergence, however, one possible reason might lie in the 
use of similar but different measures, which necessarily employ different use of 
language.  It has been suggested, at least among largely white US students, that the 
language used in the GRC scale, and others similar, might prime individuals in a way 
that directs scores in a particular direction (Jones & Heesacker, 2012).   Furthermore, 
in that study, scores on the ‘restricted emotionality’ subscale showed the greatest 
sensitivity to priming. 
 
Although results of mediation studies did not support the hypothesis, findings from 
the moderation analysis did lent weight to the contention that positive metacognitions 
would not predict alcohol use independently of gender role conflict.    Caution, 
however, in drawing conclusions from correlational methods is necessary.   Bearing 
such caution in mind, results appear to indicate that gender role conflict in men 
moderates the relationship between positive al cohol metacognition and alcohol use.  
Results for men showed a large effect (f 2 = .50) and a high level of power (.99, 𝛼 = 
.05), whereas results for women showed a large effect (f 2 = .32) but a low level of 
power (.47, 𝛼 = .05).   The large effect size noted in each group indicate that despite 
the small subsample size for women the difference between the groups can be 
regarded as reliable indicators of differences in the underlying populations. 
  
When split by severity of GRC, findings for men indicate that reducing alcohol use 
through a reduction in positive alcohol metacognition deteriorates as GRC increases.   
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The implication of this result is that alcohol abuse treatment based on reducing such 
metacognitive beliefs, or more generally, what are described as ‘expectancy 
challenges’ are less like to be successful for individual’s with high GRC. 
To date no studies have investigated the moderating effects of GRC with regards to 
alcohol consumption.  However, some evidence consistent with these results is 
indicated in a recent review of expectancy challenge studies.   Labbe and Maisto 
(2011) report that expectancy challenge treatment was more effective, reducing 
positive alcohol expectancy and alcohol consumption, in male only groups of US 
students compared with mixed sex groups.   One explanation for this difference is that 
men might be less likely to enact traditional masculine norms when the priming 
presence of women is absent.   It could be that in the presence of women, men feel a 
greater need to display their masculinity thus leading to increased internal distress in 
the form of gender role conflict and, as a result, fail to reduce confirmatory masculine 
behaviours such as alcohol use.    
 
For women, there was no difference in outcome whether or not they attended mixed 
or single sex groups, which is consistent with the findings of this study indicating 
there was no statistically significant interaction of GRC and PAM on alcohol use.  
 
Further analysis of the GRC subscale ‘restricted emotionality’ (RE) yielded a similar 
pattern of results to the total GRC scale.   However, inspection of change in the F 
ratio between the full GRC scale and RE revealed an absolute increase in the ratio 
from F(3, 70) = 11.574, p < .001 to F(3, 70) = 14.724, p < .001.  What this change 
indicates is that the RE subscale gives a better model fit than the full GRC scale.  The 
implication of this observation is twofold.   Firstly, the change identifies component 
of GRC that is most salient to individuals who suffer from, or are recovering from, 
alcohol dependence.   Secondly, the use of the RE subscale opens increased 
possibility of clinical utility.   This is because, rather than asking clients to complete 
the full GRC scale during their assessment the narrower topic range covered by the 10 
RE subscale items could possibly covered through conversational means.   The 
implication of this possibility is covered more fully in the discussion section. 
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7. Discussion. 
 
This present study examined a number of possible sex differences on measures of 
gender role conflict, alcohol positive and negative metacognitions and alcohol use.  
Findings suggest that gender role conflict does predict alcohol use in men but not 
women.   Positive and negative alcohol metacognition mean scores, however, do not 
differ significantly according to sex.    Interestingly, gender role conflict was found to 
moderate the relationship between positive alcohol metacognitions in men but not in 
women.  Negative alcohol metacognitions did not moderate that relationship in either 
men or women.  No evidence of mediation was found for that relationship in either 
men or women.   The ‘restricted emotionality’ (RE) subscale of the GRCS was found 
to moderate the relationship between positive alcohol metacognitions and alcohol use 
in men but only marginally failed to do so in women.     
 
Moneta (2011) also observed that the direct relationship between metacognition and 
alcohol use was not straightforward. In particular, that metacognition moderated the 
relationship between emotion (anxiety and depression) and alcohol use.   Sex 
differences in alcohol use were also reported.   However, the findings of this present 
study compared with Moneta (2011) differ in a number of significant areas. 
 
Firstly, the theoretical premise on which the Moneta (2011) hypotheses is based is 
predicated on the notion that individuals displaying high maladaptive metacognition 
scores tend to engage in maladaptive coping strategies, such as alcohol consumption, 
to alleviate the symptoms of distress.   Hence the hypothesised moderation model can 
be considered as: 
 
Moderation of the relationship between Emotion and Alcohol Use by Metacognition. 
 
Metacognition 
 
 
                           Emotion                                                       Alcohol Use 
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In simple terms, metacognition is the valve that controls the effect of emotion on 
alcohol use.   The theoretical premise of this present study is that self-evaluation 
conflict (e.g. gender role conflict) reduces an individual’s attention allocation capacity 
thereby disrupting metacognitive monitoring of internal states, which in turn leads to 
dysregulated alcohol use.  Hence the hypothesised moderation model can be 
considered as: 
Moderation of the Relationship Between Alcohol Metacognition and Alcohol Use by 
Gender Role Conflict. 
 
Gender Role Conflict 
 
 
           Alcohol Metacognition                                                 Alcohol Use 
 
In this model gender role conflict is the valve that controls the effect of alcohol 
metacognition on alcohol use. 
 
Secondly, this present study uses the Positive Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (PAMS) 
and the Negative Alcohol Metacognitions Scale (NAMS) while the Moneta (2011) 
study used the general Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ).   The upshot of this 
difference is that this present study was able to differentiate the effects of positive and 
negative metacognition and was able to report that the above model held for positive 
alcohol metacognitions but not for negative alcohol metacognitions.   Moneta (2011) 
did not differentiate between positive and negative metacognitions hence did not 
report the circumstances in which its hypothesised model held. 
 
Thirdly, the internal state variable used in Moneta (2011) was emotion, defined as 
scores on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS).   The internal state 
variable in this present study is gender role conflict (GRC).   These internal states are 
not the same nor equivalent.   GRC is a construct defined as a psychological state in 
which the socialized gender role has negative consequences for the individual and 
others (O'Neil, 2008).   Whereas anxiety is a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease 
about something with an uncertain outcome; while depression is a low mood 
accompanied by loss of interest and enjoyment in usual activities together with 
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reduced energy and decreased endeavour (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).   
While it might be argued that GRC could lead to feelings of anxiety or depression 
psychometric measures of each are not equivalent.  
 
Fourthly, and most importantly, the hypothesis and observations outlined in Moneta 
(2011) do not account for the sex differences reported.   Female alcohol use scores 
were reportedly lower than those for males but no sex difference was reported for 
metacognition scores.   As the incidence of anxiety and depression is generally greater 
among females than males  (The NHS Information Centre for health and social care, 
2009) , so higher emotion scores ought to be associated with higher female alcohol 
use.   However, the reverse is reported with no explanation.   This present study 
attempts to account for sex differences of observed scores (e.g. see below). 
 
7.1. Gender Role Conflict – Cause or Consequence? 
 
An interesting inference to be drawn from the theoretical positions outlined in this 
study is that the causal relationship between alcohol consumption and gender role 
conflict might not be so straightforward.    While current research tends to the view 
that gender role conflict might lead to increased alcohol consumption in men (O’Neil, 
2008), the situation might be the reverse in women.   So, if women who drink 
excessively do experience increased gender role conflict then the sample of women in 
this thesis research, who are members of an alcohol treatment and recovery 
programme, should demonstrate higher mean gender role conflict scores than women 
who are generally not in such a programme.   However, mean gender role conflict 
scores of women in this study do not differ significantly from the normative female 
scores reported by O’Neil (2008), (124.8 vs. 119.4 respectively) nor do they differ 
significantly from the male sample in this study.   One explanation for the lack of 
difference between group results is that the impact of gender role conflict on women 
could be bidirectional and additive.   As a result, women’s gender role conflict might 
comprise pre and post drinking components.  So women’s total GRC could represent 
a summation of pre drinking and post drinking scores and simply be coincidentally 
similar to male scores.   This possibility, however, does not explain the similarity to 
the normative scores for women.   Although the actual pre-morbid female GRC scores 
from the study’s participants is not known.   This complexity of female drinking-
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related cognitions has been noted in previous studies.   For example, a wider range of 
drinking-related cognitions differentiated female problematic drinkers from male 
problematic drinkers among US young adults and students (Thombs, 1993; Williams 
et al., 1998).    Some studies, however, suggest that the bidirectional nature of GRC is 
not necessarily restricted to women alone.    Smith (1998) used a hermeneutic 
phenomenological design to examine how six individuals (three men; three women) 
with drinking problems described the lived experience of the distress caused by 
excessive alcohol use.    Participants reported experiencing a wide range of negative 
feelings about the self and drinking to overcome how they felt.   This behaviour led to 
feelings of guilt, shame and perceived stigma that in turn led to further drinking.   
Smith (1998, p. 20) concluded, “people with drinking problems described their lived 
experience of suffering as a spiraling vicious vortex, which involved the physical, 
psychological, social and spiritual aspects of the individual’s being”. 
 
Despite the similarity of mean male and female GRC scores noted in this research, 
regression analysis demonstrated that male GRC scores were predictive of alcohol 
consumption while female scores were not.    One explanation for the greater 
predictive power of gender role conflict in male problematic drinkers is that GRC 
might be a more salient factor in men’s self-evaluation and subsequent alcohol 
consumption than it is for women.     Indeed, the salience masculine self-evaluation in 
men is a powerful discourse in alcohol literature.   Alcohol consumption is viewed as 
“a primary symbol of manliness” (Lemle & Miishkind, 1989, p.213).  Furthermore, 
drunkenness in men continues to be tolerated across various societies since it is seen 
as being consistent with masculine traits such as risk taking, personal prowess and 
physical stamina (Herd, 1997).    The effect of this discourse, it can be argued, has 
been to legitimise its assumptions so that they rarely challenged.   As a result, 
research and explanatory models have grown out of this viewpoint that, in turn, 
appear to strengthen the claim that the salience of gender role conflict as a precursor 
to alcohol use is greater for men than women.   For example, Williams and 
Ricciardelli (1999) have coined the terms confirmatory and compensatory drinking, to 
account for the interaction of culturally bound gender roles and alcohol consumption 
in men.   Confirmatory drinking refers to alcohol consumption that reinforces, or 
confirms, a perceived view of masculine gender role drinking behaviour.   
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Compensatory drinking, on the other hand, represents an attempt to surmount the 
internal conflict experienced through a perceived failure to meet notions of the 
masculine ideal.   Confirmatory drinking, they report, is characterised by high levels 
of negative masculinity and low levels of positive femininity and predicts increased 
levels of alcohol consumption.   Individuals who exhibit this pattern of self-perception 
drink to “enhance their expressivity but are doing so in a masculine context” (p. 329).   
In contrast, compensatory drinking is exhibited by individuals reporting low scores on 
both positive masculinity and positive femininity and again predicts levels of alcohol 
consumption.   Clearly, both types of drinking represent ways to enhance an 
individual’s notion of manliness.    The presentation, however, of these findings 
leaves the implicit assumption that information about gender stereotypes must be of 
greater salience to men than women.   Whereas other studies have demonstrated that 
women whose alcohol consumption defined them as ‘high risk’ drinkers were found 
to score significantly lower on the same measure of positive femininity than women 
rated as ‘moderate risk’ drinkers (Ricciardelli, Connor, Williams, & Young, 2001).   
What this suggests is that salience of self-evaluation of gender stereotypes leading to 
alcohol use is just as great for women as men but possibly for different reasons.  
Indeed, these authors suggest that their findings can be accounted for because of the 
incompatibility of heavy drinking and stereotypical attitudes with the behaviour 
expected of women.   In other words heavy alcohol consumption in women might 
predict gender role conflict.     
 
7.2. Reducing Gender Role Conflict. 
 
It is possible that results from this present research could call into question the 
efficacy of the approaches suggested for the metacognitive of treatment of 
problematic drinkers.   This is because each phase of treatment in the triphasic 
formulation is predicated on the notion that modifying metacognitive beliefs, 
evidenced by reducing scores on the positive and negative alcohol metacognitions 
scale, will reduce alcohol consumption.  Whereas, findings from this research have 
suggested that, for men, the rate of reduction of positive alcohol metacognition scores 
is a function gender role conflict scores.   Results showed that that the greatest rate of 
decline in positive alcohol metacognitions was among men within the lowest band of 
scores for gender role conflict.   In contrast, men in the highest band of GRC scores 
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showed almost no reduction in alcohol metacognition scores.   Similar results were 
obtained for the RE subscale.   The implication of these findings is that treatment 
based on the triphasic metacognitive formulation of problem drinkers might help 
certain clients by taking into account expectancies surrounding gender stereotypes in 
men especially.  
 
While results from this study indicated that that the relationship between positive 
alcohol metacognitions and alcohol use in women was not moderated by gender role 
conflict the statistical non-significance was marginal.   Furthermore, the ‘restricted 
emotionality’ (RE) subscale did predict such a relationship in both men and women.    
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether treatment needs to be 
adapted depending on the client’s sex?   This is because it is easy to envisage a 
situation where male and female response to items in the positive alcohol 
metacognition scale (PAM) might differ depending on the sex of the respondent.   For 
example, the items: ‘Drinking makes my negative thoughts more bearable’, ‘Drinking 
reduces my anxious feelings’, ‘ Drinking reduces my self-consciousness’ and 
‘Drinking makes me feel happy’ are unlikely to receive as positive response from 
women who experience negative gender stereotyping by what Lillie (2002) describes 
as ‘Being in Society’s Spotlight’ as a result of drinking compared with men.   
Comparisons between male and female item sub-groups was not undertaken in this 
research, however, mean scores of positive alcohol cognitions in this research did not 
differ significantly between men and women.    It would be interesting, therefore, to 
examine potential sex differences in sub-groups of items.   Furthermore, from an 
anecdotal perspective it was noted that many women participants in post survey 
feedback sessions raised topics of concern mentioned by Lillie (2002) relating to the 
gender stereotyping of women with alcohol problems.   The stigma experienced by 
these women as a result of their drinking, it appeared to the researcher, was especially 
acute among those women whose children had been removed by social services.   
 
A further factor that might impact on women’s recovery progress is the concentration 
on mental processes rather than content in metacognitive therapy.   With such an 
orientation there is a danger that therapy is perceived as being directed at some 
abstract inner mental machine rather than the individual.   Indeed, Lillie (2002, p. 
106) observed that women “felt stigmatized by society and often judged, unheard and 
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unseen by those from whom they sought help. Potential helpers saw the problem and 
not the person”.    All eight women interviewed in that study believed that treatment 
from professionals had had a negative effect on them, and at best, had resulted in a 
failure to reduce alcohol use or even increase it.    The reasons given for this counter 
productive behaviour included not being listened to or consulted about their needs, 
and not having either the severity or the complexity of their alcohol dependence 
recognised or accepted.    Frequently, participants reported that the expectation of 
immediate and permanent abstinence from professionals led to diminishing self-
esteem and motivation and a return to drinking when they failed to meet such 
demands.    Women, the study concluded, believed that they were often met on a 
superficial level, and not offered the opportunity talk in depth.    Given the 
experiences outlined in this study, a focus on mental processes alone as a treatment 
approach seem likely to alienate female clients with consequent detrimental effects on 
their recovery. 
 
Men, in contrast, might benefit from the processes orientated approach of 
metacognitive therapy.   Owen-Pugh & Allen (2012) conducting a qualitative study of 
the male experience of alcohol dependency contrasted their findings with Lillie’s 
(2002) study of female drinkers.   Male drinkers they noted tended to take personal 
responsibility for their drinking and the need to change, whereas female drinkers 
stressed the roles of others such as their experience of professional.  Men, they 
concluded, “portrayed themselves as active, solution orientated and in control” Owen-
Pugh & Allen (2012, p. 272).   The implication is that practicalities, if successful, 
might outweigh personalities.  
Men’s emotional behaviour might also impact on the responses to metacognitive 
treatment   Results of this study that indicate the GRC subscale ‘restricted 
emotionality’ (RE) is significantly associated with alcohol use in men but not women.     
Restricted emotionality also predicted positive alcohol metacognition (PAM) in the 
total sample as well as the male and female subsamples.   When, however, RE was 
regressed on to the PAM sub-scale, ‘emotional self regulation’ (ESR), only male RE 
scores predicted ESR.   What these findings imply is that for some men the ability to 
recognise, display and cope with their emotions is less well developed than for 
women and contributes to their problematic behaviour.   Two theoretical positions 
help account for men’s attitude towards their emotional state and its relation to their 
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drinking behaviour.  Pleck’s (1995) concept of gender role strain argues that the male 
socialisation process can be traumatic as they attempt to comply with male gender 
stereotype expectations.    The result is suppression of emotional display, the 
development of aggression and, for those who find themselves falling short of male 
norms, to low self-esteem.   As a consequence of such behaviours, Levant (1998) 
argues the male socialisation process leaves men comparatively unaware of their 
emotions and lacking the vocabulary to describe them.   It is possible, therefore, that 
the metacognitive therapy focus on mental processes rather than the meaning of affect 
laden cognitions could fit better with a male perspective of therapy. 
 
7.3. Reducing Gender Role Conflict – No Right Approach. 
 
While the above argument sets out the case why treatment might differ between sexes 
it is equally the case that there are reasons why it might differ within sexes.    One 
client’s treatment preferences are not necessarily the same as another hence a flexible 
approach to therapy seems required.  This is especially the case since therapist 
flexibility has been linked with improved therapeutic relationships (Perren, Godfrey 
& Rowland, 2009).    Indeed, Cooper and McCloud’s (2007, 2011) advocacy of a 
pluralistic approach to therapy is centred on the notion that different clients could 
benefit from different treatment methods and strategies.   Therapists and clients are 
expected to collaborate to identify which approach that best aligns with clients’ 
therapeutic goals and preferences.   So addressing alcohol related beliefs through 
metacognitive therapy alone might result in little improvement if such treatment fails 
to match client preferences.   For example, the key difference between the Marlatt 
model in its original form, compared with the metacognitive approach is that the 
former is content orientated while the latter process orientated.    The difference for 
individuals in treatment is that the focus shifts from what they are thinking to how 
they are thinking.   Using the Marlatt model, an individual in treatment might identify 
that walking past a pub triggers thoughts about how much better they would feel if 
they had a drink and the cravings that ensue.   Such a train of thought would be 
broken down into a ‘high-risk situation’ (walking past pubs) and an ‘alcohol outcome 
expectancy’ (drinking makes me feel like one of the boys).   Treatment would then 
focus on practical strategies to avoid high-risk situations and challenging the 
expectancy that alcohol always makes you feel ‘like one of the boys’  or that alcohol 
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is the only way you can engage with male friends.   In contrast, a metacognitive 
approach in, say, the pre-alcohol use phase would attempt to interrupt extended 
thinking and associated metacognitive beliefs.   So, the therapist would recognise the 
triggering effect of walking past a pub but then employ techniques such as detached 
mindfulness to encourage the client to observe their cravings, images and thoughts 
without attempting to control them (Spada, Caselli, & Wells, 2012).    
 
Deciding which of these two approaches best suits a particular client can be addressed 
through meta-therapeutic dialogue (Cooper & McCloud, 2012) or through more 
formal means such as The Therapy Personalisation Form (Bowen and Cooper, 2012).   
This process is important because recent studies suggest that therapist-client 
agreement on the goals and methods employed in therapy are significant predictors of 
treatment outcomes Horvath, Del Re, Fluckinger & Symonds, 2012; Tyron & 
Winograd, 2011).   Furthermore, evidence indicates that clients who received their 
preferred manner of treatment were up to 50 per cent less likely to exit their course of 
therapy early compared with those not receiving their preferred choice (Swift, 
Callahan & Vollmer, 2011). 
 
 
7.4. The Impact of Context. 
 
A problem for all measures is that the assumption that the underlying domain it 
claims to reflect is invariant across different situations.   There is reason to believe 
that such an assumption is questionable with regard to alcohol metacognition beliefs.  
Where, when and with whom individuals drink has been show to affect the pattern, 
frequency and quantity of alcohol consumption among US and Canadian students 
(e.g. Wechsler & Nelson, 2008; Demers et., 2002; Lo Monarco, Piermatteo Guimelli, 
& Ernst-Vintilla, 2011).   The situational-specificity hypothesis advanced by Wall, 
Mckee and Hinson (2000) contends that context mediates alcohol expectancies with 
regards to consumption.  For example, Canadian students’ scores of positive alcohol 
expectancies increased when measured in a drinking context (e.g. a bar) compared 
with a neutral context (e.g. a meeting room) (Wall, Hinson, Mckee, & Goldstein, 
2001; Wall, Mckee, & Hinson, 2000).   However, use of the term context can mask 
the components from which it derives.   Context, it can be argued, can comprise 
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location, people and stimuli such as cues; each of which contributes in varying 
degrees as well as interacting with each other.   In a recent review, for example, Monk 
and Heim (2013) have reported that both social factors (being among peers) and 
alcohol related cues (video scenes of bars) both contribute to increases in positive 
alcohol expectancies.   In turn, positive alcohol expectancies have been associated 
with increased alcohol consumption in experimental bar environments accompanied 
by peers or friends when measured among Dutch students (Larsen et al., 2012).   In 
this study group effects such as the presence of peers or friends accounted for 70 per 
cent of alcohol consumption variance. 
 
Despite the plethora of research aimed at investigating the influence of context on 
alcohol expectations such research has been criticised for its failure to access 
participants’ in vivo cognitions (Monk &Heim, 2013).   Typically, they argue, 
participants do not report cognitions when actually in a particular context but are 
required to respond as if they were.   This observation suggests that the full extent of 
contextual influence on alcohol expectations might not only be underestimated but 
also that much research lacks the ability to unpack the differing dimensions of 
expectation such as tension reduction or sexual enhancement in addition to 
consumption.    
 
Furthermore, the well-known effects of priming on participants’ alcohol consumption 
ought to be taken into consideration.   For example, US female undergradates primed 
with video images from a pub consumed significantly more alcohol than those primed 
with video images from a neutral environment (Roehrich & Goldman, 1995).  
Similarly, male US undergraduates primed in a mock bar reported both greater 
alcohol related memories as well alcohol consumption compared with those primed in 
a neutral location (Barraco & Dunn, 2009).   Indeed, Reich et al. (2005) noted that 
more alcohol expectancy words were recalled when a memory word list began with 
an alcohol related word (e.g. beer) compared with a non-alcohol related word (e.g. 
water) when investigating US 18-19 year olds.   
 
Perhaps the most obvious observation is that the confounding effect of context on 
alcohol metacognition was not ‘controlled for’ in the present study.   It is possible, 
therefore, that the wording and setting of both alcohol expectancy and metacognitive 
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research has an impact on the outcomes reported.   This present study was carried out 
in similar but not identical settings.   Surveys were completed in mixed sex groups 
during time made available in a group alcohol recovery programme.  Although 
participants completed the survey privately with little interruption from other group 
members, how individuals might think, feel and behave in one to one therapy sessions 
might not overlap wholly with their experience in a group setting.   More importantly, 
responses given in the context of an alcohol recovery programme might not translate 
completely to life events experienced outside therapeutic settings.   What this 
observation implies is that therapists’ expectations of client behaviour in naturalistic 
settings needs to be tempered with the understanding that clients themselves might 
not fully appreciate the effect that context can have.   This suggests that the progress 
of alcohol metacognitive therapy might not be as straightforward as the theoretical 
claims made for such an approach. 
 
Furthermore, gender role conflict is not immune to criticism concerning context 
invariance.   Jones and Heesacker (2012) examined whether gender role conflict 
might be altered by contextual circumstances.   For example, if certain notions of 
masculinity are made more salient would gender role conflict scores change as a 
result?   Participants, mainly white male US students, were primed using a video 
clips, chosen by a group of counselling psychology graduates, depicting comedians 
satirising what were considered to be normative masculine ideologies (e.g. ‘men don’t 
cry’).   Findings demonstrated that gender role conflict scores were significantly 
lower for primed participants compared with non-primed participants.   What these 
results suggest is that at least part of the manifestation of gender role is transient or 
context dependent.   Consonant, with findings from this present study scores on the 
‘Restricted Emotionality’ subscale of the GRCS were most affected by priming 
reinforcing the case of its utility in a clinical setting. 
 
Overall, these observations indicate that the more therapy is removed from what 
clients experience in naturalistic settings the more likely their responses will diverge.   
The implication is that metacognitive therapy that relies on process changes alone, in 
the absence content meaning, might falsely inform the therapist about their client’s 
internal world and slow progress.   Equally, such a situation could leave clients less 
prepared to cope with their difficulties than they otherwise believed.     
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7.5. Conclusion. 
The findings of this research might prove useful for clinical practice.   These findings 
indicate that traits related to male gendered expectations could form part of the 
assessment and treatment process in the Marlatt model of relapse prevention, 
specifically where metacognitive alcohol interventions might be employed.    
Procedures could be initiated that help to educate men about the negative 
consequences of traditional masculine ideologies and resultant gender role conflict.   
Additionally, the relationship between gender role conflict and coping strategies could 
also be addressed.   
 
Specific gender role conflict factors, such as restricted emotionality, could be 
addressed through the development of skills training programmes.    For therapists 
working with men who acknowledge problems relating to emotional expression 
psychological education has been shown to be helpful (Kilmartin, 2005).    
Furthermore, as traits associated with traditional male stereotypes, such as 
competitiveness and aggression, are also associated with alcohol use more adaptive 
behaviours and could be explored that could provide alternative means of self-
expression.    
 
More generally, issues surrounding male gendered expectations and gender role 
conflict could be discussed more frequently in substance misuse treatment settings.   
For example, male clients, who report working long hours because they believe 
women are only attracted to successful men then feels the need to drinks excessively 
as a way of coping with their self-imposed pressure, can be made aware of how their 
beliefs about masculinity affect their drinking behaviour.    Therapists can use 
opportunities in sessions to normalise what might be considered proscriptive male 
behaviour such as showing fear or crying (Greif, 2009.   So, by helping men 
acknowledge and recognise their emotional responses, as well as certain behaviours, 
these procedures might help reduce the pressure some feel to conform to gender 
norms.   Finally, educating men that gender specific stressors are best addressed 
through a range of more adaptive coping strategies could be key to better treatment 
efficacy not just within the Marlatt model generally but alcohol metacognitive therapy 
specifically. 
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7.6. Limitations. 
 
A key limitation in this study was its design.   The data collected represented a cross-
sectional view of the sampling frame therefore did not allow for the definitive 
establishment of causal effects.    Future longitudinal studies are needed to establish 
the a priori understanding that gender role conflict, positive alcohol metacognitions 
and negative alcohol cognitions are antecedent to alcohol use in men.   Longitudinal 
studies might also help elucidated the bidirectional relationship between gender role 
conflict and alcohol use in women.   The study also employed retrospective self-
report surveys, hence the data gathered could have been influenced by social 
desirability factors leading to inaccurate observations.    
 
Additionally, a limitation of quantitative research is that the operational definitions of 
psychological constructs are predetermined by the researcher thus controlling the both 
the type and range of responses; for example the Likert style scales employed in the 
survey questionnaire.   Hence a greater contribution of qualitative data in the study 
would have held open the possibility of including research where participants are 
actively involved in the process of defining and assessing the variables of interest to 
this study.   Nelson and Quintana (2005) highlight how qualitative approaches also 
supplement quantitative research by enquiring about the socio-cultural context of the 
clients’ experience.   In this regard the voice of mothers in recovery whose children 
had been taken from them is absent from this research but was an active and 
important theme running through all the groups visited.      
 
Furthermore, the counselling and therapy process can be regarded as culturally 
influenced.  How the researcher/therapist defines the psychological problem is 
culturally mediated, as are the expected roles of client and therapist (Sue & Sue, 
2003).   The quantitative outcome studies examined in this research make no 
allowance for such mediated processes and assume any therapeutic treatment emerged 
from a homogenous therapeutic relationship.  How clients and therapists experienced 
treatment more than likely has some to say about the outcomes described.   Indeed, in 
the groups visited clients often regarded their journey to abstinence as aided recovery 
rather than therapy; in other words two compatible but distinct views. 
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In that regard it is interesting to note that a key area of qualitative research that could 
have aided this study surrounds the idea of recovery; for example Gubi and Marsden-
Hughes (2013), White (2009), Jakobson, Hensing and Spak (2005).   Another area of 
interest, as alluded to above, is client and therapist perception of each other’s 
contribution and role; for example Laudet and White (2004).     Finally, the notion of 
gender identity in relation to alcohol use is a recurrent and fluid theme e.g. Lyons & 
Willmott (2008). 
 
Furthermore, the study did not take account of racial or ethnic factors associated with 
alcohol use (O’Neil, 2008).   Given the diversity of cultural, ethnic and racial 
communities in the UK such information could inform therapists about differences in 
traditional gender stereotypes between groups.   That said, data was collected from 
several different locations each of is known to be racially and culturally diverse, 
however, the participants in this study were observed to be almost exclusively white 
British.    
 
The study did not differentiate participants in abstinent recovery or active drinkers.   
As the active use of alcohol has been associated with cognitive effects it is possible 
that those in abstinence, albeit recent, could have scored differently in the surveys. 
 
Finally, the statistical power could have been increased with a larger sample size 
particularly for the female population.  
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Reflexive Statement 2. 
In beginning a reflexive statement about this topic I feel compelled to honour a 
particular tradition of transparency in this field by announcing: my name is, and I am 
not an alcoholic.   I do, however, have a relationship with alcohol, alcoholics and 
individuals who work with alcoholics.    
Much of that relationship is defined by my role as therapist, on placement, at two drug 
and alcohol services; one statutory the other not.  Also, prior to the course, I was a 
keyworker with homeless dual diagnosis individuals.   During this time I have 
watched as clients have lost relationships, their health, jobs, children, homes, liberty 
and, occasionally, their lives.   These were profound experiences that have evoked 
strong emotions and reactions within me.   Consequently, I came to this topic with a 
number of preset ideas and prejudices that might affect the objectivity of this review.   
However, some of those biases only became apparent as I went through the process of 
completing the research and I discuss them below.   
I noticed as I began to research the topic that perhaps I was, in fact, searching for a 
way to save all the clients I had been unable to stop drinking.    This residual guilt, I 
feel, has to some extent framed the scope of the topic.   As a result, it could be argued 
that I have sought to examine each the Marlatt model in a way that leaves no stone 
unturned.   Thus resulting in a quest to discover something I had missed, 
misunderstood or ignored.   To some extent this quest also explains why I chose the 
recent work on metacognitive therapy because it fulfills my fantasy that new must 
mean better.  
Another effect of conducting research in an area in which I am a therapist was the 
realisation of how little I knew and how unstructured my thinking about the topic had 
been.   Admitting this makes me feel uncomfortable as it implies that I was less 
effective as a therapist than might have been the case.   Most notably, a view that has 
developed by working in this field is how ineffective alcohol treatment appears to be.   
The effect of this on the research has been, I believe, a kind of search for culprits.   It 
could be argued that I have explored each model with an agenda to seek out failings.    
As a result, the tone of the research, while attempting to give balanced arguments, can 
seem negative at times.    
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It has also been interesting to observe the interaction between conducting this 
research and my practice.   I found that current clients come to mind as wrote which 
then subtly alters the analysis.   More especially, I noticed how a deeper knowledge 
and understanding began to affect my work with clients and with formulation 
particularly.   Here, however, I felt that I had uncovered an ethical dilemma.   Was my 
treatment approach changing as a result of being a more informed therapist or were 
clients becoming guinea pigs in a real time experiment?   This problem is not easily 
resolved as it is impossible to leave behind experience as you enter the therapy room.   
However, a heightened awareness about intentions brought some checks and balances 
into this interaction. 
One area of prejudice that I brought to the review was a concern about the motives of 
non-statutory organisations.   Much of the daily talk of managers in these 
organisations, of which I have experience, concerns the winning and losing of 
contracts and the outcome statistics by which they are measured.   Their concern for 
the client seemed limited.   As a result I found that I was seeking evidence of 
economic drivers of service provision which did not really fit with the research aims 
and from which I had to retreat. 
Perhaps the most striking effect has been the interaction of the research and my own 
attitudes.   Heath (1995) argues that views about drinking alcohol vary from culture to 
culture but that indifference is rare, and feelings much stronger, than in connection 
with other topics.   Indeed, completing this review has elicited a number of reactions 
within me.   At one point, for example, the shear scale of the harm that alcohol abuse 
causes left me feeling sympathetic towards those who wish to see increased controls 
on consumption.   However, my attitudes softened as I explored this issue with clients 
who invariably would lay the cause of their alcoholism at their own feet.   The effect 
on the research was that I deliberately avoided painting a bleak picture of individual 
and societal downfall often described by the statistics.   However, my position as 
author has not been neutral; for me the topic matters.    In some sense I have written 
this study as an expose on how little current alcohol treatment appears to be 
achieving.   Of course, that is not its intention but Heath (1995) is correct, my feelings 
were, perhaps, stronger than might have been the case with a different topic. 
Lastly, this research has meant I had to confront my own perceptions of masculinity 
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and how they might have influenced not just this study but my life choices, family, 
friends, colleagues and clients.   I noticed, for example, that in choosing the, arguably, 
‘masculine’ rationality of a quantitative study that I may have been playing out my 
own gendered perceptions of what feels comfortable as research.   Perhaps this 
observation also explains the inclusion of various qualitative pieces of research about 
the male and female experience of alcohol dependence as a kind of compensatory 
activity. 
In the end I have attempted to present a dispassionate account as possible of the topic 
under review while remaining committed to highlighting some of the limitations of 
current treatment models.  
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
Section 1. 
 
Please complete the following questions.           
 
Age: ______ 
 
Sex:        Male            Female 
 
Instructions:  In the space to the left of each sentence below, write the number that 
most closely represents the degree that you Agree or Disagree with the statement.  
There is no right or wrong answer to each statement; your own reaction is what is 
asked for. 
 
____________________________________________________________________
___ 
 Strongly                                                                                               Strongly  
  Agree                                                                                                  Disagree 
      6                    5                    4                    3                    2                    1 
____________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
 
1.  ____ Moving up the career ladder is important to me. 
 
2.  ____ I have difficulty telling others I care about them. 
   
1. ____ Verbally expressing my love to another man is difficult for me. 
 
4.  ____ I feel torn between my hectic work schedule and caring for my health. 
 
5. ____ Making money is part of my idea of being a successful man. 
6. ____ Strong emotions are difficult for me to understand. 
7. ____ Affection with other men makes me tense. 
8. ____ I sometimes define my personal value by my career success. 
9. ____ Expressing feelings makes me feel open to attack by other people. 
10. ____ Expressing my emotions to other men is risky. 
11. ____ My career, job, or school affects the quality of my leisure or family life. 
12. ____ I evaluate other people’s value by their level of achievement and success. 
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_____________________________________________________________________
___ 
          Strongly                                                                                               Strongly  
  Agree                                                                                                  Disagree 
      6                    5                    4                    3                    2                    1 
____________________________________________________________________
___ 
13. ____Talking about my feelings during sexual relations is difficult for me. 
14. ____ I worry about failing and how it affects my doing well as a man. 
15. ____ I have difficulty expressing my emotional needs to my partner. 
16. ____ Men who touch other men make me uncomfortable. 
17. ____ Finding time to relax is difficult for me. 
18. ____ Doing well all the time is important to me. 
19. ____ I have difficulty expressing my tender feelings. 
20. ____ Hugging other men is difficult for me. 
21. ____ I often feel that I need to be in charge of those around me. 
22. ____ Telling others of my strong feelings is not part of my sexual behavior. 
23. ____ Competing with others is the best way to succeed. 
24. ____ Winning is a measure of my value and personal worth. 
25. ____ I often have trouble finding words that describe how I am feeling. 
26. ____ I am sometimes hesitant to show my affection to men because of how       
others might perceive me. 
27. ____ My needs to work or study keep me from my family or leisure more than  
               would like. 
28. ____ I strive to be more successful than others. 
29. ____ I do not like to show my emotions to other people. 
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30. ____ Telling my partner my feelings about him/her during sex is difficult for me. 
_________________________________________________________________
_____ 
         Strongly                                                                                               Strongly  
  Agree                                                                                                  Disagree 
      6                    5                    4                    3                    2                    1 
_____________________________________________________________________
___ 
31. ____ My work or school often disrupts other parts of my life (home, family, 
health, leisure). 
32. ____I am often concerned about how others evaluate my performance at work or 
              school. 
33. ____Being very personal with other men makes me feel uncomfortable. 
34. ____Being smarter or physically stronger than other men is important to me.      
35. ____ Men who are overly friendly to me make me wonder about their sexual  
              preference. 
36. ____ Overwork and stress caused by a need to achieve on the job or in school,  
              affects/hurts my life. 
37. ____ I like to feel superior to other people.  
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Section 2. 
 
 
People use alcohol for recreational and other purposes. Below are a number of beliefs 
about using alcohol given by people.  
 
Thinking about your own usage of alcohol, please read each statement and indicate 
how much you agree with each one by circling a number on the right hand scales. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please try to be as honest as possible in your 
response. 
 
PLEASE INDICATE HOW MUCH YOU AGREE WITH EACH OF THE 
FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AFTER YOU HAVE STOPPED A SESSION 
DRINKING: 
 
 
                  Do not       Agree            Agree        Agr 
                   agree       slightly       moderately  very much 
 
1.   I have no control over my drinking  1                2               3              4 
2.   If I cannot control my drinking I will  
      cease to function   1                2               3              4 
3.   Drinking will damage my mind   1                2               3              4 
4.   My drinking persists no matter how  
      I try to control it   1                2               3              4 
5.   Drinking will make me lose control  1                2               3              4 
6.   Drinking controls my life   1                2               3              4 
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Section 3. 
 
 
People use alcohol for recreational and other purposes. Below are a number of beliefs 
about using alcohol given by people.  
 
Thinking about your own usage of alcohol, please read each statement and indicate 
how much you agree with each one by circling a number on the right hand scales. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please try to be as honest as possible in your 
response. 
 
PLEASE INDICATE HOW MUCH YOU AGREE WITH EACH OF THE 
FOLLOWING STATEMENTS WHEN YOU BEGIN DRINKING: 
 
   Do not Agree     Agree          Agre 
                                    agree slightly  moderately    very much 
 
1.   Drinking makes me more affectionate   1               2                3    4 
2.   Drinking makes me more confident                           1                2         3    4 
3.   Drinking makes me think more clearly                      1                2         3    4 
4.   Drinking makes me feel more relaxed  1                2         3    4 
5.   Drinking helps me to control my thoughts  1                2         3    4 
6.   Drinking makes my negative thoughts  
      more bearable   1                2         3    4 
7.   Drinking reduces my anxious feelings  1                2         3    4 
8.   Drinking makes me more sociable  1                2         3    4 
9.   Drinking reduces my self-consciousness  1                2         3    4 
10. Drinking makes me feel happy   1                2         3    4 
11. Drinking helps me focus my mind  1                2         3    4 
12. Drinking helps me fit in socially  1                2         3    4 
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Section 4. 
 
Please circle your answer. 
 
 
 
1. How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? 
Never      Monthly or less     2–4 times a month       2–3 times a week      4 or more 
times a week 
 
2. How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are 
drinking? 
1 or 2         3 or 4          5 or 6           7 to  9       10 or more 
 
 
3. How often do you have six or more drinks on one occasion? 
Never      Less than monthly        Monthly      Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
4. How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop 
drinking 
once you had started? 
Never        Less than monthly         Monthly          Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
5. How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected 
from you because of drinking? 
Never           Less than monthly        Monthly        Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
6. How often during the last year have you needed a first drink in the morning 
to get yourself going after a heavy drinking session? 
Never          Less than monthly        Monthly         Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
7. How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after 
drinking? 
Never          Less than monthly         Monthly         Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
8. How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened 
the night before because you had been drinking? 
Never          Less than monthly         Monthly         Weekly        Daily or almost daily 
 
9. Have you or someone else been injured as a result of your drinking? 
No          Yes, but not in the last year              Yes, during the last year 
 
10. Has a relative or friend or a doctor or other health worker, been concerned 
about your drinking or suggested you cut down? 
No          Yes, but not in the last year               Yes, during the last year 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. 
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                        Participant Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Dear reader, 
 
As a part of the Professional Doctorate in Counselling Psychology programme at 
London Metropolitan University carrying I am carrying out research into alcohol use. 
 
The questions in this survey have been designed to help us understand how different 
people think about themselves when thinking about alcohol and in doing so make 
treatment for alcohol problems more effective.     
 
The questionnaire should take about 15 minutes to complete.   Your completed 
questionnaire is completely anonymous and will be destroyed at the end of the 
project using a confidential shredding service.   To ensure your answers are 
confidential please put your completed questionnaire in the envelope marked: 
“Confidential, Research Project”.   Please seal the envelope and return it to the 
keyworker who gave it to you.   No one, other than the researcher should be able to 
see your answers and the researcher will not be able to identify you. 
 
You are at liberty to stop participating at any time.  
 
If you believe you have been affected by this experience please speak to your 
therapist; alternatively a list of organisations offering help is attached. 
 
 
Thank you for assistance. 
 
 
 
Nicholas Cook, 
Counselling Psychologist in Training  / Volunteer Counsellor, CRI 
 
CRI, Slough Treatment Services, Maple House, 95 High 
Street Slough Berkshire SL11DH. 
 
E mail: Nick.Cook@cri.org.uk 
 
Tel: 01 537 692 584  
 
 
 
M. 
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Group Essay 
Introduction. 
This essay examines interventions in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and 
psychodynamic therapy in the context of group psychotherapy.   A brief outline of 
each model of therapy is given first followed by a rationale for the specific 
interventions chosen for comparison.   The method of comparison draws heavily on 
the concept of complementarity as a framework capable of knitting together what are 
often quite diverse approaches.  Next, the chosen interventions are compared.  Firstly, 
more process orientated intervention then more content orientated.   Finally, there is a 
discussion about my own learning when reflecting on this essay.   Clinical examples 
come from the literature as unanimous client consent from the group with which I am 
involved could not be achieved. 
 
Theoretical models of group therapy. 
 
CBT. 
Kazdin (1978, p.337) suggests that CBT comprises of treatments that “attempt to 
change overt behaviour by altering thoughts, interpretations, assumptions and 
strategies of responding”.   This broad overview has been further elaborated as a 
cognitive model of psychopathology that asserts that the processing of external events 
is systematically biased and, therefore, distorts an individual’s construction of 
experience (Dobson & Dozois, 2010).   A variety of cognitive errors such as: 
overgeneralisation, selective attention, polarisation etc. are then manifest.   
Underlying these distorted interpretations, often referred to as automatic negative 
thoughts, are dysfunctional assumptions and core beliefs that are embedded in 
relatively stable cognitive structures (schemata).    When schemata are activated by 
external events or internal stimuli they tend to bias information processing and 
produce the typical cognitive content of a specific disorder (Beck, 2005).   Therapy 
proceeds by changing maladaptive thoughts and processes leading to changes in affect 
and behaviour.   Group CBT, however, has the ability to emphasise certain aspects of 
the range of CBT interventions that can be employed.   Normalisation of difficulties, 
for example, can be achieved by the mere presence of other similar group members as 
well as through sharing subjective experiences.   Improvements in interpersonal 
 118 
functioning are made possible through interventions such as role play and modelling 
(Wyles, Hayward, Thomas, 2005).    
 
Psychodynamic therapy. 
Lemma (2003, p.xii) begins her introduction to psychoanalytic psychotherapy by 
saying “I draw on several psychoanalytic theories as I have yet to come across one 
model or theory that can satisfactorily account for all my analytic work”.  With that 
caveat in mind Sundberg (2001) proposes that commonalities include: 
• An emphasis on the centrality of intrapsychic and unconscious conflicts. 
• Seeing defenses as developing in internal psychic structures in order to avoid 
unpleasant consequences of conflict. 
• A belief that psychopathology develops especially from early childhood. 
• A view that internal representations of experiences are organized around 
interpersonal relations. 
• A conviction that life issues and dynamics will re-emerge in the context of the 
client-therapist relationship as transference and counter transference. 
• Use of free association as a major method for exploration of internal conflicts and 
problems. 
• Focusing on interpretations, transference, defense mechanisms and current 
symptoms. 
• Insight as important for success in therapy. 
 
Montgomery (2002) argues that three main traditions of group psychodynamic 
therapy are practised in the UK: Interpersonal, Tavistock and group analytical.  He 
suggests that they share common ground but are also marked by differences in 
leadership style and underlying theoretical assumptions.   He also asserts that group 
analytic therapy is now the principal form of psychodynamic therapy offered within 
the National Health Service (NHS).   For that reason, group analytic therapy will be 
the major model of comparison in this essay. 
 
Group Analysis was developed by S.H. Foulkes, who believed there were four main 
therapeutic processes at work within a group context: mirroring, exchange, social 
integration and activation (Roberts & Pines, 1992).   Montgomery (2002) suggests 
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that the first three of these processes correspond with Yalom’s (1970) curative 
factors, while activation aligns with Foulkes notion of the group matrix.    Foulkes 
conceived groups as developing an unconscious network of interactions, or matrix.   
At one level this can be understood as the shared ground of the group, while at 
another level it represents a sense of belonging similar in concept to the secure base.   
Another important feature for Foulkes was communication, which is described as 
being at the root of mental disturbance (Foulkes & Anthony, 1957).   Finally, the role 
of the group leader, or conductor as Foulkes describes them, is to point out 
unacknowledged sources of conflict and balance interpretations with supportive 
comments. 
 
Points of comparison. 
Based on a review of psychotherapy literature Blagys and Hilsenroth (2000) identified 
seven features of psychodynamic therapy that differentiated it from CBT: Focus on 
affect and expression of emotions ; Exploration of attempts to avoid topics; 
Exploration of patterns of thoughts, feeling and relationships; Exploration of past 
experiences; Focus on interpersonal experiences; Focus on therapeutic relationships; 
Exploration of wishes, dreams and fantasies.    Additionally, Blagys and Hilsenroth 
(2002) argued that there six features of CBT that differentiated it from 
psychodynamic therapy: Use of homework; Direction of session activity; teaching of 
coping skills; Emphasis on future experiences; providing information about treatment 
and symptoms; A cognitive focus.   Given these descriptions it could be expected that 
the interpersonal behaviours of group leaders might lead to different outcomes 
depending on the model of therapy and so forms the first area of comparison.   As a 
framework for making such a comparison the notion of complementarity has been 
chosen.   Complementarity in therapy interactions refers to the process of therapy 
rather than the content (Tracy, 1993).    The second area of comparison concerns 
interventions that arguably represent core techniques that exemplify their theoretical 
origins from each modality; the challenging of cognitions in CBT and offering 
interpretation in psychodynamic therapy.  Both of these interventions are viewed 
through a lens of complementarity as a method of drawing comparison.   Finally,  role 
play has been chosen as an intervention because it is common to both models of 
therapy but is enacted for different theoretical reasons.   As a result, role play may 
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also be practiced differently in different modalities. 
 
Complementarity. 
Interpersonal theory (Kiesler, 1983) conceptualises interpersonal behaviour along two 
axes: Interdependence, (commonly understood as dominant-submissive) and 
Affiliation (friendly-hostile).   Implicit within this theory is the notion of 
complementarity.    Complementarity refers to interactions between individuals that 
demonstrate a sharing of role behaviours along these axes.   Simply put, individuals 
take turns at displaying dominance followed by submission or friendliness followed 
by hostility.   Kiesler (1983) suggests that interactions that maintain complementarity 
preserve individuals’ views of the self.   Interactions that reduce complementarity are 
considered to induce opposite effects.   Importantly, reduced complementarity is 
thought to effect behaviour change in participants such that either complementary 
behaviour returns or stops.    The implication of this assertion is that the outcome of 
reduced complementarity can be therapeutic change, but also conflict and resistance 
among group members.   
 
Tracy (1993) suggests that complementarity supports a pan-theoretical three stage 
model of therapeutic outcomes.  Successful outcomes are associated with high 
therapist-client complementarity in the initial stage, becoming lower in the middle 
before returning to high in the latter stage.   High complementarity is considered 
necessary in the initial stage so that a strong therapeutic relationship is forged.   
Lower complementarity in the middle stage of therapy could, for example, be 
associated with interventions such as challenging cognitive distortions in CBT or 
offering interpretations from a psychodynamic perspective (Dietzel & Abeles, 1975; 
Tracy, Sherry & Albright, 1999).   A return to high complementarity in the final stage 
can be regarded as a relationship repair following rupture in the middle stage (Safran, 
Murant, Samstag & Stevens, 2001).   This high-low-high pattern of complementarity 
has been to be evident in successful outcomes for both individual psychodynamic and 
cognitive behavioural therapy (Tasca & McMullen, 1992; Tracy, Sherry & Albright, 
1993).   In group therapy, however, there is evidence of divergence between the two 
therapeutic modalities.    
 
Interpersonal behaviour of group leaders – process orientated intervention. 
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Three of the six differentiating features outlined by Blagys & Hilsenroth (2002) 
(direction of session activity, teaching of coping skills and providing information 
about treatment or symptoms) accord with Westbrook, Kennerley & Kirk’s (2012, p. 
24) suggestion, that the problem-focused and structured nature of CBT requires the 
therapist to maintain structure in sessions “and then largely stick to it”.   As a result 
CBT therapists might talk more than in other therapies, possibly up to 50 per cent of 
the session in the early stages, and that some groups can be highly didactic and 
lacking interaction (Morrison, 2001).   Such a description contrasts with Lemma’s 
(2003) intersubjectivist view that in psychodynamic therapy, therapists form intense 
relationships with their clients.   Here the notion of therapist as observer is replaced 
with the therapist as participant.   It seems, therefore, that differences in 
complementarity can be expected between CBT and psychodynamic groups.    
 
Indeed, Tasca, Foot, Leite Maxwell, Balfour & Bissada (2011) report lower levels of 
complementarity in the early stage of group therapy for binge eating disorder (BED) 
in a CBT group compared with a psychodynamic psychotherapy group (PP).   Tasca 
et.al. note that Dr V (leader of the PP group) was affirming and understanding 74 per 
cent of the time compared with 57 per cent from Dr F the CBT group leader.   What is 
more, when Dr V was affirming and understanding the PP group members responded 
with its complement disclosing and expressing 78 per cent of the time.   By contrast 
47 per cent of Dr F’s interactions in the CBT group were coded as controlling 
compared with 39 per cent of Dr V’s in the PP group.   Significantly, more than 44 
per cent of Dr F’s controlling behaviours in the early stage of therapy were 
immediately followed by non complementary reactions from members of the CBT 
group.   For example, Bette (a member of the CBT group) wanted to discuss 
rewarding herself after having successfully avoided binge eating (disclosing and 
expressing).   Dr F acknowledged the item’s interest to the group, however, intent on 
keeping to the session agenda told Bette that the topic would be discussed in a future 
session; a non complementary controlling behaviour.  
 
Overall, Tasca et.al. (2011) report that 80 per cent of the PP group’s interpersonal 
behaviours displayed complementarity compared with 61 per cent of the CBT group 
in the early stage of therapy.   Tracy (1993) has argued that high complementarity is 
necessary at this stage so that a firm therapeutic alliance is established and from 
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which a productive middle stage ensues.   The difference in complementarity 
observed between these two groups implies that CBT groups might encounter more 
problematic behaviours during the middle course of therapy and, as a result, worse 
outcomes.   Indeed, Tasca et.al. (2011) note that CBT group members did demonstrate 
resistance to Dr F’s treatment suggestions during the middle stage of  therapy.    On 
the face of it, the evidence appears to support the prediction that reduced 
complementarity leads to increased difficulties.   However, the authors also report that 
both the CBT and PP groups “were equally effective in reducing days binged among 
patients with BED at post treatment” (Tasca et.al., 2011).   An alternative 
conceptualisation, therefore, merits consideration. 
 
Westbrook et.al. (2011) would understand Dr F’s behaviour of acknowledging the 
relevance of Ellen’s topic, but to be addressed at the jointly agreed time, in terms of 
the CBT notion of therapeutic collaboration.   They suggest the collaborative nature 
of CBT means therapists should relate to clients in an adult-to-adult way.  Thus 
therapists are open to ideas and give feedback on their relevance; precisely what Dr F 
did.   However, although these same authors caution that CBT groups should not 
mimic the principles of psychodynamic groups it is still worth noting Foulkes’ (1948) 
contention, that the activation of the collective unconscious is one of four key 
therapeutic processes in group work.   He suggests that learning to understand the 
needs of others in the group occurs when members realise their own wishes (Ellen’s 
wish to discuss herself) are not congruent with the wishes of the group (sticking to the 
topic on the agenda – verbalised by the leader).   Foulkes & Anthony (1957) use the 
phrase ego training in action to emphasise the learning component of group therapy.   
Insight, the understanding of self is allied with outsight, the understanding of others.   
They propose that an essential element of therapeutic change lies in an individual’s 
understanding of what they can do for others.   In a group setting, therefore, it can be 
argued that upholding a jointly agreed contract of maintaining the agenda is the 
simplest manifestation of what individuals can do for others. 
 
Challenging cognitions and offering interpretations – Content orientated 
interventions. 
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therapy when group leaders challenge cognitions in CBT settings or offer 
interpretations in a psychodynamic arena.   Both of these techniques require the client 
to confront an alternative perspective. Jointly, they might be regarded as interventions 
based on confrontation and as such need care in their application.   From a 
psychodynamic perspective Flores (1997, p. 340) warns that “Inappropriate 
confrontation may even strengthen the client’s resistance to change, thereby 
increasing the rigidity of defences”.   Similarly, when it is necessary for CBT 
therapists to point out contradictions in client’s cognitions such confrontations should 
be specific and indisputably true.   For example, Falkowski (1996) discusses a group 
member whose medical records demonstrated severe liver malfunction.   When the 
participant maintained they did not have an alcohol problem the group leader 
suggested that he “convince his liver of that fact”.   The leader’s reply created 
amusement in other group members and “the client immediately changed his attitude 
in the desired direction” (Falkowski, 1996, p.212).    
 
Singer et.al. (1975) suggests that the therapy contract in psychodynamic groups is the 
vehicle from which leaders derive their authority to confront group members by 
making interpretations.   Lemma (2003), however, notes that challenging the client’s 
perspective on a given issue is only one function of interpretation.   Interpretations, 
she suggests, can be experienced as unwanted intrusions that threaten to disrupt a 
fragile psychic equilibrium and, as a result, a risky strategy.   As a consequence, it 
seems likely that psychodynamic groups might experience a greater reduction in 
complementarity compared with CBT groups as leaders begin to exert their authority 
and confront clients with alternative perspectives in the middle stage of therapy.   The 
evidence, however, points in the opposite direction.   Tasca et. al. (2011) report that 
complementarity reduced by 7 per cent in the psychodynamic group compared with 
21 per cent in the CBT group.   A possible explanation for this contrary result might 
lay in differing leadership interventions that ameliorate the effects of confrontation. 
 
Foulkes and Anthony (1957) suggest that the holding or containing function of the 
psychodynamic group leader is at least as important as any interpretations given.   
Foulkes (1998) promotes mirroring as one of the four main therapeutic processes 
responsible for creating change.   In more psychodynamic orientated groups for 
alcohol misuse, for example, leaders use the knowledge that participants often are not 
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sure what they feel and have difficulty communicating their feelings to others.   
Group leaders, therefore, aid members to towards affect regulation by labelling and 
mirroring feelings as they arise; say, following interpretation.   In that way 
participants begin to recognise and own their emotions (US Department of Health, 
2005).   In contrast, the US Department of Health (2005) suggests that in CBT groups 
leaders are frequently tempted to become the expert in how to think, how to express 
that thinking behaviourally and how to solve problems.   In doing so CBT group 
leaders can ignore the emotional impact of confrontational interventions on clients.  
The net effect in such circumstances is to leave emotional disturbances unresolved.  
 
A more useful way to think about confrontation in CBT group settings is to point out 
inconsistencies such as disconnects between behaviour and stated goals rather.   Its 
purpose is to help clients see and accept reality so they can change accordingly 
(White & Miller, 2007).   The linguistic roots of the verb to confront, they explain, 
means to come face to face.   In this sense confrontation, they suggest, is a therapeutic 
goal rather than a counseling style: helping clients come face to face with their 
present situation, reflect on it and decide what to about it.  The confusion of 
confrontation as a therapeutic goal versus a harsh counseling method continues to 
create confusion by mixing together quite diverse treatment approaches (Polcin, 
2003).  
 
One exception to this approach is the use of paradoxical debate where the client plays 
the role of arguing for change while the therapist argues against.   “This is an activity 
that works especially well for highly resistant groups or those low on motivation for 
change” (Walters, Ogle & Martin, 2002).   Role play in therapeutic groups is 
discussed next. 
 
Role Play. 
Role play is often considered to be a key intervention that enables individuals to 
practice, receive feedback and develop skills (Miller & Rollnick, 2002).   In a CBT 
group role play can encompass a range of cognitive-behavioural interventions such as 
assertion training, behavioural rehearsal and exposure training.   The group provides 
members with the opportunity to take controlled risks then examine the outcome.   
Ellis (1977), however, has argued that role play is much more effective if it entails 
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cognitive restructuring of attitudes that contributed to the problem addressed.   In 
contrast, role play in psychodynamic therapy is typically designed to allow 
participants to bring into consciousness aspects of themselves of which they were not 
previously aware (Corsini, 1966).  
 
Edwards and Kannan (2002) describe the case of one participant, Vumile, a black 
African male, in a CBT group for social phobia.   Vumile was asked to role play 
approaching a girl (a volunteer) at a party while being video tapped.   Vumile’s 
activity conforms neatly with the goals of rehearsal and exposure.   In addition, 
Vumile was asked to predict how he would look and feel during the interaction.   The 
purpose of this request was an attempt at cognitive restructuring advocated by Ellis 
(1977) by testing the accuracy of Vumile’s predictions against the video tape 
evidence.  However, despite the evidence disputing Vumile’s predictions, Edwards 
and Kannan (2002) report that Vumile discounted it as invalid because his felt sense 
of the volunteer’s perception of him remained negative.    It is also evident that 
despite being a group therapy project, no other member was involved. So, it is 
questionable whether or not group therapy was, in fact, being harnessed.  
 
An interesting psychodynamic variation of role play might have addressed Vumile’s 
concerns differently.  “The protagonist stands back and watches a very live form of 
videotape play back” (Corey, 1990, p.)   Role play here is where an auxiliary ego, a 
member of the group, mirrors the postures, gestures and words of another individual 
within the group.   Through this method, it is suggested, clients develop a more 
accurate and objective self assessment.   The technique, it is contended, helps 
sensitive individuals to the reality of how others perceive them.   In doing so 
individual help clarify discrepancies between their self reports and what they 
communicate of themselves to others.   On the other hand, Corey (1990) cautions that 
this type of role play can be a powerful confrontation technique and ought to be used 
with discretion; empathy, it is maintained, should be the objective not ridicule.    
 
Discussion. 
Perhaps the most telling reflection, as a counselling psychologist, on this essay is the 
importance of the quality of the therapeutic relationship.   It is through this 
relationship that therapeutic change is perhaps best predicted.   In group settings, 
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however, the quality of individual relationships is necessarily diluted and the 
temptation is to fill the gap created with technique.   A measure of that gap is seen in 
the different scores of complementarity between the different interpersonal styles of 
the CBT and psychodynamic therapists investigated.   Working in CBT groups 
implies that as a counselling psychologist I should perhaps more explicitly prepare the 
relational groundwork prior to applying interventions at the beginning of therapy.   
Equally, paying greater attention to quality of the therapeutic relationship with 
participants rather than relying on technique and content to achieve the goals set 
should be both beneficial as well as more congruent with my professional identity. 
This implies also that making efforts to repair the alliance with participants at the first 
sign of rupture is an integral part of that monitoring process. 
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Process Report. 
Introduction. 
This process report examines how the interface between different cultural views of 
mental health requires a more a sensitively negotiated formulation and treatment plan 
than might otherwise be the case.   The challenge in this case has been to integrate 
this idea with the theoretical notion proposed by Fiske et al. (1998) that two culturally 
patterned social systems, independent and interdependent, represent the ‘psyches’ of 
Western and East Asian societies respectively.  These cultural level distinctions, I 
argue, can impact on the formulation and treatment of a South Asian Muslim asylum 
seeker who has been the victim of torture. 
 
Ahmed, the pseudonym given to the client, is a 39 year-old male of Sri Lankan origin 
who arrived in the UK in 2009 seeking asylum.   He was referred by his GP because 
of his low mood.   Ahmed’s referrer described him as suffering from depression and 
expected a course of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) to relieve this.   The service 
is community health centre and GP practice where I am a trainee counselling 
psychologist. 
 
I have chosen to examine this particular episode because it demonstrates how 
psychological knowledge together with and understanding of the development of the 
therapeutic relationship can enhance the outcome of therapy. 
 
 
Assessment. 
Ahmed said that he fled to the UK in 2009 from Sri Lanka following his detention by 
government officials who tortured him systematically over a four-day period and 
threatened the life of both him and his family.    Ahmed reported feelings of intense 
sadness at the separation from his wife and two children, now aged ten and six, who 
remain in Sri Lanka and became quite distressed during this explanation.    Ahmed 
also reported that his sleep was disturbed by nightmares concerning his torture.   Poor 
sleep, he said, resulted in lethargy and little energy the following day.   
Ahmed said that he suffered from intrusive memories of his torture that would induce 
intense feelings of fear and anxiety.   To reduce triggering such thoughts Ahmed said 
he avoided watching the news on television as well as violent programmes and films.   
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Despite his deep love for his family, Ahmed reported frequent angry outbursts at his 
wife when they communicated via Skype.  
 
Ahmed reported that he had continuous pain in his left leg that has resulted in 
paralysis on occasions.  He said that he suffers from frequent back and neck pain for 
which he had been referred to a specialist pain clinic that had not been able to help.  
Ahmed said that when he felt stressed he suffered from severe headache and 
gastrointestinal problems.   He also reported that he believed his penis was shrinking. 
Ahmed’s medical record showed that he had presented at the surgery on more than 90 
occasions during the preceding three years for the range of physical symptoms 
described above and that no organic cause could be identified.   Latterly, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Ahmed’s perception of lack of treatment progress coupled with his 
separation from family served to lower his mood and prompt a diagnosis of 
depression from his GP.     
 
Key cognitions noticed during the assessment were centred on mistrust of others.   As 
a result Ahmed said he had no close friends and distanced himself from co-workers.   
Ahmed said that he believed that his physical symptoms and his general predicament 
was the result of charm (spell) cast on him.   Ahmed also said that he believed he 
could not recover without the help of others. 
 
Ahmed did not report any suicidal ideation. 
 
Formulation. 
Fiske et al. (1998) have argued that values are tied to cultures.   In particular, values 
associated with mental health have been observed to differ across cultures 
(Summerfield, 2004).  For example, the view that depression can be socially 
disadvantageous and stigmatising leads to greater presentations of symptoms as 
somatic problems in South India (Raguram et al., 1996).   Taking this perspective 
could explain why Ahmed continually reported symptoms of pain rather than mental 
distress to his GP who was also of South Asian origin.   Only when the medical 
options were exhausted was Ahmed able to contemplate his psychological distress.   
However, the potential stigma might not be the only reason maintaining Ahmed’s 
symptoms of distress. 
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Despite several attempts to persuade The Home Office to grant his family permanent 
residence in the UK, Ahmed says all have failed.   As a result, Ahmed increasingly 
believes that perhaps the only way he will be reunited with his family will be by 
returning to Sri Lanka.   It seems, therefore, that by holding open the idea of retuning 
to Sri Lanka, Ahmed keeps alive the very reason why he fled originally.    It is 
feasible that Ahmed’s desire to be reunited triggers memories of torture thus 
maintaining his distressing symptoms and maladaptive coping strategies.    
 
It can be argued that Ahmed’s psychological problems are consistent with the DSM-
IV criteria for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).   If, however, return is a 
perceived as a real possibility then treatment models, based on distorted appraisals of 
risk and danger not being sufficiently processed (e.g. Ehlers & Clarke, 2000), appear 
to run counter to the reality that Ahmed experiences (Bowley, 2006).   Intervention, 
therefore, might be better served by adopting an adjustment approach that helps 
clients to understand their experiences and identify adaptive coping strategies 
(Moorey, 1996).   Adjustment in this sense can be regarded as a process of trying to 
gain mastery in circumstances that are perceived as unlikely to abate, which for 
Ahmed centre on separation from his family.    Successful adjustment is indicated by 
minimal disruption to life roles, effective regulation of emotional distress and the 
capacity to remain actively involved with social relationships.   In contrast, 
unsuccessful adjustment is indicated by disengagement, withdrawal and helplessness 
(Spencer, Carver & Price, 1998).  Ahmed’s lack of friends, distance from co-workers 
and his belief that progress could only take place with the help of others suggests, so 
far, a pattern of unsuccessful adjustment to his new circumstances. 
 
In seeking to apply a model of adjustment, however, it is important to be cognisant of 
the culturally bound nature of Ahmed’s beliefs and how these manifest in his 
symptomology.   Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed the notions of independent 
self and interdependent self.  They contend that people in individualistic (Western) 
cultures generally display an independent self whereas those in collectivist (Eastern) 
cultures have an interdependent self.  The independent self is an autonomous entity 
with clear boundaries between self and others whereas the interdependent self has 
diffuse boundaries between self and others.   In this context of oneness Patel & 
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Sumathipala (2006) argue that Cartesian dualism, which became a strong influence on 
Western biomedical concepts during the 20th century, lies in contrast to the fusion of 
mind-body concepts that underlie the greater prevalence of somatic presentations in 
Asian cultures.  Such an explanation is consistent with the lack of organic cause in 
relation to Ahmed’s physical complaints.  Indeed, it is argued that some somatic 
syndromes (for example Ahmed’s belief that his penis is shrinking – the dhat 
syndrome – associated with anxious and dysphoric mood states) are now only found 
in non-Western cultures Sumathipala, Siribaddana & Bhugra (2004).   
 
Therapy is designed to follow a two-stage model suggested by (Naeem, Phiri, Rathod 
& Kingdom, 2010).  During the first stage the therapeutic relationship is the focus of 
attention.   The first stage comprises elements of treatment delivered in a primary care 
setting in Sri Lanka to patients with somatic complaints (Sumathipala, Hewege & 
Hanwella, 2000).  These elements are: recapitulation of the problem, acknowledging 
symptoms, distress and disability are genuine, explaining the treatment strategy and 
explaining the nature of somatic complaints.   For example, the first element, 
recapitulation, is designed to reassure Ahmed that his distress has been appreciated as 
genuine and that the therapist can empathise with it.   Such approach, it is contended, 
helps establish rapport that leads to a “strategic alliance” and a shift from what 
Ahmed might have experienced during his years of medical consultations.  The 
second element, acknowledgement, demonstrates an understanding that any symptom, 
irrespective of its cause, can make clients worry.  In this way, it is argued, Ahmed’s 
beliefs are not threatened and his world view remains in tact. 
 
Transcript and Commentary. 
Overview of Therapy. 
The second stage of therapy, of which this session is a part, attempts address elements 
of treatment that include returning to normal activities, diary keeping and monitoring 
progress.   In this session coping strategies are addressed.   So far Ahmed has 
discussed his experience of the previous week and the outcome of a behavioural 
experiment designed to improve mood and link to his experience of pain.   
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Therapist 1.   And so do these thoughts Ahmed about your family…I saw a moment 
ago when you were talking about your son that your eyes got a little bit tearful. 
 
My intention at this moment was two fold.   Firstly, I was aware that validating the 
experience of minority group clients reduces the likelihood of dropping out of 
treatment (Hays & Iwamasa, 2006).   I also had in mind Morley’s (1996) observation 
that sadness and depression are entirely rational responses to objectively difficult 
circumstances so I should be wary of alienating Ahmed by diminishing his emotions 
as the result of over reaction or dysfunctional thinking.   I was keen to maintain, 
therefore, what I believed was a good therapeutic relationship by acknowledging the 
obvious distress that separation from his son had caused Ahmed.   Secondly, I wanted 
to begin exploring the meaning of separation and how Ahmed might begin the process 
of adjustment.  
Client 1.   I miss him very much. 
 
T2.   Yes, I can see. 
C2.   I promise myself I would never do this but this I can’t control.   This is life you 
know, this is life, what can I do? 
 
T3.   So when this image comes to your mind Ahmed you feel it very strongly. 
C3.   Yeah, very strongly.   Believe me you don’t know how much I miss my family.   
This is making me more weak.   I can’t tolerate.   Only thing I encourage myself and 
XXX.   Everyday but I am going just encouraging myself.   But I wish, I really wish 
everything is finished.   Sickness is always sickness.   See I’m having gastritis… 
 
T4.   Mmm. 
C4.   I really just got it two times and then I recover but I can’t it without tablet.  If I 
don’t take my tablets at night I can’t have a cup of coffee.   I will puke.   It’s burning 
and I have to go further on.  Everyday I’m taking tablets.  So life is like this, ok, no 
problem.  As long as this breath is there for this body, for this name.  I want to do 
something good.  I want to repair myself. 
 
Acknowledging Ahmed’s distress allows him to expand on how separation affects him.  
Importantly, Ahmed quickly begins to conceive of his distress in physical terms.   
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While the prevalence of somatic responses in Asian cultures has been well 
documented (e.g. Kirmayer, 1984) it is perhaps worth considering Ahmed’s 
description in the context of somatic symptoms as metaphors for experience 
(Kirmayer & Young, 1998).   From this perspective Ahmed’s complaints might 
represent not only the physical sensations in his gastro-intestinal tract but also the 
notion of ‘disagreeableness’.   In this sense it might be possible to interpret Ahmed’s 
reaction to mean that separation is something that can’t be digested, that is, coped 
with.  In a similar vein Lock (1993) has suggested that somatic symptoms can 
represent a form of protest or contestation of social conditions.  Compared with frank 
complaints, Kleinman (1986) argues, somatic symptoms are oblique so protect the 
powerless from counter attack that might follow from more direct criticism.   In 
Ahmed’s case it would be understandable that he appreciates his safety in the UK but 
is also upset by the UK authorities’ refusal to allow his family to join him.  Ahmed 
could easily find it difficult to voice his frustrations at me, an authority figure in a 
state run institution, so finds a more culturally acceptable form of expression. 
 
T5.   Mmm. 
C5.   Main benefit is for my family, bring them up.  Make myself ok do something. 
 
T6.   So Ahmed, if the main medicine for you is your family… [Ahmed holds up his 
hand]. 
C6.   I’m one hundred per cent ready just to go right now with the flight.  Get down 
there. 
 
T7.   Ok. 
C7.   I will do that.  I know myself, I’m doing the most miserable thing, which if I 
were destroying myself. 
 
T8.   Yes. 
C8.   The person who is funding for the family is gone but what will happen to my 
family?   They will be depending on my mother and their mother.   Everyday they 
will be shamed, why should I do this?   This is the only thing that is stopping me, why 
should I do this?  Friends are there only when you have money.   You’ve got no 
money.   Who are you?  Oh I’m busy.   This is life. 
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At C6 Ahmed states his willingness to return to Sri Lanka, which he has spoken about 
in previous sessions.  This willingness to return, as mentioned in the formulation, 
keeps alive the fears that initiated his problems.  So, if as Bessel van der Kolk (1994) 
puts it “the body keeps the score in trauma”.  It is perhaps unsurprising that Ahmed’s 
gastritis and range of other physical complaints, mentioned elsewhere in the session, 
become evident.   Also significant is Ahmed’s identification of the shame of not being 
able to support his family as a reason with sufficient power to overcome his desire for 
reunification.   Although shame is an emotion frequently mentioned by those who 
have suffered traumatic experiences (Wills, 2006), some theorists have proposed that 
this emotion can represent East-West cultural differences.   Shame orientated Eastern 
cultures, it is argued, rely on external sanctions for good behaviour whereas guilt 
orientated Western cultures rely on internalised notions of sin (You, 1997).   The 
perspective of the interdependent-self might, therefore, account for the weight Ahmed 
places on the prospect of the opprobrium of others, thus leading him to control his 
personal desires. 
 
T9.   So Ahmed, if your family are a part of your recovery, an intimate part of your 
recovery.   And I know that you are separated by distance and geography at the 
moment, but is there a connection between you and your family that still aids your 
recovery do you think? 
 
Having acknowledged the importance of Ahmed’s family my intention was to identify 
aspects of his current relationship that still held positive meaning despite the distance 
between Ahmed and his family and then build on that idea for therapeutic effect.  This 
intervention, I believed, was congruent with the adjustment approach (Morley, 1996) 
to Ahmed’s problems identified in the formulation.    
 
C9.   No.   What I mean by recovery in the sense, at least, the way I’m trusting you.    
 
T10.   Yes. 
C10.   But my, I mean some things which I can’t talk to my wife.   At least I’ve got 
somebody to look after me.  
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T11.   Mmm. 
C11.   At the moment I’ve got nobody.   If I pay I can get somebody but that’s not 
total commitment, that is for what you get paid. 
 
T12.   Mmm. 
C12.   That service. 
 
T13.   Yeah. 
C13.   But when you have somebody who you love next to you.   I suppose one 
hundred per cent there’ll be problems, issues will come.   But with this way I’m going 
on I think that is nothing. 
 
Ahmed’s response left me feeling disappointed.  I had hoped for a simple answer to 
my question and thereby progress to my objective.   On reflection I can see that I was 
on the border of what Sanders and Wills (2005) describe as being ‘hooked’ into an 
interaction with Ahmed where the therapist gets sucked into dysfunctional cognitive-
interpersonal cycle (Safran & Muran, 2003).   I constructed a question (at T14 below) 
that was partly related to Ahmed’s previous statements and partly providing an 
answer to relieve my frustration.   A better approach might have been to repeat in 
simple terms the request for positive aspects of his current family relationship.   
 
T14.   Let me ask you Ahmed, do you still love your wife? 
C14.   No doubt.   If I did not I’ll be bearing towards this day. 
 
T15.   I can understand that, and do you believe your wife still loves you? 
C15.   No doubt. 
T16.   Ok.   So this love between you and your wife exists and you have no doubt 
about it.  But the.  And so if you had that love between yourselves when you were in 
Sri Lanka – if you went from the house to the city, to Colombo, what sort of distance 
is that? 
C16.   From city to Colombo?  My wife is there, I’m here in Colombo? 
 
T17.  No, say, say. 
C17   Both of us together you mean. 
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T18.   Say you went from your house in Sri Lanka and your wife stayed in the house 
what kind of distance would that be? 
C18.   That’s about three and half hour distance. 
 
T19.   Ok about three and a half hours.   Ok, and your wife still loves you and you still 
love her.  How would you feel?   Would you feel ok or would you feel sad and 
depressed because you were in Colombo? 
 
Despite the difficulties I believed that I had at last framed a question that would elicit 
how Ahmed felt when separated from his wife that would quickly provide a spring 
board to identify previously successful coping strategies. 
 
C19.   Ah, when we got married, yeah. 
 
T20.   Yeah. 
C20.   Er and when she was pregnant.   My father in law is a well influential person 
with hospital, lawyers, doctors.   So he said I want, I want my daughter to be in my 
area.  Where he can look after.   So I thought ok that’s good but my father did not 
like.   She also prefer together.   And if I be adamant one day she, she got a chance to 
tell me both my parents was ready but you was only so adamant you.   I did not want 
to make her a slave. 
I said mum dad see this hesitation.   They also, their only daughter no?   You also 
have a daughter how do you feel?   But it’s not good son you here and she’s there.   
For little time no?   I went and talked to her in my family house.   I was in Colombo.   
Everyday she takes the phone, she says listen I have to go.   I will look after you.   
You said you want a family also.   All together is not possible but I’ll come and see 
you, at the weekend.   I left her.   She pinpoints and always tells me about this.   So 
you left me I my mother’s house and you’re staying with your parents.   Well I gave 
her option.   If I keep you you’re going to say this to me; end of the day you will bind 
with your parents and blame it on me.   Now your parents are happy and I have made 
my parents to understand.   They are not objecting.   Only thing we’re apart, but I’m 
still coming.   And suddenly, suddenly when I go she will never let me to go and talk 
to anybody.   I have to give it her because she missed me that day. 
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T21.    Yes. 
C21.   You can’t take that entire gap.   I have to share with everybody.   Even though 
you were apart. 
 
As Ahmed spoke my attention was drawn to his interweaving of family members into 
his reply.  His narrative, I noted, fitted my perception of the interdependent self 
outlined in the formulation.   However, as I reflect again on the passage I also 
recognise my growing frustration with how little I understood of what Ahmed was 
attempting to communicate.   The impact of this frustration was to fall back on 
previous ways of thinking (wondering about Ahmed’s mentalisation) to relieve my 
own tensions.   Relating psychological skills to intercultural adjustment, Matsumo, 
Hirayama & Le Roux (2005) argue that if negative emotional reactions overwhelm 
individuals they cannot engage in critical thinking about those skills nor the 
differences between cultures.   Instead, they contend, individuals regress to pre-
existing modes of thought rather than create rival hypotheses outside of previous 
social experience.   For them, emotion regulation is the gatekeeper to dealing with 
cultural difference, “because, if we cannot put inevitable negative emotions in check, 
it is impossible to engage in what is clearly higher order thinking about cultural 
difference” (Matsumo et al., 2005, p.387).   This analysis implies that I should have 
paid greater attention to my own emotional process and questioned its meaning 
during this interaction rather than creating a question designed to bring Ahmed into 
my frame of reference. 
    
T22.   [Talking over]  But did you both cope with the separation? 
C22.   I told you we had some bombs, but we coped on. 
 
T23.   Mmm. 
C23.   We had some bombs,  we coped on. 
 
T24.   So what I was trying to get at Ahmed… 
C24.   [Interrupting] When there is too much love. 
 
T25.   Yes. 
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C25.   There is pain. 
 
T26.   Ok. 
C26.   When there’s less love there’s too much doubt. 
 
T27.   Mmm. 
C27.   When there’s no love you lose a lot.   Either she’s for something, I for 
something. 
 
T28.   Mmm. 
C28.   But the matter in us there’s too much love. 
 
Listening to Ahmed’s response I can see that our frames of reference were different 
and that the intention behind my interventions was being interpreted quite differently.   
In particular the use of Socratic dialogue did not seem to elicit the kind of response 
given by European clients.   Naeem, Phiri, Rathod & Kingdom (2010) make the point 
that South Asian Muslim clients often expect the therapist to be a ‘master’ or 
‘teacher’ who will advise rather than use long Socratic dialogue to help them achieve 
insights.   Indeed, Socratic dialogue, they argue, can make clients feel uncomfortable 
as they interpret such a technique as criticism of their thinking.   My own response 
was to notice the sadness in that seemed to come across Ahmed’s demeanour as he 
gave his philosophical reply.   His body language suggested someone who felt 
dejected.   Wanting to acknowledge this change in mood I pursued that observation. 
 
T29.   But when that…when you were separated physically in Sri Lanka did the pain, 
I know you had some upsets there, but was it anything like the upset the upset and 
distress you feel here? 
C29.   This is totally different.   That was nothing. 
 
T30.   Mmm. 
C30.   Everyday both of us like dying.   But only thing I wind her up, I encourage her 
up.   I’m calling everyday because she has to ready to look after the children.   I have 
to encourage her and give her strength.  Listen to me.. 
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T31.   Mmm. 
C31.   You know the situation, this is.   I’m not just sleeping I’m trying to do my 
maximum level, this.  But when you come here it’s a different life for you.   There 
you’re like a queen, when you come here you have to do each and every thing.   I’m 
ready for it. 
But don’t hurt your parents because they’re old.   When you come to elderly age 
every small thing … when they are shouting that means they are trying to protect you. 
 
T32.   Mmm. 
C32.   Respect it.   But once you’ve come here even their headache or their fever you 
can’t go to see them so balance your time, appreciate what you have at the moment.   
Once you come here it’s a different total world. 
 
T33.   Mmm. 
C33.   There’s nobody to cook for you everything is us.  So I made every thing 
understanding.    I wonder…ok.    She’s very capable. 
 
T34.   Mmm. 
C34.   She’s very capable. 
 
On hearing Ahmed’s reply again I recognise that my response was driven by the 
continuing gulf between us.   It appeared to me that much of Ahmed’s response was 
irrelevant; I had not considered the possibility, however, that much of my intervention 
was irrelevant to him.   Reflecting on this mismatch now, a better way forward might 
have been aided by greater cognisance of my own internal processes (frustration and 
confusion) as a springboard for questioning the validity of my intervention.    Patel 
and Sumathipala (2006) argue that a key element of intercultural psychological 
treatment relies on an appreciation of the client’s explanatory model, which can offer 
an alternative approach for understanding their distress.   Clues for revealing the 
client’s model, they suggest, include: client assumptions, beliefs, thoughts about their 
problems and causes, associated fears, impact of their symptoms and expectations of 
treatment.   While this ground had been covered in earlier session the opportunity 
was lost to revisit it and address specifically what Ahmed expected of therapy and me 
as therapist.   A better approach might have been to express my confusion and ask 
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Ahmed if he held any similar feelings.  In doing so, holding open the possibility of a 
constructive dialogue about the differences that appeared to be present.   
T35.   So the… pain you feel here, of separation, is much greater than you felt… 
C35.   At that time. 
 
T36.   At that time.   But you were still three hours apart. 
C36.   Three hours apart.   For how many days did she give birth.  After she gave birth 
I took leave for about a week. 
 
T37.   Mmm. 
C37.   I was with her then my daughter was born sick.   Doctor, what they said there.   
Colour’s changing.  They put her in incubator,  things like that, oh. 
 
T38.   Mmm.  How did you cope Ahmed when you were apart in Sri Lanka?   How 
did you cope with the separation?     
C38.   I made myself busy as possible. 
 
When Ahmed said this I felt some degree of relief that we had got to a coping strategy 
that he had identified.   However, as I soon realised that relief was based on my 
interpretation of what this statement would mean to Ahmed.   In fact, his reply was 
more like a crossing of paths rather than a confluence of ideas. 
 
Remainder of session. 
 
The session continues to elicit Ahmed’s thoughts about possible positive coping 
strategies.   At the end of the session Ahmed reports a positive shift in mood. 
 
  
 
 
Evaluation. 
Naeem et al. (2010) make the point that South Asian Muslim clients frequently seek 
additional sources of help (spiritual, religious etc.) that can create competing 
therapeutic frameworks.   Without a strong therapeutic alliance, they argue, such 
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clients are likely to disengage from treatment.   The emphasis, therefore, on listening 
to clients and validating their subjective experience as a necessary condition to 
treatment cannot be overstated.   Indeed, for some, raising psychological factors at 
this stage should be avoided (Patel & Sumathipala, 2006).   It can, perhaps, be argued 
that this initial stage represents the first step towards adjustment for Ahmed as he 
learns to accept a novel individual, in terms of both culture and situation, into his life 
routine.   Indeed, Price (2000) noted that assessment for psychological therapy, for 
those presenting with somatoform disorders, might of itself have therapeutic effects.   
In the round, therefore, Ahmed’s attendance at every session over a six month period 
coupled with no GP appointments might indicate a degree of success with this 
approach.   From a cultural context, such an approach to adjustment serves to 
minimise threats to Ahmed’s world view enabling him to engage in therapy from a 
secure and equal base. 
 
Moving on from this initial stage, however, the process of adjustment, particularly 
with regards to emotion regulation, is less certain.   On the one hand, increasing 
evidence has shown acknowledgement and appropriate expression of emotion can 
promote adjustment (e.g. Austenfield & Stanton, 2004).   On the other, in Asian 
cultures, expressive emotion regulation styles have been shown to be disadvantageous 
for psychological well being (Nagata & Shimizu, 2004).   This implies an individual’s 
style of emotion regulation compared with their culturally sanctioned style can 
determine whether such behaviour is adaptive or maladaptive.    It is feasible that in 
this session my interpretation of Ahmed’s responses to questions about coping with 
sadness as irrelevant or tangential could have represented a culturally congruent non-
expressive style of emotional coping.   In other words, when asked, Ahmed 
demonstrated his coping response.   The validity of this analysis, however, was not 
pursed in the session because of my failure to engage Ahmed in a dialogue about his 
expectations of the process of therapy and my part in it.   As mentioned in the 
commentary, I didn’t pause to reflect on the meaning of my frustration and confusion 
that, in retrospect, seem to be valid indicators of cross cultural discrepancies.   The 
impact of this lack of dialogue was that probably both client and therapist didn’t know 
how, if at all, therapy was proceeding at that moment.   For me, as the therapist, this 
implies that my understanding of treatment, its effects and possible interventions were 
not grounded in Ahmed’s needs.   During supervision it was advised that I enter the 
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client’s world to reduce the difference between us.   It is, however, more apparent 
now that greater consideration is given as to how that objective is achieved.   In that 
regard Matsumoto et al. (2005) advise that in addition to “openness and flexibility to 
call to mind and to consider alternatives that might have been inappropriate in 
previous social experience.  A further necessity in adjusting to a new culture must be 
the monitoring of the behaviours and reactions of one’s self” seems pertinent.  The 
object lesson in Ahmed’s case, therefore, is that if adjustment is to be helpful as a 
therapeutic intervention the therapist is the subject of adjustment also.  
 
Word count: 3289. 
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Reflexive Essay. 
Learning and the Therapist 
 
Introduction. 
In writing this essay I have attempted to trace my development as a therapist in a 
chronological manner that elicits how it has fashioned my emerging philosophy of 
practice.   For the most part my practice has centred on clients’ struggles with drug 
and alcohol dependency, and their attendant problems.   Consequently, the clients I 
have chosen to illustrate my development reflect this fact.   More importantly, it was 
these clients who invariably represented key points of insight along the way.  The 
essay begins with an examination of my motives to become a therapist in the 
cognitive tradition.  It moves on to describe my early experiences of therapy then 
explores how I incorporated new perspectives into my practice.   Finally, the essay 
attempts to draw together these experiences as an emerging philosophy of practice. 
 
Motivation. 
I would like to set the ground of some early experiences and their influence on my 
decision to pursue psychology.   During my 40s, following the take over of the 
financial institution for which I worked, I found myself in an environment where the 
the business model of the new organisation was of questionable ethics.   The internal 
tension created by the clash between personal and corporate ethics became irresistible 
and I resigned in search of something more worthwhile.   I concede that my high-
minded principles were bolstered by the fact that, financially, I didn’t need to earn a 
living any more.  I began working as a volunteer at a charity for the homeless, 
assessing clients and helping them find accommodation.  One client, however, 
transformed the situation from worthwhile to something more personal.   David (a 
pseudonym) presented for assessment; he was crying, hallucinating and vomiting as 
he withdrew from heroin.   Generally, David would have been asked to leave, instead 
I cleaned up, asked if he would like some tea and just sat with him.  We chatted about 
his hallucinations.   After an hour or so David’s hallucinations abated, his demeanour 
was calmer and his withdrawal symptoms less acute.  We agreed to go to A& E at the 
local hospital and as walked over together I apologised for not finding any 
accommodation.   He cried as he thanked me for the relief he now felt.   That evening 
as I reflected on the fact that I hadn’t found David some accommodation but suddenly 
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felt, in an intense way, I had really helped someone.   My response was twofold.   
Firstly, I became less procedural with clients and spent more time simply listening.   
Secondly, I needed to understand what had happened between David and me.   I 
recognise that as a person that I am attracted to things in the abstract, a detached 
curiosity, (perhaps why I am resubmitting) and enrolled, part time, on a psychology 
course at the Institute of Education (IOE) in the belief that I might learn something 
about human behaviour.   I learned I didn’t know much about human behaviour. 
 
My work with the homeless continued and involved working with those with mental 
health and substance misuse problems.  During that time I began to see my self 
differently, less judgemental, less materialistic more empathetic towards clients and 
the causes of their plight.   Indeed, in reviewing trainee psychotherapist’s motivations 
Rizq (2009) concludes that these are often accompanied by the desire for some kind 
of self-transformation.   However, I was concerned that I lacked any formal training 
in therapy and that I would be more effective if I trained professionally.     
 
My proficiency as a practitioner, I believed, would be best served by building on the 
psychology studied at IOE.    Miller (2003) cites the likes of Piaget, Bruner and 
Bartlett among those at the forefront of what he, and others, describe as the cognitive 
revolution in psychology.   These figures, along with other notable cognitive 
psychologists such as Vygotsky, feature as central theorists in IOE psychology 
courses (IOE, 2008).   My contention, therefore, is that the IOE is firmly rooted in the 
cognitive tradition and, in turn, shaped my view of how psychology proceeds.   As a 
consequence, I recognise that my desire to become a practitioner was predicated on 
assumptions that my use of psychology would be congruent with the cognitive 
paradigm from which I emerged.   The advantage of this view, as I saw it then, was 
that cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) would mesh readily with the formidable 
body of experimental and theoretical work that supported the cognitive approach.     
 
First Encounters. 
My early experience of practice mirrored the first phase of development for new 
professionals.   It is suggested that trainees in this phase rely on external authority 
figures for both theoretical and experiential learning (Auxier et.al., 2003; Brott & 
Myers, 1999).   In my case (at a NHS drug and alcohol service) Marlatt & Gordon 
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(1985) provided a cognitive theoretical framework, Beck, Wright, Newman and Lise 
(1993) a CBT treatment protocol, finally supervision from a clinical psychologist 
strongly allied with a cognitive therapeutic stance.   Combined, these elements 
provided a smooth transition from theory to practice. They also reinforced my 
assumptions about the benefits of utilising the cognitive paradigm within clinical 
practice. 
 
However, as my experience grew, particularly with alcohol dependent clients, I began 
to question if CBT alone could best address the problems of this group.   For example, 
a number of my clients expressed positive views about Alcoholic Anonymous (AA).   
Indeed, a number of studies have demonstrated superior rates of recovery when 
traditional CBT is combined with active participation in AA and, for some 
individuals, the AA programme alone has been sufficient to bring about abstinence 
(e.g. Oulmette, Finney & Moos, 1997).   The point here is not that additional 
resources might have aided recovery rates but that the AA programme is predicated 
on spiritual beliefs, not any psychological theory.  The evidence pointed to the fact 
that two wholly different theoretical paradigms could produce the same results and 
what’s more, when combined, results that were superior to either individually.   
Reflecting on this observation I can see that I had encountered, in a practical way, the 
debate about common factors and pluralism within therapeutic practice (Wampold, 
2001). 
 
I also noticed that in my desire to become more professional than the amateur I 
believed I was at the homeless charity that I tended to follow a fairly rigid CBT 
protocol with clients.  My so called professionalism, however, seemed to rebound 
clients’ homework wasn’t completed, behavioural experiments abandoned, goals 
changed and DNAs increased.   The client progress I had experienced previously as 
an amateur appeared to evaporate as a professional.   I needed to adapt.    
 
Clients had been sufficiently motivated to come to therapy in the first place but then 
disappointed by it.  Clearly, their expectations of how therapy proceeds was a key 
factor and, when asked, more often than not simply meant doing what they believed 
worked for them not what a text book treatment plan had devised.  One approach for 
clients who regarded self help models as their primary route to recovery was utilising 
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the approach of an American organisation, SMART Recovery (SMART Recovery, 
2013).   SMART is a self-help organisation that offers an alternative four point 
programme to AA’s 12 step facilitation and eschews any notion of spirituality.   By 
reorganising my work using SMART’s four point programme (motivation, coping 
with cravings, managing thoughts feelings behaviour, living a balanced life) I was 
able to support clients by recognising their needs and preferences while still 
incorporating CBT principles.   For example, following assessment I would ask 
clients about their likes and dislikes generally.   Most would find this engaging and 
would suggest topics that provided the basis for a motivating agenda.  For example, 
many clients would list music among things they enjoy which allowed me to 
introduce the Rolling Stones track Angie.  Angie is code for Keith Richards’ love 
affair with heroin, his desire and craving – information from Richards’ autobiography 
often new and interesting to clients.   Listening to the track or reading the lyrics 
provides an opportunity to ask how clients feel, what goes through their mind and 
how they cope; three of the four SMART steps.   Feeling motivated, clients would 
often lead their own SMART/AA group with an identical session.  The impact was 
that homework was completed, DNAs reduced and clients actively created sessions.  
Once motivated, new perspectives, new learning appeared to be of real benefit to 
clients.  
 
As a result I began to feel more confident but, as a novice, still paid close attention to 
the limits of my ability.   In one such case Jane, a pseudonym, displayed extreme 
mood swings both in and out of session.    Of particular concern were Jane’s active 
self-harming and suicide attempts, which had resulted in a number of recent hospital 
admissions.   After three assessment sessions with Jane it was apparent that her high-
risk behaviours ought to be the focus of care.   I referred Jane to the Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT) with a view to her being accepted into its Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy (DBT) programme as it offered 24 hour telephone support and, in 
the initial stages, a structured day programme.   
 
   
Puzzles and Contradictions. 
Numerous studies over many years have consistently shown that up to 50 per cent of 
post treatment alcohol dependent individuals relapse (e.g. Neto, Lambaz & Tavares, 
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2007).   Despite this knowledge, when working with such clients on relapse 
prevention, I noticed a greater than expected degree of personal anxiety in sessions.   I 
was not only concerned but also puzzled why so many clients who had suffered so 
much and struggled so hard to achieve abstinence then behaved in this goal 
incongruent way.   It seemed to me that the dominant CBT theory of Marlatt & 
Gordon (1985) failed to explain adequately the self-defeating nature of such 
behaviour.  Reflecting on my anxiety, I recognised that it was in large part due to my 
sense of confusion when attempting to understand the clients’ world, as they 
perceived it. 
 
At this stage of my training I was able to draw on the psychodynamic concept of 
projective identification.   Using this notion opened the possibility that the anxiety 
and confusion I experienced, in fact, represented latent feelings within clients that had 
been split off as a means of self-protection.   If this was the case, what was provoking 
such confusion and anxiety within clients?   Discussing these ideas of confusion, 
anxiety and self-defeating behaviour in supervision I was pointed towards Kelly’s 
Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955). 
 
Kelly proposed that humans act as scientists in an attempt to make sense of the world.   
The sense making media are personal constructs (bipolar discriminations) acquired 
developmentally from infancy onwards and which allow individuals to anticipate 
events by engaging in experiments (i.e. their behaviour with others) (Bannister & 
Fransella, 1971).   Although Kelly believed there to be a reality individuals did not 
have direct access to it.   Kelly maintained that one individual’s interpretation of their 
world is as valid as any other.   Importantly, Kelly (1955) proposed that individuals 
choose alternatives from their construct poles that are more meaningful and coherent 
within their construct system, so protecting their identity from invalidation.   What 
this means is that individuals tend to act in idiosyncratic ways to make their world 
more predictable and less confusing, even if it runs counter to what others might 
believe is in their best interests.   From this Kellian perspective I was better able to 
account for abstinent clients’ confusion and anxiety, and their apparent self-defeating 
behaviour.   With this new perspective I better understood a comment from one client, 
who had been alcohol dependent for more than 20 years and was suffering from life 
threatening alcohol related pancreatitis, that seemed to sum up this experience; he said 
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“The problem is that now I’m sober I just don’t get it, everything feels alien, it’s just 
not me”.   He relapsed. 
 
I began to think at this stage that some clients were so wedded to a construction of the 
world that their freedom of action was constrained.   Somehow, I believed these 
clients needed to learn that they could construct alternatives.   In the back of my mind 
in remembered an early experiment in the study of cognitive dissonance where 
participants’ attitudes changed as a result of being required to act out certain roles 
(Brehm & Cohen 1962).    I began, therefore, to incorporate role play into my work in 
the expectation that it would facilitate new learning.   In truth I am unable to say if 
this technique loosened clients’ constructs of the world, however, on a number of 
occasions clients did report more tolerant attitudes and behaviour in what otherwise 
might have volatile circumstances.   I was beginning to form the view that learning 
was an important element in my practice of therapy.   Perhaps, from a psychodynamic 
perspective, this notion might be regarded as insight.    
 
Incorporating New Perspectives. 
I was able to incorporate Kelly’s ideas into my practice as a way of making sense of 
apparently contradictory behaviour.   I also made greater use of clients’ early 
childhood experience in creating a formulation than perhaps I had done previously.    
More recently, Kelly’s influence on Ryle’s development of Cognitive Analytic 
Therapy (CAT)(Ryle & Kerr, 2002) has opened up a new area of interest and 
connections in my practice.   Ryle intentionally drew on Kelly’s theory and notion of 
the individual as scientist actively construing the world.   Indeed it has been noted that 
this idea chimes well with CBT’s use of behavioural experiments (Marzillier & 
Butler, 1995).   As a consequence I have been able to conceptualise such interventions 
in practice from an additional perspective thereby giving a richer meaning to client 
reports of their results.    With one client, for example, who suffered from severe 
social anxiety a simple exercise compared his cognitions about how he believed he 
was perceived by other patients in the health centre waiting room of my placement 
with recordings I made of their actual reactions.  There was a significant disparity 
between the client’s negative view and his almost total invisibility noted in the 
recorded reactions.   Later in the session, however, I asked the client to imagine that 
the waiting room was a theatre populated by actors and to ascribe roles to the 
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individuals.   I then asked him what role he took, weakling, he replied.   This 
additional perspective enabled the most fluid conversation we had had so far 
discussing the believability of his ‘performance’, how he would know and what he 
had learned of his role.  
 
 Marzillier and Butler (1995) also note similarities between CAT and schema focused 
CBT (e.g. Young et. al. 2003).  In fact they find few differences between these two 
models other than ones of emphasis.   On the other hand, given the analytic influence 
on CAT, this cognitivist endorsement of CAT seems a little biased.   Indeed, Ryle 
(1998) has indicated that CAT is different from CBT in that the former lays greater 
emphasises on social interaction as the major component of therapeutic interest.   In 
taking on Kelly’s ideas it seems that Ryle, and by implication CAT, places greater 
weight on how personal constructs interact with the world rather than on their intra-
psychic qualities.  Allison & Denman (2001) suggest that social interaction in CAT is 
represented by the notion of reciprocal roles as a unit of procedural knowledge that 
enables individuals to ‘do’ a certain kind of relationship, and know what to anticipate 
from it.  
 
Ryle (1994) suggests that reciprocal roles are internalised templates of our early 
experience of the social world.   They consist of a role for the self, a role for the other 
and a paradigm for their relationship.  More often than not reciprocal roles are shared 
templates so when an individual adopts one pole the person to whom they are relating 
feels the need to take up the congruent pole.   In normal social situations, Ryle 
suggests, this reciprocation is generally appropriate and unnoticed.   In a therapeutic 
setting, however, there are fewer environmental cues to guide choices and if the 
client’s reciprocal roles are characteristically dysfunctional the therapist can feel a 
strong pressure to reciprocate.   Ryle argues that although this phenomenon has been 
recognised as counter-transference and projective identification in psychodynamic 
theory these concepts are unduly opaque.   In contrast, he argues, the notion of 
reciprocal roles is a less mystifying and more transparent explanation of the process 
issues involved.    Importantly, for me as a cognitive therapist, the CAT notion of 
reciprocal roles offers the opportunity for me to integrate psychodynamic concepts 
into my practice rather than simply them to run in parallel.     
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A Learning Process. 
In drawing together my experiences and influences from studying the psychology of 
education at IOE through my initial experiences with clients explaining the CBT hot 
cross bun to my introduction to Vygotsky’s influence on CAT, it seems to me that I 
conceive and value therapy as a learning process.    CBT acknowledges the role of 
psychoeducation particularly in the early stages of treatment when we are exhorted to 
socialise clients to the model  (Sanders & Wills, 2005).   Giving clients a rationale for 
understanding their problems and consequently the treatment offered is considered to 
enhance the likelihood of a positive outcome (Wells, 2009).   However, I think it is 
important to conceive of therapy it’s self as a process of learning.   To some extent 
this notion is recognised by Westbrook, Kennerley and Kirk (2011) when they call on 
the adult learning theory models of Lewin (1946) and Kolb (1984) to aid therapeutic 
change.   These models emphasise the value of a cycle reflection for clients, 
especially when helping them to “become their own therapists” (Westbrook et.al. 
1984, p121).  Indeed, this idea resonates with me when I think of my own experiences 
supporting clients who valued AA’s model of self-help.  Similarly, Young conceives 
learning as a central plank of schema therapy.   “We assign Reinventing Your Life 
…to patients to help them learn about their schemas” (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 
2003, p 76).   The work of Vygoysky has been important in the development of CAT 
(Ryle & Kerr, 2002).   Vygotsky proposed the notion of scaffolding, a process by the 
teacher provides just sufficient support to enable the student to do what they are not 
yet able to do by themselves.   Scaffolding proceeds by the provision of theoretical 
knowledge, which the client assimilates.   In CAT the shared tools for self-reflection 
that both client and therapist create represent the process of scaffolding. 
 
However, here lie the seeds of problems, perhaps, especially from a counselling 
psychology perspective.   The notion of therapy as a learning process, as CAT’s use 
of scaffolding might imply, can reduce the therapeutic relationship to one of teacher 
and student together with the power imbalances that can accompany such 
relationships.   Therapy is inevitably characterised by differences in expertise and 
authority  (Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009).   These authors argue that 
psychotherapists are by definition members of a professional class and as such often 
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unreflectively incorporate values and norms representative of one cultural milieu.   
This leads them to assume that ideas about certain experiences, emotions, behaviour 
and relationships are sanctioned according to their world view.   Such a notion has led 
some to call the therapy session the power hour (Green, 1995).   Therapists who are 
sensitive to such power distortions have sought ways to share power with clients as a 
means to check the unwitting control of one over another (e.g. Guilfoyle, 2003).   I 
believe my training via counselling psychology has heightened my awareness of these 
pitfalls.   Equally, I contend that education of the client has a role to play in 
counteracting the forces of power by adopting the position of clients as informed 
consumers, rather than “patients who submit to the doctor’s orders” (Marecek & 
Hare-Mustin, 2009, p87). 
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